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Abstract
We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of
screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either
to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the
principal chooses to continue. The agent’s type is his private information, and his
actions are imperfectly observed. Players’ flow payoffs depend on the agent’s action,
and players’ lump-sum payoffs when the game stops depends on the agent’s type.
Both players are long-lived and share a common discount factor. We study the limit
of the equilibrium outcomes as both players get arbitrarily patient. Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors converge to the unique Nash equilibrium payoff vector of an auxiliary,
two-stage game with observed mixed actions. The principal learns some but not
all information about the agent’s type. Any payoff-relevant information revelation
takes place at the beginning of the game. We calculate the probability that the
principal eventually stops the game, against each type of the agent.
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1. Introduction
We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screen-
ing in a principal-agent problem. The principal (player 2, or “she”), at each period, can
either take an irreversible action that ends the dynamic game or wait for at least another
period. The agent (player 1, or “he”) takes one of a finite number of actions in any period
in which the game has not yet ended. The agent is either a commitment type, who is
committed to playing a fixed mixed action at every period of the game or a normal type,
who maximizes his expected discounted payoff. The principal’s payoff from stopping the
game depends on the agent’s type. Therefore, she may choose to delay ending the game
if she expects that different types of the agent will play different strategies, which would
lead to the revelation of information about the agent’s type. She may also choose to not
end the game because ending the game may be costly given her beliefs about the agent’s
type. Both players are long-lived and discount the future using a common discount factor.
Moreover, the agent’s actions are possibly observed with noise. We ask three main ques-
tions: How much does the principal learn about the agent’s type? How much does the
principal benefit from waiting? How fast does the agent reveal any private information?
We consider two types of situations. In the first scenario, which we call screening game,
the agent prefers that the irreversible action be taken, while the principal prefers not to
take the irreversible action against the normal type of the agent. A prominent example of
such situations is that of a relationship between a firm and a worker in a nonflexible labor
market. The firm hires the worker using short-term contracts and prefers to offer a long-
term contract only if the worker is highly skilled. A low-skilled worker can exert extra
effort to imitate a high-skilled worker, and the firm suffers a loss if it offers the long-term
contract to a low–skilled worker. This may be because ending a long-term contract is
very costly, or simply because it is not an option. Similarly, a firm that subcontracts with
a supplier may want to take over the supplier if the latter owns an advanced-technology
product line but may prefer subcontracting otherwise. As a result, the subcontractor may
undertake costly activities to generate outputs that are similar to that coming from an
advanced-technology product line.1
In the second scenario, which we call contracting game, the agent prefers that the
irreversible action is not taken and the principal prefers to take the irreversible action
1Examples of screening with irreversible actions are, internships and the decision to hire, dating and
the decision to marry, academic tenure-track position and the decision to promote and venture-capital
financing. In some of these examples the principal may have limited commitment power. The case of
promotion to tenure also comes with the option of firing/rescheduling, and we discuss such a scenario in
Subsection 10.1.
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against the normal type of the agent. Consider a firm that offers an incentive contract
to a worker who may have high or low productivity. If the firm learns that the worker’s
productivity is high, it would be tempted to change the terms of the contract and reduce
the worker’s surplus. Therefore, a high-productivity worker has incentives to mimic low
productivity workers, even if by doing so he forgoes some surplus. Such situations have
been extensively studied in the ratchet effect literature.
The class of games we study resemble an experimentation problem. The principal’s
payoff from stopping the game depends on her opponent’s type, hence she would like to
gather a lot of information before taking the irreversible action. On the other side, the
information flow is determined by the agent’s actions, hence is endogenous. Importantly,
the principal and the normal type of the agent have opposing preferences on the irreversible
action, which creates the incentives for the agent to pool with a commitment type. This
assumption on the payoff functions of the players implies that the principal’s optimal
strategy against the normal type of the agent is independent of the principal’s expectations
of what the normal type would do if the principal never took the irreversible action. Hence,
throughout the game, if the agent’s type is revealed, the equilibrium continuation play is
unique. This property in our model helps to eliminate coordination issues that often lead
to multiplicity of equilibria in repeated games.
Every Nash equilibrium induces a reduced equilibrium outcome, which specifies for
each type and action profile, the expected discounted number of periods in which this ac-
tion profile is played against this type. Our main result characterizes reduced equilibrium
outcomes when players become arbitrarily patient. We show that, reduced equilibrium
outcomes converge to the the unique reduced equilibrium outcome of an auxiliary two-
stage game. In this auxiliary game player 1 (the agent) chooses a mixed action, and
player 2 (the principal), after observing player 1’s mixed action, chooses W (wait) or S
(stop). Players’ payoff functions are equal to the flow payoff functions in the dynamic
game if player 2 chooses W , and equal to payoffs when the dynamic game stops, if player
2 chooses S. The distribution over commitment types in the auxiliary game is identical
to that in the dynamic game. Our main result implies that equilibrium payoff vectors
of the dynamic game converge, as the players become arbitrarily patient, to the unique
equilibrium payoff vector of the auxiliary two-stage game.
We further characterize the evolution of the posterior beliefs of player 2 throughout
the game. We show that in screening games, when the players are patient, for every belief
and action profile, the expected discounted number of periods in which the posterior belief
is equal to this belief and the action profile is equal to this action profile converges to
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the corresponding equilibrium probability in the auxiliary two-stage game. In contracting
games, we obtain a similar result for action profiles in which player 2 plays W .
Our characterization results on equilibrium behavior and evolution of beliefs show
that any payoff-relevant information revelation takes place almost immediately at the
beginning of the game. The equilibrium behavior is akin to having an initial signaling
period in which player 1 commits to a stationary strategy, followed by player 2’s best
response to it given her posterior belief about the agent’s type. Hence, reputation building
is not gradual. Moreover, our main result facilitates simple and tractable comparative
statics of the equilibrium payoffs in the dynamic game with respect to the payoff functions
and the distribution over types. Hence, the effectiveness of dynamic screening for the
principal can be understood by solving a simple two-stage game.
The intuition for why reputation building is not gradual is as follows. In screening
games, the agent may invest in reputation by mimicking a commitment type with a posi-
tive probability. If he chooses to do so, then he pools with that commitment type, which
eventually leads to the irreversible action. Building reputation gradually would require
that after some initial investment, the agent loses his reputation with some probability
in a later round. However, an initial investment is not optimal if the agent expects to be
indifferent between further investment and losing his reputation later on. In contracting
games, once the agent reveals his private information, irreversible action is taken, and
this leads to the worst possible outcome for the agent. Hence, the agent finds it optimal
to pick which commitment type to mimic at the beginning, and not to reveal any further
information.2
The main strategic tensions that arise in our model are familiar from the reputation lit-
erature with imperfect monitoring (Cripps et al. (2004, 2007)), and from the ratchet effect
literature (Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988, 1993); Gerardi and Maestri (2018), Acharya
and Ortner (2017)). In our model, the agent prefers being thought of as one of several
commitment types, instead of being thought of as the normal type. If the principal expects
to learn much information about the agent’s type, and acting on this information worsens
the agent’s continuation payoff, the agent has strong incentives to imitate a commitment
type and build a reputation. This prevents information revelation, even if imitating has a
short-run cost to the agent. However, there is a countervailing force that may incentivize
the agent to reveal information. If the agent’s actions are monitored with noise, and if
the agent is not expected to reveal any information for some long duration of play, then
2These intuitions are precise only when player 1’s actions are observed perfectly. When player 1’s
actions are observed with noise player 1 will never reveal his type completely.
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the principal interprets any signal she observes as pure noise. Hence, the agent may have
incentives to play his myopic best response instead of mimicking the commitment type.
This contradicts the expectation of no information revelation. The tension between the
agent’s short-run temptations to reveal information–and long-run benefits from building a
reputation–together with the principal’s incentives to screen the agent, lead to a nontrivial
resolution of equilibrium dynamics.
We further analyze the long-run behavior when the game is a screening game, or when
the game is a contracting game and the monitoring structure satisfies the full-support
assumption. The characterization result described above does not pin down the long-
run behavior. This is however an important question. For instance, in some of our
main examples, one would like to know the long-run probability that each type of the
agent is eventually promoted or demoted. These predictions can help a modeler who has
data only about the aggregate promotion and demotion decisions of a principal against
different worker types, and does not have individual specific data about the duration of
each relationship. In Theorems 4 and 5, which are our second set of main results, we find
the probability that player 2 chooses action S against each type in the long run when
players are patient.
These results are stated separately for the two classes of games, because in contracting
games long-run behavior depends on whether the monitoring structure has full support
or not, while in screening games long-run behavior does not depend on the full-support
assumption. Let us start with contracting games. We first observe that throughout the
game, the normal type of player 1 reveals information, if the monitoring structure has full
support. This insight was provided in Cripps et al. (2004), and we adapt their findings
that were provided in the setting of repeated games to our setting. We find that, if players
are sufficiently patient, information revelation by player 1 becomes arbitrarily slow when
the posterior beliefs about player 1’s type are close to a set of beliefs that we call reputation
boundaries. A belief about player 1’s types is a reputation boundary if it puts positive
probability only on the normal type and one commitment type, and at that belief, both
S and W are myopic best responses to the commitment type’s action. We show that
whenever player 2 plays S with some delay, then when she plays S, the posterior beliefs
are arbitrarily close to a reputation boundary. This finding and the first observation,
together with Bayes’ rule, allow us to calculate the long-run probability that S is taken
against each type.
In screening games, the intuition is different, and the result holds even under perfect
monitoring. Our first payoff and behavior characterization result described above imply
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that in screening games with patient players, if player 2 plays W with a positive proba-
bility against the normal type, then player 1’s equilibrium behavior is akin to an initial
randomization over revealing his type, and mimicking one of the commitment types. If
player 1 reveals his type, then player 2 plays W in every future period. If he mimics a com-
mitment type, player 2’s posterior belief is close to a reputation boundary. We show that
when beliefs reach a reputation boundary, they can only move arbitrarily slowly around
this reputation boundary. This is possible only if player 1 pools with the commitment
type in the future periods. However, in a screening game, pooling with a commitment
type has a short-run cost to player 1, so pooling can be sustained only with expectations
of rewards coming in the form of S being played in some not too distant future. Because
such expectations have to be sustained at every period, player 2 cannot indefinitely play
W , and plays S against the commitment type and the normal type eventually. Because
beliefs do not fluctuate much around the reputation boundary with patient players, we
can calculate the probability with which S is played against each type in the long run.
Our benchmark models can be further used as building blocks to explore equilibrium
behavior and payoffs in more complicated dynamic models. In Section 10, we discuss an
example that combines both scenarios: When the principal stops the game, she can take
one of two possible irreversible actions. She can either promote the agent, or demote (or
reschedule) the agent. The principal prefers to promote the commitment type, and prefers
to demote the normal type. We show that screening is not effective in this model. In this
section, we also discuss other related scenarios that our model does not cover. We discuss
the related literature in more detail in Section 9. All the proofs are in the Appendices.
2. The Model
Two players interact in a dynamic relationship that takes place in discrete time, t 2
{0, 1, ...}. In the beginning of period 0, player 2 chooses whether to take an irreversible
action (S) or not (W ). If player 2 takes the irreversible action, then the game ends.
Otherwise, player 1 takes an action a 2 A = {a0, a1, ..., ak}. At the end of each period in
which S has not been played, a public signal y from a finite set of signals Y is observed.
The probability distribution of the signal depends on player 1’s action, and we write
P (y | a) for this distribution.
After observing the signal y0 at the end of period 0, player 2 chooses whether to play
S or W in the beginning of period 1. If she plays S the game ends. Otherwise a similar
dynamic unfolds. In general, if S has not been taken by player 2 before period t, then at
period t, first player 2 decides whether to play S or W . If she chooses W , then player 1
takes an action at 2 A that leads to the public signal yt 2 Y . If she chooses S the game
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ends.3
For any mixed action of player 1, ↵ 2 ∆A, and any signal y 2 Y , let P (y | ↵) :=P
a2A ↵(a)P (y | a). We assume that the signal distribution satisfies the following identi-
fication assumption:4
Assumption 1. (Identification): @ (↵0,↵00) 2 ∆A⇥∆A such that ↵0 6= ↵00 and
P (· | ↵0) = P (· | ↵00) .
We say monitoring has full support if P (·|a) has full support for each a 2 A, i.e., if
0 < P (y | a) < 1 for all a 2 A and y 2 Y . In the following development, we do not assume
full support monitoring assumption unless stated otherwise. At the beginning of the game,
nature draws a type for player 1, from a finite set Θ := {✓0, ✓1, ..., ✓K}, according to a
distribution µ0 2 ∆Θ,
5 with µ0 (✓i) denoting the prior probability that player 1’s type is
✓i. Type ✓0 is a normal type who maximizes his payoffs, which we describe shortly. Each
type ✓i for i   1 is a commitment type who is committed to playing a fixed (possibly
mixed) action ↵i 2 ∆A whenever the game has not ended yet.
Histories and strategies: If an irreversible decision has not been taken by the beginning
of period t 2 Z+, a public history contains all the signals observed by the players in
periods ⌧ < t. We write h0 = ; for the initial public history and let Ht = Y t 1 denote the
set of public histories for the beginning of period t, with a typical element identified by
ht. Let H := [tH
t be the set of all public histories.
If an irreversible decision has not been made by the beginning of period t 2 Z+, a
private history for player 1 also contains all the actions taken in periods ⌧ < t as well
as his type ✓ 2 Θ. We let Ht1 = Y
t 1 ⇥ At 1 ⇥ Θ denote the set of all private histories
for player 1 at the beginning of period t, with a typical element identified by ht1. Let
H1 := [tH
t
1 be the set of all private histories for player 1.
An outcome ! of the game consists of the type ✓ of player 1, ✓ (!) , the stopping time
T (!)2 Z+ [ {1} at which player 2 takes the irreversible action, the realized sequence
(a⌧ (!))⌧<T(!) of (private) actions taken by player 1 and all signals (y⌧ (!))⌧<T(!) observed
before the stopping time T (!). We write Ω for the set of all outcomes.
3We assume that at the beginning of every period, first player 2 moves, and then player 1 moves.
However, our results do not rely on this specification, and essentially all our main results go through even
if players moved simultaneously.
4This assumption is equivalent to the following assumption: Let M be the matrix where player 1’s
actions are the rows, and the signals are the columns, and each entry for (a, y) 2 A⇥Y is P (y | a). Then,
the rows of M are linearly independent. A similar assumption is made in Cripps et al. (2004).
5For any set X, ∆X denotes the set of probability distributions on X.
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A strategy for player 1 is  1 : H1 ! ∆A, and a strategy for player 2 is  2 : H !
∆ {S,W}.6
Payoffs: Player 1 receives a flow payoff of u1(a) in any period where player 2 plays W
and player 1 plays a. Player 1 receives a (lump-sum) continuation payoff of V1 if the
irreversible action is taken. Player 2 receives a flow payoff u2(a) in any period where
player 2 plays W and player 1 plays a.7 Player 2’s continuation payoff after she takes the
irreversible action depends on the type of her opponent, and V2(✓) denotes this payoff.
Players have a common discount factor,   2 (0, 1).
Every strategy profile   = ( 1,  2) together with µ0 induces a probability distribution
P(µ0, ) over outcomes. In order to save on notation, we drop the term µ0 and simply write
P( ) for the probability distribution over outcomes, and we write E( ) [·] for the induced
expectation operator. We write P✓( ) for the probability distribution over outcomes when
player 1 is type ✓ 2 Θ, and write E✓( ) [·] for the induced expectation operator. We observe
that P( ) [·] =
P
✓2Θ µ0(✓)P
✓
( ) [·] and E( ) [·] =
P
✓2Θ µ0(✓)E
✓
( ) [·].
Player 1’s payoff from the strategy profile   is:
U1( ) := E
✓0
( )
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tu1(at) +  
TV1
!
.
Player 2’s payoff from the strategy profile   is:
U2( ) := E( )
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tu2(at) +  
TV2 (✓)
!
.
For any ↵ 2 ∆A and i = 1, 2, we use ui(↵) to denote
P
a2A ↵(a)ui(a) when it does not
cause confusion.
Given a strategy profile, we let {µ (ht)}ht2H denote player’s 2 posterior beliefs, where
µ (ht) 2 ∆Θ is the belief assigned by player 2 to player 1’s type at the history ht. For any
history ht 2 Ht, we let U2(h
t;  ) be the continuation payoff of player 2 at history ht. For
any private history of player 1, ht1, let h
t be the associated public history. Notice that the
continuation payoff of player 1 at history ht1, which we call U1(h
t
1;  ), depends only on the
public history and hence U1(h
t
1;  ) =: U1(h
t;  ). Given a strategy profile   = ( 1,  2), for
6The strategy of player 1 conditional on a commitment type, ✓i, is the constant strategy ↵i.
7This representation of payoff function does not preclude the dependence of payoffs on the observed
signals. In particular, if the ex-post payoff of player 2 depended on both player 1’s action and the
signal at the end of the period, say v2(at, y), then the ex-ante flow payoff function of player 2 would be
u2(at) :=
P
y2Y v2(at, y)P (y|at).
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every on path public history ht, and type ✓ 2 Θ, we define  1 (h
t; ✓) 2 ∆A as
 1
 
ht; ✓
 
(a) := P✓( )
 
at = a|h
t
 
for every a 2 A.
The period expected mixed action,  1 (h
t; ✓), corresponds to player 2’s expectation about
player 1’s strategy at public history ht conditional on type ✓.
Reduced outcome: A reduced outcome, o = {(x (✓) , y (✓))}✓2Θ, is a vector of tuples where
x (✓) 2 [0, 1], and y(✓) 2 ∆ (∆A). The set of all reduced outcomes is O. Each strategy
profile   induces a reduced outcome {(x (✓) , y (✓))}✓2Θ, where for each ✓ 2 Θ,
x(✓) := 1  E✓( )
 
 T
 
,
measures the expected duration of the game against type ✓, and for each ↵ 2 ∆A, and
✓ 2 Θ with x(✓) > 0,
y(✓)(↵) :=
E
✓
( )
⇣
(1   )
P
T 1
t=0  
t
I{ 1(ht;✓)=↵}
⌘
x(✓)
,
measures the expected discounted number of periods in which player 1’s strategy is ↵
conditional on his type being ✓, and conditional on histories in which the game is not
stopped yet.8 When x(✓) = 0, then y(✓) is any arbitrary probability distribution on ∆A.
When x(✓) > 0, ˆ
∆A
y(✓)(↵)d[↵] = 1,
and y(✓)(↵) 2 [0, 1] for each ↵ 2 ∆A.9 Therefore, y(✓) is a probability distribution on
∆A. Because a commitment type, ✓i, always plays the mixed action ↵i, when x(✓i) > 0,
y (✓i) (↵i) = 1. A direct calculation shows that players’ payoffs from a strategy profile  
that induces a reduced outcome {(x (✓) , y (✓))}✓2Θ are given by:
U1( ) = x (✓0)
ˆ
∆A
u1(↵)y (✓0) (↵)d[↵] + (1  x (✓0))V1, (1)
U2( ) =
X
i2{0,...,K}
µ0 (✓i)
✓
x (✓i)
ˆ
∆A
u2(↵)y (✓i) (↵)d[↵] + (1  x (✓i))V2 (✓i)
◆
. (2)
8
I is the indicator function.
9The function y(✓)(·) is measurable since its support has countably many elements.
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In this paper, we study Nash equilibria of the stochastic game described above. If
a reduced outcome is induced by a Nash equilibrium, we call it a reduced equilibrium
outcome.
3. Assumptions on Payoffs and Types
We first assume that player 1’s myopic best response to W is unique. This assumption
is generically satisfied, and is not needed for our results, but makes the exposition of our
analysis slightly simpler.
Assumption 2. argmaxa2Au1(a) has a single element, a0.
Our second assumption is the most substantive assumption on the payoff functions.
It requires that action S either leads player 1 to his highest payoff, and player 2 to her
lowest payoff, or it leads player 1 to his lowest payoff, and player 2 to her highest payoff.
Essentially, players disagree on the desirability of the stopping action.
Assumption 3. (Conflict of desires in stopping decisions) The payoff functions satisfy
one of the following two conditions:
i) (Screening Game) V1 > maxa2Au1(a) and V2 (✓0) < mina2Au2(a).
ii) (Contracting Game) V1 < mina2Au1(a) and V2 (✓0) > maxa2Au2(a).
We say that the game is a screening game if the normal type of player 1 prefers player
2 to play action S to any other action profile, and if for player 2 playing S against the
normal type is not individually rational. We say that the game is a contracting game if
player 1 gets his lowest feasible payoff when player 2 plays S, and player 2 gets her highest
feasible payoff against the normal type of player 1 by playing S. If the payoff functions
satisfy Assumption 3, and if player 1 is known to be the normal type, the dynamic game
has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome. If the game is a screening game, then player 2
never plays S and player 1 always plays a0. If the game is a contracting game, then player
2 plays S at the beginning of the game.
The next assumption requires the existence of some commitment types that player 1
may find worthwhile to mimic. Player 2’s best response against such commitment types
coincides with the preferred action of player 1. This assumption ensures that the normal
type of player 1 has incentives to establish a reputation by imitating some commitment
types.
Assumption 4. (Existence of commitment types worthwhile to mimic)
i) If the game is a screening game, then there is a type s 2 {1, 2, ..., K} such that
V2(✓i) > u2(↵i) for all i 2 {1, 2, .., s} and V2(✓i) < u2(↵i) for all i > s.
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ii) If the game is a contracting game, then there is a type s 2 {1, 2, ..., K} such that
V2(✓i) < u2(↵i) for all i 2 {1, 2, .., s} and V2(✓i) > u2(↵i) for all i > s.
In the subsequent analysis, "s" is the cutoff index such that all commitment types
with an index below s are worthwhile for the normal type to imitate, and all those with
an index above s are not. The next assumption requires that the normal type of the
agent’s myopic best response is different from any commitment action. This assumption
ensures that player 1 has a trade-off between revealing information about his type and
imitating a commitment type to build a reputation.
Assumption 5. (Mimicking a commitment type is costly)
↵i 6= a0 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., K}.
10
Finally, we impose another assumption that aids the exposition but is not necessary
for our findings.
Assumption 6. ↵i 6= ↵j for any i, j 2 {1, ..., K} with i 6= j, and u1(↵i) > u1(↵i+1) for
every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s  1}.
This assumption says that commitment types choose distinct strategies, and the flow
payoff from imitating a commitment type with a lower index is higher than the flow payoff
from imitating a commitment type with a higher index. It implies that u1(↵i) 6= u1(↵j)
for every (i, j) 2 {1, 2, ..., s}2 with i 6= j.
4. Illustrative Examples
We present two numerical examples and an alternative interpretation of our model
as an experimentation game. We also preview some of our results in the context of the
numerical examples.
Example 1. Screening game: worker promotion
Consider the following example of a dynamic screening game. If player 2 chooses S
at some period, then the game ends. In any period where player 2 has never played
S, player 1 takes an action a 2 {a0, a1}. Player 1’s actions are possibly observed with
some noise, and the monitoring structure satisfies Assumption 1. Player 1 is either a
commitment type, ✓1, who plays a1 in every period when the game has not ended yet, or
a normal type, ✓0, who can choose either action. The prior probability that player 1 is a
commitment type is µ 2 (0, 1). The normal type of player 1 receives a flow payoff of 1 if
10We use the convention that a0 denotes both a pure action, and the mixed action that puts probability
1 on the pure action a0.
10
he chooses action a0 (u1(a0) = 1), and a payoff of 0 if he chooses a1 (u1(a1) = 0). Player
2’s flow payoff in a period when the game has not ended yet depends only on the action
of player 1, and u2(a0) = 0, and u2(a1) = 1. If player 2 chooses action S in period t, then
the normal type of player 1 receives a lump-sum payoff of V1 = 2 (i.e., player 1 receives
a payoff that is equivalent to a payoff stream of 2 at every period t0   t). Player 2’s
lump-sum payoff when the game ends depends on the type of her opponent. Specifically,
V2(✓0) =  1 and V2(✓1) = 2. In this game, player 1 prefers the game to end, and player 2
prefers to end the game against the commitment type, but not against the normal type.
This example captures a situation where a principal (player 2) would like to promote a
high-skilled worker (commitment type), but not a low-skilled one (normal type), who can
exert extra effort.
Suppose that player 2 expects the normal type of player 1 to pool with the commitment
type, i.e., play a1 at every period. Then, player 2’s best response is to play S if µ > µ
⇤ := 2
3
,
and to play W if µ < µ⇤. In Theorems 1 and 2, we characterize the players’ equilibrium
payoffs, and the evolution of the posterior belief process when the players are patient (as
  ! 1). If µ > µ⇤, then player 2 plays S almost immediately against both types, and
screening is ineffective. Hence, player 1’s payoff converges to V1, which is equal to 2, and
player 2’s payoff converges to µV2(✓1) + (1   µ)V2(✓0) = 2µ   (1   µ). If µ < µ
⇤, then
player 1’s equilibrium behavior is akin to an initial randomization between mimicking the
commitment type or revealing his type. Player 2’s posterior belief about player 1’s type
almost immediately either jumps to µ⇤ if player 1 mimics the commitment type, or falls to
0 if player 1 reveals his type. Conditional on the former event, the normal type of player
1 continues to pool with the commitment type, and player 2 plays S with some delay.
Conditional on the latter event, player 2 never plays S. Moreover, we show in Theorem
4 that S is played only when the posterior belief is in a small neighborhood of µ⇤, and
is eventually played against the commitment type. Hence, Bayes’ rule implies that, she
eventually plays S against the normal type with probability µ
1 µ
1 µ∗
µ∗
.
Example 2. Contracting game: task rescheduling, worker demotion
Consider the following example of a dynamic contracting game. In this game, the
action sets of the players, the possible types of player 1, and the flow payoff functions
when W is played are the same as in Example 1. However, if player 2 chooses action S,
then players’ lump-sum payoffs are V1 =  1, V2(✓0) = 2, and V2(✓1) =  1. In this game,
player 1 prefers the game not to end, and player 2 prefers to not end the game against the
commitment type, but prefers to end the game against the normal type. This example
captures a situation where a principal (player 2) decides whether to continue hiring an
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agent (player 1), or to demote/reschedule him. A high ability worker (commitment type)
always chooses high effort, while a low ability worker (normal type) can choose either
effort.
Suppose that player 2 expects the normal type of player 1 to pool with the commitment
type, i.e., play a1 at every period. Then, player 2’s best response is to play W if µ >
µ⇤ := 1
3
, and to play S if µ < µ⇤. In Theorems 1 and 3, we characterize the players’
equilibrium payoffs, and the evolution of the posterior belief process when the players are
patient (as   ! 1). If µ < µ⇤, then player 2 plays S almost immediately against both
types. Hence, player 1’s payoff converges to V1, which is equal to -1, and player 2’s payoff
converges to µV2(✓1) + (1  µ)V2(✓0) =  µ+ 2(1  µ). If µ > µ
⇤, then player 2 plays W
and player 1 plays a1 for a sufficiently long time, which results in the payoff u1(a1) for
player 1, and u2(a1) for player 2. Moreover, the posterior belief about player 1’s type lies
close to the set of beliefs {⌘ 2 ∆Θ : ⌘(✓1)   1/3}. Hence, equilibrium behavior is akin
to the behavior that would result if player 1 committed to pooling with the commitment
type, i.e., screening is ineffective.
However, we also show in Theorem 5 that if player 1’s actions are observed with noise
that has full support, and if µ > µ⇤, then player 1’s type is partially revealed. Despite
the equilibrium behavior being akin to pooling behavior, pooling at every period is not
an equilibrium. Suppose for simplicity that there is a Markov equilibrium where the state
variable is the public belief about player 1’s type. If player 1 is expected to play a1 with
probability one, then the posterior belief of player 2 about player 1’s type is unchanged
after the signal realization, and the continuation payoff of player 1 is independent of the
signal realization. However, then player 1 would profitably deviate to playing a0. We
show that this argument applies more generally (in all Nash equilibria), and player 2
learns some information about player 1 until the action S is finally taken. This argument,
reminiscent of the findings of Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), shows that imperfect
monitoring leads to information revelation. We show that player 2 eventually plays S
against the normal type, for any discount factor.
In Theorem 5, we further characterize the long-run behavior when the players are
patient (as   ! 1). In the long run, player 2’s posterior belief conditional on her opponent
being the normal type eventually falls until reaching an arbitrarily small neighborhood of
µ⇤, and player 2 plays action S. Conditional on the commitment type, the posterior belief
either converges to 1, and player 2 never takes action S, or the posterior belief converges
to µ⇤, and player 2 plays S. The key finding is that when the posterior belief falls, it
moves very slowly around µ⇤, and action S is taken only when the posterior belief is close
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to µ⇤. This allows us to calculate the long-run probability of action S against each type
using Bayes’ rule. Eventually, S is played with probability 1 against the normal type,
and with probability 1 µ
µ
µ∗
1 µ∗
against the commitment type. The total probability that
Player 2 eventually plays S is 1 µ
1 µ∗
. A key contribution of the paper, which distinguishes
it from the insights of Cripps et al. (2004), is that when agents are patient, the posterior
belief process has two absorbing states, µ⇤ and 1, and action S is taken with probability
1 at belief µ⇤.
Example 3. An alternative interpretation of the model
Our model can be thought of as a two-armed bandit problem where the outcome
distribution of one of the arms can be manipulated by a strategic agent.
More concretely, suppose there are two possible states of the world, ! 2 {↵,  }, and
two arms, A and B. Each arm produces a random payoff to the principal. The realized
payoff is 1 with probabilities pA(!) and pB(!), and the realized payoff is 0 with the
remaining probabilities. The principal does not know the state. At the initial period, the
principal chooses arm A or arm B. If she chooses arm A, then she observes the realized
payoff, and the next period she faces the same situation. If she chooses arm B, then she
is stuck with arm B forever, i.e., choosing arm B is an irreversible action. More generally,
in any period, if she has never chosen arm B, then she makes a decision between arm A
or the irreversible arm B.
There is an agent who has a preference over the principal’s arm choices. The agent’s
flow payoff from the principal choosing arm A is uA, and his flow payoff from the principal
choosing arm B is uB. The agent observes the state.
Suppose uA > uB, and the principal prefers arm A in state ↵ and arm B in state
 , i.e, pA(↵) > pB(↵) and pB( ) > pA( ). If state is  , each period the agent can pay
a cost c < uA   uB that changes the probability of a high payoff from arm A to pA(↵)
in that period. In state ↵, the agent cannot manipulate the probability distribution of
outcomes. If, in addition, pB( ) > pA(↵), then this experimentation game satisfies all of
our assumptions, and is an instance of a contracting game.
Suppose now that uB > uA, and the principal prefers arm A in state ↵ and arm B in
state  , i.e, pA(↵) > pB(↵) and pB( ) > pA( ). If the state is ↵, each period the agent
can pay a cost c < uB   uA that changes the probability of a high payoff from arm A to
pA( ) in that period. In state  , the agent cannot manipulate the probability distribution
of outcomes. If, in addition, pA( ) > pB(↵), then this experimentation game satisfies all
of our assumptions, and is an instance of a screening game.
13
5. Auxiliary Two-stage Game
In this section we introduce an auxiliary two-stage game that is simple to analyze.
In this game, player 1 has a single opportunity to signal his type by choosing a mixed
action to commit to. Player 2 observes player 1’s commitment action, updates her beliefs,
and chooses her action. As we argue below, this game generically has a unique Nash
equilibrium outcome. Our main result shows that Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the
dynamic game converge to the unique Nash equilibrium payoff vector of the two-stage
game when players are patient.
Let G be the dynamic stopping game described in the model that satisfies Assumptions
1-6. We define the corresponding auxiliary two-stage game, G˜ as follows. First, nature
picks player 1’s type ✓ 2 Θ according to the probability distribution µ0 2 ∆Θ, as in G. In
the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a mixed action ↵ 2 ∆A. Player 1 is either a
commitment type ✓i 2 {✓1, ..., ✓K} who chooses the mixed action ↵i with probability one,
or a normal type, ✓0, who chooses his action strategically. A strategy for the normal type
of player 1 is  ˜1 2 ∆(∆A). In the second stage, player 2 chooses an action a2 2 {S,W},
after observing player 1’s mixed action. A strategy for player 2 specifies the probability
of playing W expressed as  ˜2 : ∆A! [0, 1]. After player 2’s action choice, the game ends,
and payoffs are realized. Payoff functions of the players in this auxiliary game are closely
linked to those in the dynamic game. If player 2 chooses S in the second stage, then player
1’s payoff is V1, and player 2’s ex-post payoff is V2(✓). If instead, player 2 chooses action
W when player 1 has chosen action ↵ 2 ∆A, then players get payoffs u1(↵) and u2(↵),
respectively. When it does not cause a confusion, if G is a screening (contracting) game,
we also refer to the corresponding auxiliary two-stage game as a screening (contracting)
game. We study Nash equilibria of this two-stage game.
Every strategy profile together with the prior µ0 induces a probability distribution,
P˜( ,µ0) over the action profiles (↵1, a2) 2 ∆A ⇥ {W,S} and player 1’s types, which we
call an outcome distribution. Each outcome distribution induces a reduced outcome,
o = {x(✓), y(✓)}✓2Θ 2 O := {[0, 1],∆(∆A)}✓2Θ, where for each ✓ 2 Θ,
x(✓) := P˜( ,µ0) (a2 = W |✓) ,
and when x(✓) > 0, for every B 2 B (∆A),we have11
y(✓) (B) := P˜( ,µ0) (B|a2 = W, ✓) .
11We write B (X) for the Borel sigma-field for the topological space X.
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The term x(✓) is the probability that player 2 plays W against type ✓, and y(✓) is
the probability distribution over player 1’s actions conditional on player 2 playing W and
player 1’s type being ✓. Similar to the description in the dynamic model, when x(✓) = 0,
y(✓) is any arbitrary probability distribution on ∆A. For a commitment type, ✓i, if
x (✓i) > 0, then y (✓i) (↵i) = 1. Finally, players’ payoffs from a strategy profile   that
induces a reduced outcome {(x (✓) , y (✓))}✓2Θ are given by equations (1) and (2). We say
two reduced outcomes {x1(✓), y1(✓)}✓2Θ, and {x2(✓), y2(✓)}✓2Θ are equivalent if for every
✓ 2 Θ, either x1(✓) = x2(✓), and y1(✓) = y2(✓), or x1(✓) = x2(✓) = 0.
This auxiliary game is simple to analyze since it is a two-stage game with observable
mixed actions. Hence, all complicated inference problems pervasive in dynamic games
with imperfect monitoring are absent in this game. We will show that generically there
exists a unique reduced equilibrium outcome.
For i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, let µi
b := {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) = µ
⇤
i and µ(✓0) = 1   µ
⇤
i } be the
belief that makes player 2 indifferent between playing S and W when she believes that
her opponent’s type is ✓i with probability µ
⇤
i , and with the remaining probability her
opponent is a normal type who picked action ↵i. More precisely,
µ⇤iV2(✓i) + (1  µ
⇤
i )V2(✓0) = u2(↵i).
The existence and uniqueness of a threshold µ⇤i 2 (0, 1) follows from Assumptions 3 and 4.
Suppose that in the second stage, the support of the posterior belief of player 2 is {✓0, ✓i}
for some i 2 {1, ..., s}. Then, player 2’s optimal action is to play the desirable action for
the normal type (S in a screening game, W in a contracting game) whenever her posterior
belief attaches a probability more than µ⇤i on type ✓i, and her optimal action is to play the
undesirable action for the normal type (W in a screening game, S in a contracting game)
when this probability is strictly smaller than µ⇤i . Finally, the structure of the equilibrium
will depend on which one of the following two inequalities on the prior belief holds:
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
> µ0(✓0), (3)
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
< µ0(✓0). (4)
If inequality (3) holds, then for any fixed strategy of player 1, there exists a commit-
ment type ✓i, with i  s, such that player 2’s posterior belief after observing action ↵i
attaches a probability strictly more than µ⇤i to type ✓i. If inequality (4) holds, then for any
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fixed strategy of player 1 whose support is contained in the set {↵1, ...,↵s}, there exists
a commitment type ✓i, with i  s, such that player 2’s posterior belief after observing
action ↵i attaches a probability strictly less than µ
⇤
i to type ✓i.
5.1. Screening Game
Lemma 1. Suppose G is a screening game, and let G˜ be the corresponding auxiliary
two-stage game.
1. If inequality (3) holds, then G˜ has a unique reduced equilibrium outcome. In this
outcome, player 2 plays S against types ✓ 2 {✓0, ✓1, ..., ✓s} and W against types
✓ 2 {✓s+1, ..., ✓K} .
2. If inequality (4) holds, then G˜ has a unique equilibrium outcome distribution, which
is generated by the following strategy profile ( ˜1,  ˜2):
2.1. For i 2 {1, .., s},  ˜1(↵i) =
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
.
2.2.  ˜1(a0) = 1 
P
i2{1,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
.
2.3. For i 2 {1, .., s},  ˜2(↵i) =
V1 u1(a0)
V1 u1(↵i)
.
2.4.  ˜2(↵) = 1, for every ↵ /2 {↵1, ...,↵s}.
Lemma 1 shows that generically, two-stage screening games have a unique reduced
equilibrium outcome. Below, we provide sketch of the proof, but we skip a formal proof
since it is straightforward.
If inequality (3) holds, then for any fixed strategy of player 1 there exists some type
i 2 {1, ..., s}, such that observing ↵i, player 2’s posterior belief that player 1 is type ✓i
exceeds µ⇤i , hence plays S with probability 1. This observation is the key for the argument
of the first claim.
If inequality (4) holds, the normal type does not obtain a payoff of V1 in equilibrium.
Suppose by way of contradiction that this is not true. Then the support of player 1’s
equilibrium strategy is a subset of {↵1, ...,↵s}. However, inequality (4) implies that for
any fixed strategy of player 1 with its support contained in {↵1, ...,↵s}, there exists some
type i 2 {1, ..., s} such that ↵i is in the support of player 1’s equilibrium strategy and,
after observing ↵i, player 2’s posterior belief that player 1 is type ✓i is strictly below µ
⇤
i .
Therefore, player 2 plays W after observing ↵i, and player 1’s equilibrium payoff is less
than V1. A similar argument also establishes that the support of player 1’s equilibrium
strategy must contain a0, hence player 1’s equilibrium payoff is equal to u1(a0). This
16
θ0
θ1
θ2
µ0
µ
∗
1
µ
∗
2
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the equilibrium posterior beliefs of the principal on the belief simplex.
Each corner of the triangle represents the degenerate distribution that puts probability one on the type
that is labeled at that corner. This is an example of a screening game where Θ = {✓0, ✓1, ✓2}, and s = 2.
If inequality (4) holds, as illustrated in the figure, then player 2’s equilibrium posterior belief is one of
the three beliefs: (1, 0, 0), (1   µ⇤1, µ
⇤
1, 0), or (1   µ
⇤
2, 0, µ
⇤
2), illustrated as the red dots. The Martingale
property of the beliefs implies a unique distribution over this set of posterior beliefs, and a unique strategy
for the normal type of player 1 that induces this distribution.
implies that player 2’s posterior belief after observing ↵i for any i 2 {1, ..., s} should
attach a probability to type ✓i that does not exceed µ
⇤
i , and should not be strictly below
µ⇤i . In other words, in every equilibrium, player 2’s posterior belief after observing ↵i
should be µbi (see Figure 1). Because player 1’s equilibrium payoff is u1(a0), and because
he is choosing each ↵i with a strictly positive probability, player 2 plays W after observing
↵i with probability  ˜2(↵i) 2 (0, 1) that satisfies the following indifference condition for
player 1:
u1 (a0) =  ˜2(↵i)u1(↵i) + (1   ˜2(↵i)) . (5)
5.2. Contracting Game For contracting games, we make the following genericity as-
sumption about the prior belief µ0. For every l 2 {1, ..., s}, we have
X
0<il
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
6= µ0(✓0). (6)
Recall Assumption 6 that, u1(↵i) > u1(↵j) for all i < j, i, j 2 {1, ..., s}.
Lemma 2. Suppose G is a contracting game. Let G˜ be the corresponding auxiliary two-
stage game, and assume µ0 satisfies inequality (6).
1. If inequality (4) holds, then in the unique reduced equilibrium outcome of G˜, player
2 plays S against every type.
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2. If inequality (3) holds, then let j be the smallest element of {1, 2, ..., s} such that
µ0(✓0) <
P
0<ij µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
. G˜ has a unique equilibrium outcome distribution, which
is generated by the following strategy profile ( ˜1,  ˜2):
2.1. If j = 1:  ˜1(↵1) = 1,  ˜2(↵i) = 1 for i 2 {1, ..., s},  ˜2(↵) = 0 for ↵ /2
{↵1, ...,↵s}.
2.2. If j 2 {2, 3, ..., s}:
2.2.a  ˜1(↵i) =
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
for i 2 {1, ..., j 1},  ˜1(↵j) = 1 
P
i2{1,...,j 1}
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
.
2.2.b  ˜2(↵i) = 1 for i 2 {j, ..., s},  ˜2(↵i) =
u1(↵j) V1
u1(↵i) V1
for i 2 {1, ..., j   1},
 ˜2(↵) = 0 for ↵ /2 {↵1, ...,↵s}.
Lemma 2 shows that generically, two-stage contracting games have a unique reduced
equilibrium outcome. Below, we provide sketch of the proof, but we skip a formal proof
since it is straightforward.
If inequality (4) holds, then player 1’s equilibrium payoff is V1. Suppose by way of
contradiction that this is not true. Then, the support of player 1’s equilibrium strategy
is contained in {↵1, ...,↵s}. However, inequality (4) implies that there exists a type
i 2 {1, .., s} such that ↵i is in the support of player 1’s equilibrium strategy, and player
2’s posterior belief that player 1’s type is ✓i after observing ↵i is strictly below µ
⇤
i . Hence,
after observing ↵i, player 2 plays S. Therefore, player 1’s equilibrium payoff is V1. Player
1’s incentive constraints imply that player 2 plays S against every type.
We now analyze the case when inequality (3) holds. Notice that because we reordered
the commitment types, if all the types when mimicked would induce player 2 to play W
with probability 1, then the normal type would prefer to mimic type ✓1. Suppose that
µ0(✓1)
1 µ∗1
µ∗1
> µ0(✓0). After observing action ↵1, player 2’s posterior belief that player 1’s
type is ✓1 exceeds µ
⇤
1, regardless of the normal type’s strategy. Hence, in equilibrium,
player 1 guarantees the payoff u1 (↵1) by mimicking ✓1. Because mimicking another com-
mitment type, or playing any other action, gives a strictly lower payoff than u1(↵1), in the
unique equilibrium outcome he mimics ✓1, which leads to a posterior belief that attaches
a probability greater than µ⇤1 on type ✓1. Hence, if j = 1, a unique equilibrium outcome
is obtained.
Let us then assume that j > 1. What happens as the prior on the normal type increases
slightly so that µ0(✓1)
1 µ∗1
µ∗1
< µ0(✓0) < µ0(✓1)
1 µ∗1
µ∗1
+ µ0(✓2)
1 µ∗2
µ∗2
? In this case, for any
strategy of the normal type of player 1, one of the actions ↵i 2 {↵1,↵2} must lead to
a posterior with support contained in {✓0, ✓i}, and that attaches a probability strictly
higher than µ⇤i on type ✓i. Hence, playing ↵i must lead to the payoff u1 (↵i). It then
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follows that player 1’s equilibrium strategy may put positive probability only on ↵1 and
↵2. Since u1 (↵1) > u1 (↵2), ↵2 must lead to a posterior belief on type ✓2 greater than
µ⇤2, to which player 2 best responds by playing W, while action ↵1 leads to the posterior
µ⇤1 on type ✓1 and player 2 randomizes, putting probability  ˜2(↵1) on W that keeps the
normal type indifferent between the two actions:
u1 (↵2) =  ˜2(↵1)u1(↵1) + (1   ˜2(↵1))V1.
In general, when inequality (3) holds, let 0 < j  s be the smallest integer such that
µ0(✓0) <
X
0<ij
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
(7)
holds. A similar argument implies that the normal type will randomize between actions
↵i 2 {↵1, ...,↵j}. The action ↵j will lead to a posterior belief that puts a probability more
than µ⇤j on type j, and will lead player 2 to best respond by playing W. On the other
hand, each action ↵i 2 {↵1, ...,↵j 1} will lead to the posterior belief µ
b
i , and it will be
followed by a randomization of player 2 which puts probability  ˜2(↵i) on W , keeping the
normal type indifferent between all the actions ↵i 2 {↵1, ...,↵j}:
u1 (↵j) =  ˜2(↵i)u1(↵i) + (1   ˜2(↵i))V1. (8)
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium posterior beliefs in an example. Although it is
possible to characterize the equilibria of the auxiliary two-stage game and the dynamic
game for a proper subset of beliefs which do not satisfy inequality (6), this genericity
assumption allows us to express and explain our main results in a simpler way.
6. Equilibrium of the Dynamic Model
Recall that O is the set of all reduced outcomes. Take an element o⇤ = {(x⇤ (✓) , y⇤ (✓))}✓2Θ 2
O and, for each n 2 N, an element on = {(xn (✓) , yn (✓))}✓2Θ 2 O. We say that the se-
quence {on}
1
n = 1 converges to o
⇤ if for each ✓ 2 Θ, xn (✓)! x
⇤ (✓), and x⇤ (✓) > 0 implies
yn (✓) converges weakly to y
⇤ (✓).12 Our main result is Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Take a sequence { n} of discount factors converging to one and let { n} be
a sequence of Nash equilibria of a sequence of games where along the sequence, the payoff
functions and the prior belief µ0 are fixed, µ0 satisfies (6), and in the n
th game the discount
12Let X be a metric space with its Borel sigma-field B(X). A bounded sequence of
probability measures (Pn) on (X,B(X)) converges weakly to the probability measure P if
limPn (C) = P (C) for all continuity sets C of measure P.
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Figure 2: This panel illustrates the equilibrium posterior beliefs of the principal on the belief simplex.
This is an example of a contracting game where, Θ = {✓0, ✓1, ✓2}, and s = 2 and inequality (3) holds. If
j = 1, as illustrated in the left figure, then player 2’s posterior belief is either (0, 0, 1) or (1   µ1, µ1, 0).
If j = 2, as illustrated in the right figure, then player 2’s posterior belief is either (1   µ⇤1, µ
⇤
1, 0) or
(1   µ2, 0, µ2). The Martingale property of the beliefs implies a unique distribution over this set of
posterior beliefs, and unique strategy for the normal type of player 1 that induces this distribution.
factor is  n. Let on = {(xn (✓) , yn (✓))}✓2Θ be a reduced outcome induced by  n and let
o⇤ = {(x⇤ (✓) , y⇤ (✓))}✓2Θ be the unique reduced equilibrium outcome of the corresponding
auxiliary two-stage game. The sequence of reduced outcomes {on}
1
n = 1 converges to o
⇤.
Theorem 1 asserts that any sequence of equilibrium-reduced outcomes {(xn (✓) , yn (✓))}✓2Θ
of dynamic games converges to the unique equilibrium-reduced outcome {(x⇤ (✓) , y⇤ (✓))}✓2Θ
of the auxiliary two-stage game, when players are patient. This implies that, in the patient
limit, the equilibrium payoff vector of the dynamic game is identical to the equilibrium
payoff vector of the auxiliary two-stage game. Hence, noise in the monitoring structure
does not affect equilibrium payoffs when players are patient.
In light of Lemmas 1 and 2, Theorem 1 implies that dynamic screening is partially
effective. First, dynamic screening allows the principal to screen all types that are not
worthy to be mimicked by the normal type, i.e., types with index greater than s, and play
a best response to them. In screening games, if the prior belief about the commitment
types with indices less than s is high relative to the prior belief about the normal type
(high reputation case), then player 2 plays S almost immediately. Hence, screening among
such types is ineffective. If the prior belief about the commitment types with indices less
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than s is low relative to the prior belief about the normal type (low reputation case), then
player 1 reveals partial information. In contracting games, in the low reputation case,
player 2 plays S almost immediately. Hence, screening among such types is ineffective.
In the high reputation case, player 1 reveals partial information, and player 2 utilizes this
information.
However, the implication of the theorem goes further than the payoff equivalence. The
reduced outcome of a strategy profile in the dynamic game captures some information
about the behavior of the players. In the unique reduced equilibrium outcome of the
auxiliary game, for any type ✓ 2 Θ, either x⇤(✓) = 0, or y⇤(✓) has finite support. The
term x⇤(✓) tells us the expected discounted duration of the game against type ✓. If
x⇤(✓) = 0, then player 2 plays S almost immediately against type ✓. If x⇤(✓) > 0 and
y⇤(✓)(↵) = 0 for some ↵ 2 ∆A, then we do not expect to see type ✓ playing ↵ for a
number of periods that have a non-negligible impact on ex ante payoffs. On the other
side, reduced outcomes in the dynamic game do not capture the long run behavior, nor
anything about the dynamics of the play. To gain more insight about these aspects of the
equilibrium play, we examine the belief and behavior dynamics jointly in sections 6.1.1
and 6.1.2, and the long run behavior in section 7.
6.1. Equilibrium Belief Process and Behavior We now investigate the belief dy-
namics in conjunction with behavior in equilibrium. We will show that the evolution of
player 2’s posterior beliefs is closely linked to the belief process in the equilibrium of the
auxiliary two-stage game. In particular, the belief process and the associated behavior
confirm that player 1’s equilibrium behavior is as if the normal type chooses a strategy
↵ 2 {a0,↵1, ...,↵s} in the beginning of the game and sticks to it until the end of the game.
Hence, the normal type does not build his reputation gradually over time. Rather, it
forms it in the beginning through his initial actions and then sticks to it for a long time.
In Theorems 2 and 3 below, we formalize and show these findings.
6.1.1. Behavior in Screening Games Recall that Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 imply that
in screening games, if inequality (3) holds, then player 2 plays S against types ✓ 2
{✓0, ✓1, ..., ✓s} almost immediately. Therefore, we cannot obtain tight results about the
belief dynamics conditional on these types in this case. However, if inequality (4) holds,
then player 2 plays W against types ✓ 2 {✓0, ✓1, ..., ✓s} with positive probability, and in this
case, we have a tight result about belief dynamics against such types. For i 2 {0, 1, ..., K},
let µi 2 ∆Θ be the distribution that puts probability one on type ✓i. Given two elements
x, y of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, we define d(x, y) := kx  yk , where k. k
stands for the Euclidian norm.
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Theorem 2. Take a sequence { n} of discount factors converging to one and let { n} be
a sequence of Nash equilibria of a sequence of screening games where along the sequence,
the payoff functions and the prior belief µ0 are fixed, and in the n
th game the discount
factor is  n. Let G˜ be the corresponding auxiliary two-stage game.
1. For every i > s and for every " > 0,
limE✓i( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µi)<"}
 
= 1.
2. Suppose inequality (4) holds. Let ( ˜1,  ˜2) be the strategy profile that leads to the
unique equilibrium outcome distribution of G˜. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for
every " 2 (0, "⇤) the following hold:
2.1. limE✓i( n)
⇣
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µbi})<"}
⌘
=  ˜2(↵i) for every i 2 {1, ..., s}.
2.2. limE✓i( n)
⇣
 TnI{d(µt,µbi)<"}
⌘
= 1   ˜2(↵i) for every i 2 {1, ..., s}.
2.3. limE✓0( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µ0)<",d( 1(ht;✓0),a0)<"}
 
=  ˜1(a0).
2.4. limE✓0( n)
⇣
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µbi)<",d( 1(ht;✓0),↵i)<"}
⌘
=  ˜1(↵i) ˜2(↵i) for every
i 2 {1, ..., s}.
2.5. limE✓0( n)
⇣
 TnI{d(µt,µbi)<"}
⌘
=  ˜1(↵i) (1   ˜2(↵i)) for every i 2 {1, ..., s}.
Theorem 2 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes and evolution of posterior beliefs
in screening games when the players are patient. Recall that in a screening game, the
equilibrium outcomes of the auxiliary two-stage game entail player 2 to play W against
types i > s. Item 1 of Theorem 2 states that the expected discounted behavior of player
2 against such types is to play W with probability 1, and that the posterior beliefs attach
probability close to one on such types. Item 2 of Theorem 2 considers the case in which
inequality (4) holds. Recall that, in this case, the equilibria of the auxiliary two-stage
game involves player 2 playing W against types {✓0, ..., ✓s} with positive probability. In
the unique equilibrium outcome, player 1 randomizes among {a0,↵1, ...,↵s} in a unique
way such that the posterior belief after observing ↵i is equal to µ
b
i . Moreover, player
2 plays W with probability  ˜2(↵i) =
V1 u1(a0)
V1 u1(↵i)
after observing ↵i. The first subitem in
this case looks at equilibrium behavior and beliefs conditional on a type ✓ 2 {✓1, ..., ✓s}.
First, the expected discounted number of periods in which W is played, and the posterior
belief is close to µbi is equal to  ˜2(↵i). Second, the expected discounted probability with
which i) S is played, and ii) the posterior belief is close to µbi , is equal to 1   ˜2(↵i). The
third and the fourth subitems in this case look at the equilibrium behavior and beliefs
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conditional on type ✓0 until the stopping time. First, the expected discounted number
of periods in which player 2 plays W , the posterior belief is close to µ0, and player 1’s
strategy is close to a0 is  ˜1(a0). Second, the expected discounted number of periods in
which player 2 plays W , posterior belief is close to µbi , and player 1’s strategy is close to
↵i is  ˜1(↵i) ˜2(↵i). The fifth subitem states that the expected discounted probability with
which player 2 plays S, and the posterior belief is close to µbi conditional on type ✓0 is
 ˜1(↵i) (1   ˜2(↵i)).
Theorem 2 implies that when players are patient, player 2’s posterior belief pro-
cess spends all the payoff-relevant time in a small neighborhood of the beliefs M :=
{µbi}i2{1,...,s} [ {µi}i2{0,s+1,...,K}. Because each element of M is an extreme point of the
convex hull of M , once the posterior belief gets close to an element of M , m, then the
discounted probability with which the posterior belief moves away from m is very small.
This follows because the belief process is a martingale, and hence after reaching m, if
beliefs further moved away from m, they would spend some time outside of the set M .
This means that, player 2’s posterior beliefs almost immediately reach close to an ele-
ment of M , and stay there. Moreover, once the beliefs reach close to an element of M ,
the behavior of player 1 stays approximately constant. Hence, reputations are not built
gradually. They are built or destroyed almost immediately.
6.1.2. Behavior in Contracting Games We now present our results about belief dynamics
in contracting games. Recall that if inequality (3) holds , then we let j to be the smallest
element of {1, 2, ..., s} such that µ0(✓0) <
P
0<ij µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
. Let
Mj := {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓j)   µ
⇤
j and µ(✓0) = 1  µ(✓j)}.
If inequality (4) holds, then Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 imply that in contracting games,
player 2 plays S almost right away at the beginning of the game against all types. Hence,
we cannot obtain tight results about the belief dynamics conditional on these types in
this case. However, if inequality (3) holds, then player 2 plays W against types ✓ 2
{✓0, ✓1, ..., ✓s} with positive probability, and in this case, we have a tight result about
belief dynamics against such types. Given a set A ✓ RK+1 and a vector x 2 RK+1, we
define d(x,A) := inf x˜2A kx  x˜k .
Theorem 3. Take a sequence { n} of discount factors converging to one and let { n} be
a sequence of Nash equilibria of a sequence of contracting games where along the sequence,
the payoff functions and the prior belief µ0 are fixed, µ0 satisfies inequality (6), inequality
(3), and in the nth game the discount factor is  n. Let G˜ be the corresponding auxiliary
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two-stage game, and ( ˜1,  ˜2) be the strategy profile that leads to the unique equilibrium
outcome distribution of G˜. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for every " 2 (0, "⇤) the following
hold:
1. If j < s, then for every j < i  s,
limE✓i( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µi)<"}
 
= 1.
2. If j > 1, then for every 0 < i < j,
limE✓i( n)
⇣
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µbi)<"}
⌘
=  ˜2(↵i),
3. limE
✓j
( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,Mj)<"}
 
= 1.
4. If j > 1, then for every 0 < i < j,
limE✓0( n)
⇣
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µbi)<",d( 1(ht;✓0),↵i)<"}
⌘
=  ˜1(↵i) ˜2(↵i),
5. limE✓0( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,Mj)<",d( 1(ht;✓0),↵j)<"}
 
=  ˜1(↵j).
Theorem 3 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes and the evolution of posterior beliefs
in contracting games when the players are patient. Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 imply
that the expected discounted number of periods in which player 2 plays W against any
type ✓i 2 {✓j+1, ..., ✓s} converges to one. Item 1 of Theorem 3 states that the expected
discounted number of periods in which the posterior belief is close to µi conditional on
type ✓i also converges to one. Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 imply that the expected discounted
number of periods in which player 2 plays W against any type ✓i 2 {✓1, ..., ✓j 1} converges
to  ˜2(↵i). Item 2 of Theorem 3 states that conditional on type ✓i, the expected discounted
number of periods in which player 2 plays W , and the posterior belief is close to µbi
converges to  ˜2(↵i). Item 3 states that conditional on type ✓j, the expected discounted
number of periods in which player 2 plays W , and the posterior belief is close to the
set Mj converges to  ˜2(↵j), which is 1. Items 4 and 5 consider the belief process and
behavior conditional on type ✓0. Item 4 states that conditional on type ✓0, the expected
discounted number of periods in which the posterior belief is close to µbi , player 2 plays
W , and player 1 plays a strategy close to ↵i converges to the auxiliary two-stage game’s
equilibrium probability with which player 1 mimics type ✓i, and player 2 plays W after
observing ↵i, for all i 2 {1, ..., j   1}. Finally, item 5 states that the expected discounted
number of periods in which the posterior belief is close to the set of beliefs Mj, player 2
plays W , and player 1 plays a strategy close to ↵j converges to the auxiliary two-stage
game’s equilibrium probability with which player 1 mimics type ✓j.
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In contracting games, we cannot rule out the possibility that player 2 plays S with
positive probability at some histories in which the posterior belief assigns a positive prob-
ability to two or more commitment types in equilibrium. This may be possible only in the
very early stages of the game, because commitment types separate from each other very
fast. Therefore, Theorem 3 does not characterize the discounted joint probability with
which S is played, and the posterior belief is close to µbi for i 2 {1, ..., j 1}. However, the
theorem still implies that conditional on the game not being stopped almost immediately,
the posterior beliefs reach close to either the set {µbi}i2{1,...,j 1}, the convex hull of µ
b
j
and µi (i.e., Mj), or the set {µi}i2{j+1,...,s}. Let N := {µ
b
i}i2{1,...,j} [ {µi}i2{j,...,s}. Each
element of N is an extreme point of the convex hull of N . Therefore, once the posterior
beliefs reach a small neighborhood of an element of {µbi}i2{1,...,j 1} or {µi}i2{j+1,...,s}, the
posterior beliefs can move out of this neighborhood with only a very small probability.
Similarly, if the posterior belief reaches a small neighborhood of Mj, then the posterior
beliefs can move away from the set Mj with only a very small probability. Therefore, pos-
terior beliefs (reputations) again are approximately constant throughout the game. This
implies that, conditional on the game not being stopped almost right away, the normal
type does not reveal further private information that is payoff-relevant for player 2.
7. Long-Run Equilibrium Behavior
Theorems 1, 2 and 3 provide a tight characterization of the equilibrium payoffs and
give insights about the equilibrium behavior of the dynamic game when the players are pa-
tient. An outsider may not observe how a dynamic strategic situation unfolds completely.
Rather, she may observe some coarse information about the frequency of stopping actions,
without observing the duration of the relationship. To connect the equilibrium predic-
tions to such observable outcomes, one needs to know the long-run behavior of the game,
which is not captured by reduced outcomes.
In contrast to the results in Theorems 1, 2 and 3, the monitoring structure matters
for the long-run behavior in contracting games, while in screening games, the long-run
behavior is independent of the monitoring structure. We explain this distinction in the
discussions that follows the results.
We start with screening games, and assume that the monitoring structure satisfies
Assumption 1, i.e., we do not make the full-support assumption. In a screening game,
either inequality (3) holds and a patient player 2 plays S almost immediately against all
types ✓ 2 {✓0, ✓1, ..., ✓s}, or inequality (4) holds and player 1 randomizes in such a way
that player 2’s posterior belief is either close to µ0 or is close to µ
b
i for some i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}.
Our long-run results are about the behavior when the game does not stop in the short
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run, hence we focus on the case in which inequality (4) holds.
Theorem 4. Take a sequence { n} of discount factors converging to one and let { n} be a
sequence of Nash equilibria of a sequence of screening games, where along the sequence the
payoff functions and the prior belief µ0 are fixed, µ0 satisfies inequality (4), and in the n
th
game the discount factor is  n. Let G˜ be the corresponding auxiliary two-stage game, and
( ˜1,  ˜2) be the strategy profile that leads to the unique equilibrium outcome distribution of
G˜. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for every " 2 (0, "⇤) the following hold:
1. For i 2 {1, ..., s},
1.1. limP✓i( n)
 
T <1, d
 
µT, µ
b
i
 
< "
 
= 1.
1.2. limP✓0( n)
 
T <1, d
 
µT, µ
b
i
 
< "
 
=  ˜1(↵i).
2. limP✓0( n) (T =1) =  ˜1(a0).
3. For i 2 {s+ 1, ..., K}, limP✓i( n) (T <1) = 0.
Theorem 4 considers the long-run behavior in screening games when players are pa-
tient. The first sub-item of item 1 states that, conditional on any type ✓i 2 {✓1, ..., ✓s},
player 2 eventually plays S, and when S is played, the posterior belief is close to µbi .
The second sub-item states that, conditional on type ✓0, the probability that player 2
will eventually play S at a posterior belief close to µbi is equal to the auxiliary two-stage
game’s equilibrium probability that player 1 mimics type ✓i. To see why, recall that by
Theorem 2, the posterior beliefs conditional on type ✓i spend most of the time close to
µbi . Hence, conditional on the posterior belief reaching to µ
b
i , the normal type of player
1 (type ✓0) either pools with the commitment type, or S is played. If S is not played,
then the normal type should expect S to be played in some future period. Because such
expectations about the future play of S should be provided in each period where there is
pooling, eventually player 2 plays S.
Item 2 states that conditional on type ✓0, the probability that player 2 never plays S
is equal to the auxiliary two-stage game’s equilibrium probability that player 1 plays a0.
Items 1 and 2 together imply that in the long run, player 2 plays S against the normal type
with probability 1
µ0(✓0)
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
. Item 3 states that S is not played against
types ✓ 2 {✓s+1, ..., ✓K}.
The reason why full-support assumption is not needed in screening games is that
irreversible action serves as rewards that incentivize player 1 to pool with the commitment
types. Hence, in every period in which player 1 pools, he also expects S to be played
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with a positive probability in some future period. In contrast, in contracting games
irreversible action serves as a threat to player 1. If monitoring is perfect, and if the
normal type of player 1 reveals his type by playing a0, then player 2 plays S in the next
period. Hence, pooling forever is sustained as the unique equilibrium outcome if there is
a single commitment type, and if the prior belief on the commitment type is sufficiently
high. However, if monitoring structure satisfies the full-support assumption, then pooling
forever cannot be sustained. We now analyze this case.
In contracting games, we provide sharp predictions for the long-run behavior for the
set of types that play an action which is followed by W with positive probability in
the unique equilibrium outcome of the auxiliary two-stage game. Recall that in this
equilibrium outcome, against any type ✓i, for i > s, player 2 plays S. Therefore, in
the dynamic game Theorem 1 implies that player 2 plays S against these types almost
immediately, i.e., the game ends against such types in the short run. Hence, our results
will be about the types ✓i 2 {✓0, ..., ✓s}. Moreover, as stated earlier, the full-support
assumption is needed to obtain sharp predictions.
Theorem 5. Take a sequence { n} of discount factors converging to one and let { n} be
a sequence of Nash equilibria of a sequence of contracting games, where along the sequence
the payoff functions and the prior belief µ0 are fixed, µ0 satisfies inequality (6), P satisfies
the full-support assumption, and in the nth game the discount factor is  n. Let G˜ be the
corresponding auxiliary two-stage game, and ( ˜1,  ˜2) be the strategy profile that leads to
the unique equilibrium outcome distribution of G˜. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for every
" 2 (0, "⇤) the following hold:
1. For every n, Player 2 plays S against the normal type eventually in the nth game,
i.e., P✓0( n) (T <1) = 1.
2. Suppose that µ0 satisfies inequality (3). Let j to be the smallest element of {1, 2, ..., s}
such that µ0(✓0) <
P
0<ij µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for every " 2
(0, "⇤) the following hold:
2.1. For i 2 {1, ..., j   1}, limP✓i( n) (T <1) = 1.
2.2. limP✓0( n)
 
T <1, d
 
µT, µ
b
j
 
< "
 
=  ˜1(↵j).
2.3. limP
✓j
( n)
 
T <1, d
 
µT, µ
b
j
 
< "
 
=
⇣
µ∗j
1 µ∗j
⌘⇣
µ0(✓0)
µ0(✓j)
⌘
 ˜1(↵j).
2.4. For i 2 {j + 1, ..., s}, limP✓i( n) (T <1) = 0.
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Theorem 5 considers the long-run behavior in contracting games. The first item states
that if the monitoring structure has full support, player 2 plays S against the normal type
eventually, for every discount factor. The intuition for this result follows closely to that
provided by Cripps et al. (2004): The normal type does not pool with a commitment type
forever when the monitoring structure has full support.
The long-run behavior against the commitment types are sharp only when the parties
are patient. Let us start with a type ✓i 2 {✓1, ..., ✓j 1}. According to Theorem 2, the
posterior belief conditional on type ✓i reaches a small neighborhood of µi
b rapidly when
the parties are patient. Theorem 5, item 2, first sub-item states that eventually player 2
plays S against these types when players are patient. To see why, first notice that when
players are patient, player 1’s equilibrium payoffs change steeply around the belief µi
b,
by Theorem 1. This is because, if the probability of the commitment type ✓i is above
µ⇤i , then player 1’s equilibrium payoffs are close to the payoff he gets by committing to
mimic the commitment type forever, which is a moderately high payoff, while if this
probability is below µ⇤i , then player 1’s equilibrium payoff is close to his minmax payoff.
This discontinuity in the limit equilibrium payoffs around the belief µbi implies that the
posterior beliefs move in very small step sizes if they reach a small neighborhood of µbi .
This is because otherwise, player 1 would have strong incentives to mimic the commitment
type, hampering any information revelation and any movement in the posterior beliefs.
In other words, posterior beliefs get absorbed at µbi . We now argue that, player 2 should
be playing S in the long run, which follows from an intuition similar to the one provided
by Cripps et al. (2004). To see why, assume on the way to a contradiction that player 2
plays W in the long-run with positive probability. Since the belief {µt^T} is a bounded
martingale, with positive probability the posterior would have to converge to µi
b in the
long run. But in this case, player 2 would have to ignore a long sequence of signals that
are more likely under a0 then under ↵i, which would imply the existence of profitable
deviations for the normal type.
The second sub-item of item 2 states that player 2 plays S against the normal type of
player 1 eventually, at posterior beliefs close to µbj, with the same probability that player
1 mimics type ✓j in the unique equilibrium of the auxiliary two-stage game. The third
sub-item of item 2 states that player 2 plays S against type ✓j with a probability that
is strictly between 0 and 1. This probability is found by Bayes’ rule by considering the
experiment that either reveals that player 1 is type ✓j, and leads to the belief µj , or leads
to the belief µbj. In this experiment, with probability µ0(✓0) ˜1(↵j), player 1 is the normal
type, and with the remaining probability, he is type ✓j. The intuition for these results
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follows from our findings regarding the discontinuity of limit equilibrium payoffs at belief
µbj, and the insights from Cripps et al. (2004).
The last sub-item of item 2 states that Player 2 never plays S against other types.
8. Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 1 for a Screening Game
We provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 1 for screening games. The purpose is
to explain some of the new technical tools we use and develop in our proofs that may be
useful in dynamic games with incomplete information. We provide the sketch through an
example. We will state some results for this example in formal lemmas, but we will not
provide additional proofs for these lemmas. The appendices contain more general versions
of these lemmas, and their proofs. We provide such statements to guide the steps and the
logic of the general proof.
Player 1 has two actions, A = {a0, a1}, and there is only one commitment type, i.e.,
Θ = {✓0, ✓1}. The commitment type plays action a1 at every period until the game is
stopped. In the following development, µ 2 [0, 1] refers to the probability that player
1 is a commitment type, or player 1’s reputation, and the prior probability that player
1 is a commitment type is µ0 2 (0, 1). The signal distribution is governed by P , and
P satisfies the identification assumption. We further assume that Assumptions 2-6 are
satisfied, and the dynamic game is a screening game. Slightly abusing the notation, let
V2(µ) := µV2(✓1) + (1   µ)V2(✓0). Also, let µ
⇤ 2 (0, 1) be the number that satisfies the
equality
V2 (µ
⇤) = u1(a1).
We will show the sketch of the proof of the following claim, which is weaker than the
implication of Theorem 1 for the example:13
Claim 1. Take a sequence of Nash equilibria { n}n of a sequence of games along which
all the parameters except the discount factor are fixed, µ0 2 [0, 1], and  n ! 1.
1. If µ0 > µ
⇤, then limE( n)
 
 Tn
 
= 1, limU1( n) = V1, and limU2( n) = V2(µ0).
2. If µ0 < µ
⇤, then limU1( n) = u1(a0), limU2( n) =
µ0
µ∗
u2(a1) +
⇣
1  µ0
µ∗
⌘
u2(a0), and
limE✓1( n)
 
 Tn
 
= u1(a1) u1(a0)
V1 u1(a1)
.
8.1. Centralized Play and Coarsening
13We omit the sketch of the proof for other implications of Theorem 1 for space considerations. The
current sketch contains the most important tools we use for the general proof.
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8.1.1. Centralized Play: A generalized centralized play Γ is an auxiliary static direct
mechanism in which player 1, who is a commitment type with probability µ0, first reports
his type to the designer. The designer then garbles the information sent by the commit-
ment and the normal types, and sends a message, which we take to be the posterior belief
induced by the message, µ 2 [0, 1]. Let the distribution over posteriors be governed by
(Borel-measurable) probability measures,   : {✓0, ✓1}! ∆[0, 1]. We write  (✓)(µ) for the
probability that message µ is given when player 1 reports his type ✓. Note that Bayes’
rule puts a further restriction on the probability that message µ 2 [0, 1] is sent after each
report, given by
µ0 (1  µ) (✓1)(µ) = (1  µ0)µ (✓0)(µ). (9)
For convenience, we refer to  (µ) := µ0 (✓1)(µ)+ (1 µ0) (✓0)(µ) as the probability that
the posterior belief is µ, given the garbling used by the mechanism. Observe that equation
(9) implies that
 (✓0)(µ) =  (µ)
1  µ
1  µ0
,
 (✓1)(µ) =  (µ)
µ
µ0
. (10)
The mechanism also identifies a   measurable function Y : Θ ⇥ [0, 1] ! ∆{a0, a1, S}.
The term Y (✓)(µ) corresponds to the probability distribution over action profiles that the
designer chooses to play for type ✓ at belief µ. The tuple Γ = ( , Y ) denotes the garbling
used by the designer, and the distribution over the action profiles, for each µ 2 [0, 1]. Fix
a prior belief µ0, discount factor  , and a strategy profile   in the dynamic game. We say
that a generalized centralized play Γ implements   if the equations (11), (12), and (13)
below hold for each ✓ 2 Θ:
 (✓)(µ) = E✓ 
 X
ht2H
 
(1   ) tI{µ(ht)=µ,t<T} + I{µ(ht)=µ,T=t} 
t
 !
, (11)
 (✓)(µ)Y (✓) (µ)(a) = E✓( )
 X
ht2H
 
I{µ(ht)=µ,t<T,at=a}(1   ) 
t
 !
for a 2 {a0, a1}, (12)
 (✓)(µ)Y (✓) (µ)(S) =  (✓)(µ)
0
@1  X
a2{a0,a1}
Y (✓)(µ)(a)
1
A = E✓( n)  I{µ(ht)=µ,T=t} t  .
(13)
The introduction of a centralized play will be a useful tool to investigate player 2’s
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equilibrium payoff bounds. If Γ implements  , then the probability of each action a 2
{a0, a1} chosen by the generalized centralized play after the garbling leads to belief µ, is
equal to the expected discounted number of periods at which i) player 1 plays action a
and ii) the public belief that player 1 is a commitment type equals µ. Note first that
because the commitment type plays a1 at every period, we have Y (✓1)(µ)(a0) = 0 for all
µ > 0.14 Second, because in any Nash equilibrium, the normal type can always mimic the
commitment type, a generalized centralized play Γ which implements a Nash equilibrium
  satisfies the following incentive compatibility constraint:
ˆ
[0,1]
 (✓0)(µ)
0
@ X
a2{a0,a1}
Y (✓0)(µ)(a) (u1(a)  V1) + V1
1
A d[µ]   (14)
ˆ
[0,1]
 (✓1)(µ)
0
@ X
a2{a0,a1}
Y (✓1)(µ)(a) (u1(a)  V1) + V1
1
A d[µ]
Moreover, because the belief process is a martingale, we obtain that for every ✓ 2 Θ,
ˆ
[0,1]
µ (✓1)(µ)d[µ] = µ0,
ˆ
[0,1]
(1  µ) (✓0)(µ)d[µ] = 1  µ0.
We now introduce a strengthening of the notion of generalized centralized play by restrict-
ing that Y (✓0)(µ) = Y (✓1)(µ) for almost every µ, calling such mechanisms centralized
plays.
Definition 1. A generalized centralized play Γ = ( , Y ) is a centralized play if for
almost every posterior µ 2 ∆Θ with respect to the measure  , Y (✓0)(µ) = Y (✓1)(µ) =:
Y (µ).
In general, a strategy profile may not be implemented by a centralized play. However,
when players are sufficiently patient, the generalized play that implements a strategy
profile is approximated by a centralized play. Formally, take a sequence of dynamic games
along which all the parameters of the game except for the discount factor   are fixed. Let
{ n}n=1,... be a sequence of strategy profiles for this sequence of games, and suppose
 n ! 1. Let {Γn}n be the associated sequence of generalized centralized plays where each
14The implication is stated for µ > 0, because Bayes’ rule implies that  (✓1)(0) = 0, hence there is no
restriction on Y (✓1)(0).
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Γn implements  n. Each Γn induces a probability measure on the set (4Θ⇥4{A, S}).
Since the set (4Θ⇥4{A, S}) is compact, the family of probability measures over them
is relatively compact by Prohorov’s Theorem (Billingsley (2013), Theorem 5.1), and thus
each sequence {Γn} of probability measure has a (weakly) convergent subsequence. In
the Appendix, we show that every limit point Γ = ( , Y ) of {Γn}n is a centralized play.
To show this result, we utilize a powerful learning lemma shown in Fudenberg and Levine
(1992). We assume that the entire sequence {Γn} is convergent for the remainder of this
sketch.
8.1.2. Coarsening: Fix a belief µ¯ 2 (0, 1). A centralized play Γ˜ = ( ˜, Y˜ ) is a µ¯-coarse
centralized play if the support of  ˜ is {0, µ¯, 1}. For every centralized play Γ = ( , Y ), we
construct a new centralized play Γ˜ = ( ˜, Y˜ ) which is a µ¯-coarsening of Γ that preserves
the probability distribution over action profiles and types generated by Γ almost surely.
We use the following martingale-splitting to construct Γ˜:
 ˜(0) =
ˆ
[0,µ¯]
✓
1 
µ
µ¯
◆
  [dµ]
 ˜(1) =
ˆ
(µ¯,1]
✓
µ  µ¯
1  µ¯
◆
  [dµ]
 ˜(µ¯) = 1   ˜(0)   ˜(1).
Note that  ˜(✓)(µ) for ✓ 2 {✓0, ✓1}, and for µ 2 {0, µ¯, 1} are derived from  ˜(µ) using
equation (10).
Likewise, we construct Y˜ using   and Y as follows: For each a 2 {a0, a1, S} let
Y˜ (0)(a) =
´
[0,µ¯]
Y (µ)(a)
⇣
1  µ
µ¯
⌘
  [dµ]
 ˜(0)
if  ˜(0) > 0,
Y˜ (µ¯)(a) =
´
[0,µ¯]
Y (µ)(a)
⇣
µ
µ¯
⌘
  [dµ] +
´
(µ¯,1]
Y (µ)(a)
⇣
1 µ
1 µ¯
⌘
  [dµ]
 ˜(µ¯)
if  ˜(µ¯) > 0,
Y˜ (1)(a) =
´
(µ¯,1]
Y (µ)(a)
⇣
µ µ¯
1 µ¯
⌘
  [dµ]
 ˜(1)
if  ˜(1) > 0.
If  ˜(µ) = 0 for some µ 2 {0, µ¯, 1}, then we put no further restriction on Y˜ (µ)(·) except
that Y˜ (µ)(a)   0 for every a 2 {a0, a1, S} and
P
a2{a0,a1,S}
Y˜ (µ)(a) = 1. Essentially, when
coarsening a centralized play, we split the beliefs µ 2 [0, µ¯] to the set of beliefs {0, µ¯}, and
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0 1µ¯µ
˜ ˜
(a) µ  µ¯
0 1µ¯ µ
(b) µ > µ¯
Figure 3: This panel illustrates martingale-splitting used in the coarsening procedure. If
µ  µ¯, as in the left figure, then  (µ) is split to  ˜(0) and  ˜(µ) with the weights 1  µ
µ¯
and
µ
µ¯
, respectively. If µ > µ¯, as in the right figure, then a similar procedure is used to split
 (µ) to  ˜(1) and  ˜(µ) with the weights 1  1 µ
1 µ¯
and 1 µ
1 µ¯
, respectively.
beliefs µ 2 (µ¯, 1] to the set of beliefs {µ¯, 1}. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure for  .
Remark 1. Every coarsening of a centralized play preserves the distribution over action
profiles type by type, hence it preserves players’ payoffs.
8.2. Reputation Boundary We start with the definition of a reputation boundary.
Verbally, a belief µ¯ 2 (0, 1) is a reputation boundary if whenever player 1’s reputation is
above the boundary µ¯, a patient player 2 plays S almost immediately in all Nash equilibria
(NE).
Definition 2. A belief µ¯ 2 (0, 1) is a reputation boundary if for all µˆ > µ¯,
lim inf
 %1
inf
µ˜0 µˆ
(
E( )
⇥
 T
⇤
:   is a NE for
the game with prior µ˜0 and the discount factor  
)
= 1. (15)
Lemma 3. A reputation boundary exists.
Existence of such a boundary is obtained rather easily using an auxiliary static mechanism-
design program. In this program, player 2 chooses a strategy profile against a normal type,
and a strategy against the commitment type, that maximize his expected payoff subject
to a static incentive constraint that the normal type does not strictly prefer to follow the
strategy profile for the commitment type. Any equilibrium strategy profile that obeys
(on path) sequential rationality constraints satisfies the static constraints implied by this
program. When the initial belief that player 1 is a commitment type is close to 1, the
solution is attained uniquely by player 2 playing S immediately. Therefore, a stronger
result is obtained for the special case in which there is a single commitment type: there
exists a boundary µ¯ < 1 such that if µ > µ¯, then T = 0 in all Nash equilibria, indepen-
dent of  . Reputation boundary separates the region of high reputations, where further
screening is not sequentially rational for player 2, from the region of lower reputations
where some screening may be possible.
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8.3. High Reputation Suppose µ0 > µ
⇤. We will now argue that if players are suffi-
ciently patient, then player 2 plays S almost immediately, in all Nash equilibria. In other
words, we will show that µ⇤ is a reputation boundary.
To this end, assume towards a contradiction that the infimum of all reputation bound-
aries is µ¯ > µ⇤, and observe that Definition 2 implies that µ¯ is itself a reputation boundary.
We will find " 2 (0, µ¯ µ⇤) such that the property highlighted in equation (15) holds when
we replace µ¯ with µ¯  ", i.e., µ¯  " is a reputation boundary. This establishes the contra-
diction to the hypothesis that µ¯ is the infimum over all reputation boundaries.
Take a sequence of games in which the prior is µ0, and the discount factor along the
sequence converges to 1. Also, take a sequence of Nash equilibria of the sequence of games,
{ n}, and generalized centralized plays, {Γn}, where each Γn implements  n. Let Γ be
a limit point of Γ. As we discussed previously, Γ is a centralized play. Because each Γn
satisfies the IC constraint (14), so does Γ. Moreover, since the commitment type never
plays a0, ˆ
µ>0
 (µ)Y (µ)(a0)d[µ] = 0. (16)
Finally, because of the definition of the reputation boundary, as  n ! 1, the probability
that action S is taken when the posterior belief µt > µ¯ approaches to 1. Hence, we have
that X
a2{a0,a1}
ˆ
µ>µ¯
 (µ)Y (µ)(a)d[µ] = 0. (17)
We call a centralized play limit-equilibrium-compatible if it satisfies the incentive com-
patibility constraint (14), and satisfies equalities (16) and (17). We conclude with the
following Lemma.
Lemma 4. Γ is limit-equilibrium-compatible.
Player 2’s behavior when µ0 2 [µ¯  ", µ¯]: Suppose now that µ0 2 [µ¯  ", µ¯] for some
small " 2 (0, µ¯   µ⇤). In light of Lemma 4 and Remark 1, player 2’s limit equilibrium
payoff along the sequence { n} converges to the payoff she would get from the limit-
equilibrium-compatible centralized play Γ = ( , Y ). Let Γ˜ =
⇣
 ˜, Y˜
⌘
be the µ¯-coarsening
of Γ. Player 2’s payoff in Γ˜ is the same as her payoff in Γ, and is given by
2
664
 ˜(0)
⇣P
a2{a0,a1}
Y˜ (0)(a) (u2(a)  V2 (0)) + V2(0)
⌘
+ ˜(µ¯)
⇣
Y˜ (µ¯)(a1) (u2(a1)  V2 (µ¯)) + V2(µ¯)
⌘
 ˜(1)V2(1)
3
775 , (18)
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and the incentive compatibility constraint is
 ˜(✓0)(0)
hP
a2{a0,a1}
Y˜ (0)(a) (u1(a)  V1) + V1
i
+  ˜(✓0)(µ¯)
h
Y˜ (µ¯)(a1) (u2(a1)  V1) + V1
i
   ˜(✓1)(µ¯)
h
Y˜ (µ¯)(a1) (u2(a1)  V1) + V1
i
+  ˜(✓1)(1)V1.
(19)
Let  (Γ0) be the value achieved by (18) under a limit-equilibrium compatible cen-
tralized play Γ0 = ( 0, Y 0). Consider the problem of maximizing  (Γ0) across the set of
all limit-equilibrium-compatible centralized plays. Recall that V2(µ0) = µ0V2(✓1) + (1  
µ0)V2(✓0) is the payoff of player 2 from playing S at the beginning of the game. We show
in the Appendix the following Lemma, which we use to extend the reputation boundary:
Lemma 5. There exists " > 0 such that if µ0 2 [µ¯  ", µ¯] , then for every limit-equilibrium-
compatible centralized play Γ0 = ( 0, Y 0),
´
µ2[0,1]
 0(µ)Y 0(µ)(S)d[µ] < 1 implies
 (Γ0) < V2(µ0).
Lemma 5 implies that µ¯  " is a reputation boundary. This is because player 2’s equi-
librium payoffs are bounded below by V2(µ0) for any discount factor. If, along a sequence
of equilibria, player 2 does not play S almost immediately against some type, then the
limit-centralized play satisfies
´
µ2[0,1]
 (µ)Y (µ)(S)dµ < 1. Then, Lemma 5 implies that
player 2’s limit equilibrium payoff is less than V2(µ0), which contradicts player 2’s behavior
being part of an equilibrium. Hence, we obtain the following result, which states that for
any prior µ0 > µ
⇤, a sufficiently patient player 2 almost immediately takes the irreversible
action in any Nash equilibrium, and her equilibrium payoffs converge to V2(µ0), i.e., µ
⇤ is
a reputation boundary. This also completes the sketch of the first item of Claim 1.
Lemma 6. µ⇤ is a reputation boundary.
Corollary 1. Take a sequence of Nash equilibria { n}n of a sequence of games along
which all the parameters except the discount factor is fixed, µ0 2 [0, 1], and  n ! 1. Let
{Γn}n be the associated sequence of generalized centralized plays where Γn implements  n,
and let Γ = ( , Y ) be the limit point of {Γn}n. Then, Y (µ)(S) = 1 for almost every
µ 2 (µ⇤, 1] with respect to the measure  .
Corollary 1 follows from Lemma 6 for the following reason. Fix a Nash equilibrium,
a belief µ > µ⇤, and consider the first on path history ht at which the posterior belief
µ(ht) = µ. The continuation strategy profile at ht is a Nash equilibrium of the game in
which the prior is µ. Hence, Lemma 6 implies that S is played almost immediately. But
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this means that the expected discounted number of periods in which the posterior belief
is equal to µ, and W is played, is close to 0. Hence, either Y (µ)(S) = 1, or  (µ) = 0.
8.4. Low Reputation We now sketch the proof of the second item of Claim 1. We
start by showing that player 2 does not play S at histories in which the posterior belief
is strictly less than µ⇤.
Lemma 7. Take a sequence of Nash equilibria { n}n of a sequence of games along which
all the parameters except the discount factor is fixed, µ0 2 [0, 1], and  n ! 1. Let {Γn}n
be the associated sequence of generalized centralized plays where Γn implements  n, and
let Γ = ( , Y ) be the limit point of {Γn}n. Then,
ˆ
µ2[0,µ∗)
 (µ)Y (µ)(S)d[µ] = 0.
To show Lemma 7, we first show that for any fixed prior µ0 = µ < µ
⇤, a sufficiently
patient player 2 never plays S at the beginning of the game. To see why this implies
Lemma 7, observe that in any equilibrium, and at any on path history ht with µ(ht) = µ,
the continuation strategy profile at ht is a Nash equilibrium of the game in which the
prior is µ, and hence S is not played at such histories, delivering the result.
We now explain why for any fixed prior µ0 = µ < µ
⇤, a sufficiently patient player
2 never plays S at the beginning of the game. Suppose that u2(a0)   u2(a1). Then,
because µ < µ⇤, V2(µ) < u2(a1)  min{u2(a0), u2(a1)}, and never playing S gives player
2 a strictly higher payoff than playing S right away. The more challenging case is if
u2(a0) < u2(a1). In this case, consider an alternative strategy for player 2,  
0
2, that plays
S at the first history when the posterior belief reaches weakly above µ⇤, and plays W
at all other histories.15 If player 2 plays S at the beginning of the game with a positive
probability, then her equilibrium payoff is V2(µ). However, if she plays  
0
2, regardless of
player 1’s strategy, her payoff is bounded below by a number that converges as   ! 1 to
✓
1 
µ
µ⇤
◆
u2(a0) +
µ
µ⇤
u2(a1). (20)
Observe that for µ < µ⇤
g(µ) :=
✓
1 
µ
µ⇤
◆
u2(a0) +
µ
µ⇤
u2(a1) > V2(µ),
15Note that since this strategy may be a deviation, the play may be off-path with respect to an
equilibrium if player 2 plays according to  02.
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because g(·) and V2(·) are affine functions, and g(0) > V2(0), and g(µ
⇤) = V2(µ
⇤). Hence,
a sufficiently patient player has a profitable deviation from a strategy in which she plays
S with a positive probability at the beginning of the game.
We obtain the lower bound on player 2’s payoff in the Expression (20) from the strategy
 02 by considering all strategies of player 1, not only incentive-compatible ones. Let { 
0
n}n
be a sequence of strategy profiles of a sequence of games where  n ! 1, and player
2’s strategy in  0n is equal to  
0
2. Let {Γ
0
n} be the sequence of generalized centralized
plays that implements { 0n} with a limit point Γ
0. Let Γ˜0 be the µ⇤-coarsening of Γ0.
Because  02 plays S at histories with posterior belief greater than µ
⇤, and never plays
S when this belief is less than µ⇤, by the properties of the coarsening procedure, we
have Y˜ 0(0)(S) = 0, Y˜ 0(1)(S) = 1 and Y˜ 0(µ⇤)(a0) = 0. Consider minimizing player
2’s payoff across coarse centralized plays, Γ˜, that satisfy the aforementioned properties.
The inequality u2(a0) < u2(a1) implies that the objective function is minimized when
Y˜ (0)(a0) = 1. Moreover, V2(µ
⇤) = u2(a1). Hence, player 2’s payoff minimization problem
boils down to:
min
 (1)2[0,µ]
 (0)u2(a0) +  (µ
⇤)V2 (µ
⇤) +  (1)V2 (1)
Subject to: X
µ2{0,µ∗,1}
 (µ) = 1, and
µ⇤ (µ⇤) = µ   (1)
The first constraint is imposed because the support of   is {0, µ⇤, 1}, and the second
constraint follows because Bayes’ rule implies µ
1 µ
 (✓1)(µ∗)
 (✓0)(µ∗)
= µ
∗
1 µ∗
,  (✓0)(1) = 0,  (✓1)(0) =
0. After plugging the constraints in the objective function, and rearranging, the coefficient
in front of  (1) becomes positive, hence the program is minimized at  (1) = 0. This gives
us the lower bound in the Expression (20).
Remark 2. Take a sequence of Nash equilibria { n}n of a sequence of games along which
all the parameters except the discount factor is fixed, µ0 2 [0, 1], and  n ! 1. Let {Γn}n
be the associated sequence of generalized centralized plays where Γn implements  n, and
let Γ = ( , Y ) be the limit point of {Γn}n. Then, Lemmata 6, 7 and Γ being a centralized
play imply the following:
1.
´
µ>µ∗
 (µ)Y (µ)(S)d[µ] =
´
µ>µ∗
 (µ)d[µ].
2.
´
µ2[0,µ∗)
 (µ)Y (µ)(S)d[µ] = 0.
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3.
´
µ2(0,µ∗)
 (µ)Y (µ)(a1)d[µ] =
´
µ2(0,µ∗)
 (µ)d[µ].
Therefore, if Γ˜ is a µ⇤-coarsening of Γ, then  ˜(0)Y˜ (0)(S) = 0,  ˜(1)
⇣
1  Y˜ (1)(S)
⌘
= 0
and  ˜(µ⇤)Y˜ (µ⇤)(a0) = 0.
Our next step is to provide an upper bound on player 1’s equilibrium payoffs when his
reputation is µ < µ⇤.
Lemma 8. Take a sequence of Nash equilibria { n}n of a sequence of games along which
all the parameters except the discount factor is fixed, µ0 2 [0, µ
⇤), and  n ! 1. Player 1’s
equilibrium payoffs converge to u1(a0).
Suppose towards a contradiction that Lemma 8 is false. Because player 1 can always
guarantee himself a payoff of at least u1(a0), the contradiction hypothesis is that we can
find a sequence of Nash equilibria { n}n for which limU1 ( n) > u1 (a0). Let {Γn}n be
the associated sequence of generalized centralized plays where Γn implements  n, and let
Γ = ( , Y ) be the limit point of {Γn}n. Also let Γ˜ be the µ
⇤-coarsening of Γ.
Recall that  ˜(✓0)(1) =  ˜(✓1)(0) = 0 for any centralized play, due to Bayes’ rule.
Furthermore, because µ0 < µ
⇤, equation (9) implies that  ˜(✓1)(µ
⇤) >  ˜(✓0)(µ
⇤). Notice
that the payoff of player 1 in Γ˜ is given by:
U1 :=  ˜(✓0)(0)
0
@ X
a2{a0,a1}
Y˜ (0)(a)u1(a)
1
A+  ˜(✓0)(µ⇤)⇣Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1⌘ ,
(21)
where we used  ˜(✓0)(1) = 0, and Remark 2. The incentive compatibility constraint is
U1    ˜(✓1)(µ
⇤)
⇣
Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1
⌘
+  ˜(✓1)(1)V1, (22)
where we used  ˜(✓1)(0) = 0, and Remark 2. Now suppose on the way to a contradiction
that U1 > u1(a0). Because  ˜(✓0)(0) +  ˜(✓0)(µ
⇤) = 1, and because u1(a1) < u1(a0),
U1 > u1(a0) implies that
Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1 > u1(a0), and
Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1   U1.
Because V1   Y (µ
⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1)+V1, inequality (22) is satisfied only if  ˜(✓0)(0) =
0, and  ˜(✓1)(1)Y˜ (µ
⇤)(a1) = 0. However, if  ˜(✓0)(0) = 0, then  ˜(✓0)(µ
⇤) = 1, which
contradicts to  ˜(✓1)(µ
⇤) >  ˜(✓0)(µ
⇤).
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We have shown that if µ0 < µ
⇤, the player 1’s equilibrium payoffs converge to u1(a0), as
the players get arbitrarily patient. We now argue that  ˜(✓1)(1) = 0, and Y˜ (µ
⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1)+
V1 = u1(a0), continuing with the arguments we used for the sketch of Lemma 8. Sup-
pose on the way to a contradiction that Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1 < u1(a0). Then
U1 = u1(a0) implies that  ˜(✓0)(µ
⇤) = 0, which in turn implies by Bayes’ rule that
 ˜(✓1)(µ
⇤) = 0. Hence,  ˜(✓1)(1) = 1, which violates the incentive compatibility constraint,
(22). Suppose on the way to a contradiction that Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1 > u1(a0).
Then, U1 = u1(a0) implies that again the incentive compatibility constraint, (22), is vio-
lated. So, we obtain that Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1)+V1 = u1(a0). To see that  ˜(✓1)(1) = 0,
we again use the incentive compatibility constraint, (22), and notice that  ˜(✓1)(1) > 0
violates the constraint.
The implication of  ˜(✓1)(1) = 0, and Y˜ (µ
⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1) + V1 = u1(a0) is that
1  Y˜ (µ⇤)(a1) = limE
✓1
( n)
 
 Tn
 
= u1(a0) u1(a1)
V1 u1(a1)
. Finally, note that µ < µ⇤ and  ˜(✓1)(1) = 0
imply by Bayes’ rule (see equation (9)) that  ˜(✓0)(0) = 1  
µ0
1 µ0
1 µ∗
µ∗
> 0. Hence, U1 =
u1(a0), and Y˜ (µ
⇤)(a1) (u1(a1)  V1)+V1 = u1(a0) imply that Y˜ (0)(a0) = 1, and we obtain
that limU2( n) =
µ0
µ∗
u2(a1) +
⇣
1  µ0
µ∗
⌘
u2(a0) .
9. Relation to the Literature
This paper is closely related to the reputation literature with imperfect monitoring,
reputation literature with long-lived players and the literature on dynamic principal-agent
models without commitment.
The first strand of literature we relate to is the reputation literature with imperfect
monitoring. The closest papers to ours are Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Cripps
et al. (2004). Both papers study reputation effects in repeated games with imperfect
monitoring, whereas we study a dynamic game with irreversible actions.
Fudenberg and Levine (1992) study a repeated game played between a long-lived,
patient and informed player against a sequence of uninformed, short-lived opponents, in
which the informed player’s actions are observed with noise. They find that the informed
player receives her Stackelberg payoff as long as there is a small but positive probability
that the informed player can be a commitment type who plays the Stackelberg action at
every period. In our dynamic stopping model, both players have equal discount factors,
and the payoff of the uninformed player if she stops the game depends her opponent’s
type, i.e., there are interdependent values. In our model, the informed player does not
get his Stackelberg payoff in equilibrium. We focus on the limit equilibrium behavior for
any initial belief, and the equilibrium payoffs and behavior depends on this initial belief
even when the players are patient. The most important connection between our model
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and theirs is that we utilize a learning result shown in Fudenberg and Levine (1992).
Pei (2018) studies a repeated game with a long-lived player and infinitely many short-
lived opponents, and assumes payoffs are interdependent. He shows that reputation effects
may fail when values are interdependent. In monotone-supermodular games, he shows
that all equilibria involve the informed player signaling his type initially by choosing
an action, and always playing that action. In our model, the principal’s payoff from
stopping the game depends on the agent’s type, hence in our model payoffs are likewise
interdependent. Different from Pei (2018), we study a dynamic game with an irreversible
action, the players share a common discount factor, and informed player’s actions are
allowed to be observed with noise.
Cripps et al. (2004) showed that in repeated games with reputation effects, when
monitoring is imperfect and the information structure has full support, eventually the
private information of the informed party gets revealed, and the behavior converges to
an equilibrium of the repeated game with complete information. We use this insight
to characterize the long-run behavior when there is full-support imperfect monitoring in
contracting games. We use a similar but different insight to characterize the long-run
behavior in screening games, without assuming the full-support assumption. The insight
of Cripps et al. (2004) led us to explore whether the inevitability of information revelation
will lead the principal to experiment and wait further. In our model, until the game is
stopped, the informed party reveals his private information progressively. In a repeated
game, progressive information revelation leads to eventually full revelation of the informed
player’s types. However, in our dynamic game, the uninformed player may stop the game
at certain beliefs. This prevents complete learning of the informed player’s type. The
beliefs at which the game stops depends on the principal’s expectation of the speed by
which further information will be revealed. We characterize such beliefs at which the
game will eventually be stopped, and this allows us to calculate the long-run probability
with which the game stops against each type. To do so, we need to focus on the case of
patient players, which is unlike Cripps et al. (2004), whose results hold for every discount
factor.
Our paper is related to reputation effects in repeated games with long-lived players.
In this line of research, the closest papers to ours are Cripps et al. (2005) and Atakan
and Ekmekci (2012). The first paper shows a reputation result when the stage game is a
simultaneous-move strictly conflicting interest game, and the latter one shows a reputation
result when the stage game is a game of perfect information and is a strictly conflicting
interest game or a locally non-conflicting interest game. Both papers assume that the ac-
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tion or the move of the informed player is perfectly observed. Atakan and Ekmekci (2015)
assumes that the uninformed player’s actions are observed with noise, which allows them
to study simultaneous-move games and also extend their previous reputation result to a
more robust type of uncertainty about commitment types. We borrow some techniques
developed by this previous work. Most importantly, in screening games, to obtain the limit
equilibrium payoff function we use mechanism design approach iteratively to get better
predictions about Player 2’s equilibrium behavior. Atakan and Ekmekci (2012, 2015) use
a dynamic programming technique iteratively to obtain a reputation result. Apart from
these, we introduce the notion of centralized plays, and an auxiliary mechanism-design
problem to obtain equilibrium properties. We also use a suitable version of martingale-
splitting (coarsening procedure) that was introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1995), to
decrease the dimensionality of the auxiliary mechanism-design problem, and solve it.
Our paper is also related to dynamic principal-agent models without commitment.
The seminal papers Sobel (1985) and Watson (1999) study models in which a principal
starts setting small stakes in a relationship to screen the agent’s type, and increases the
stakes as his beliefs about the agent being a trustworthy type increases. Similar forces
appear in screening games studied in this paper. Hart and Tirole (1988) study a model
in which a seller who repeatedly sells a good to a buyer cannot commit not to decrease
its price after learning that the buyer has a lower valuation. Similar forces appear in
contracting games. Relatedly, Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988, 1993), Gerardi and Maestri
(2018) and Acharya and Ortner (2017) study the ratchet effect in a similar context. In
these papers, the principal cannot commit not to change the terms of trade after learning
the agent’s type.16 In our models, the set of screening tools available to the principal is
coarse, and the principal has an irreversible action. Moreover, we allow for the agent’s
actions to be observed with noise, whereas all papers we mentioned in this literature
analyze situations with perfect monitoring.
Our paper is also related to screening games with Coasian dynamics. Gul et al. (1986),
Deneckere and Liang (2006) and Strulovici (2017) study screening problems modeled
through a bargaining process. Liu et al. (Forthcoming) studies Coase conjecture when
the seller faces multiple buyers every period, and uses an auction with reserve price to
screen the buyers. In our model, different from this literature, the principal cannot adjust
16A recent strand of this literature has given a new perspective to dynamic screening problems. Mal-
comson (2016) studies the ratchet effect in relational contracts. In his model, the agent’s actions are
observed perfectly. Bhaskar and Mailath (2019) study a dynamic moral hazard problem with initial
symmetric information, hidden actions and imperfect monitoring. Unobservability of the agent’s action
leads to asymmetric information in the out-of-equilibrium paths, and lead to the ratchet effect. In these
papers, the principal does not have an irreversible action.
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the terms of the relationship finely, and the agent’s actions are observed with noise.
10. Discussion
10.1. Multiple Stopping Actions In our model, the principal has a single stopping
action. Consider a variation of our model in which if player 2 decides to stop the game,
she may choose one of two possible irreversible actions. For a concrete example, consider
a hybrid model that incorporates the games described in Examples 1 and 2. In any period
when the game has not yet stopped, player 2 chooses W , or one of two possible irreversible
actions, Sp or Sf (stands for stop and promote and stop and demote, respectively) which
ends the game. In any period when the game has not yet stopped, player 1 chooses his
action from the set A = {a0, a1}. Player 1 is either a normal type (✓0), or a commitment
type (✓1), who plays a1 at every period of the game. Let µ0 2 (0, 1) be the probability that
player 1 is a commitment type. We allow for imperfect monitoring of player 1’s actions,
and maintain Assumption 1 on the monitoring structure.
Players’ payoff function in any period when the game has not stopped yet are identical
to those in the examples, i.e., u1(a1) = 0, u1(a0) = 1, u2(a1) = 1, and u2(a0) = 0. The
lump-sum continuation payoffs when the stopping action is taken depends on whether Sp
or Sf is chosen by player 2. If Sp is chosen, then the payoffs are as in Example 1, i.e.,
V1(Sp) = 2, V2(Sp, ✓0) =  1, and V2(Sp, ✓1) = 2. If Sf is chosen, then the payoffs are as
in Example 2, i.e., V1(Sf ) =  1, V2(Sf , ✓0) = 2, and V2(Sf , ✓1) =  1. Hence, player 2
prefers to play Sp against the commitment type, and Sf against the normal type, while
player 1 prefers Sp to Sf .
We first observe that if the normal type of player 1 is expected to pool with the
commitment type (i.e., play a1) at every period of the game when the game has not been
stopped yet, then player 2’s best response is to play Sf if µ0 < 1/3 , and to play Sp if
µ0 > 2/3, at the beginning of the game. If µ0 2 (1/3, 2/3), then her best response would
be to never stop the game (along the path generated by player 1’s expected behavior).
We have verified that, as the players get arbitrarily patient, the equilibrium outcomes
measured as the expected discounted number of periods in which each action profile is
taken against each type, converge to the unique equilibrium outcome of the auxiliary two-
stage game, which is defined in the same fashion as it is defined in our main model. In
particular, if µ0 < 1/3, then player 2 plays Sf almost immediately against both types. If
µ0 > 2/3, then player 2 plays Sp almost immediately against both types. If µ0 2 (1/3, 2/3),
then the outcome is as if player 2 always plays W , and player 1 plays a1. In the long
run, however, if the monitoring structure satisfies the full-support assumption, then the
posterior beliefs eventually reach the set {1/3, 2/3}, and player 2 eventually stops the
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game, and plays either Sf when posterior belief is close to 1/3, or plays Sp when the
posterior belief is close to 2/3.
10.2. Class of Games Assumption 3 restricts the class of games we study. Impor-
tantly, it implies that the dynamic game has a unique equilibrium when player 1’s type
is known. We now discuss two examples for a preliminary exploration of how our results
would change if we relaxed Assumption 3.
First, consider a variation of Example 2, in which the only change is V2(✓0) = 0.5. With
this modification, the game is no longer a contracting game, because V2(✓0) < u2(a1) = 1.
In this game, player 2 would prefer not to play S against the commitment type, or against
the normal type if he is expected to pool with the commitment type, and prefers to play
S against the normal type if she expects player 1 to play a0 for a sufficiently long period.
In this game, a reputation result holds: For a fixed µ0 > 0, player 1’s Nash equilibrium
payoffs are bounded below by a payoff that converges to u1(a1) = 1 as the parties become
arbitrarily patient. To see why, first observe that, for any discount factor  , there exists
a threshold µ( ) > 0 such that player 2 does not play S when her posterior belief about
player 1’s type is above µ( ), in any Nash equilibrium. Moreover, lim !1 µ( ) = 0. This
is because for a patient player 2, the cost of playing W for a number of periods until the
posterior belief falls close to 0 is smaller than the cost of playing S against the commitment
type. Second, observe that, by mimicking the commitment type, a patient player 1 can
guarantee himself a payoff close to u1(a1). This is because the probability that player 2’s
posterior belief never falls below µ( ), conditional on player 1 always playing a1, converges
to 1 when µ( ) converges to zero. These two observations deliver the result. However,
when player 1 is known to be the normal type, and when players are patient, there are
multiple payoff profiles that can be sustained in equilibrium. Therefore, our techniques
do not allow us to obtain a payoff or behavior characterization result in this example.
Second, consider a variation of Example 1, in which the only change is u2(a1) =  2.
With this modification, the game is no longer a screening game, because V2(✓0) > u2(a1) =
 2. In this game, player 2 would prefer to play S against the commitment type, or against
the normal type if he pools with the commitment type, and prefers to play W against the
normal type if she expects player 1 to play a0 for a sufficiently long period. In this game,
again, a reputation result holds: For a fixed µ0 > 0, player 1’s Nash equilibrium payoffs
are bounded below by a payoff that converges to V1 as the parties become arbitrarily
patient. Moreover, a patient player 2 almost immediately plays S against both types.
This result is far from trivial, and the proof is similar to the proof that µ⇤ is a reputation
boundary in the sketch we provide. The intuition is similar to that in Cripps et al. (2005)
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and Atakan and Ekmekci (2012), who study reputation effects in repeated games with
strictly conflicting interests. Notice that, our example is akin to a strictly conflicting
interest game: player 1 has an action, a1, that if he committed to playing forever, then
player 2 has a unique best response, which gives player 2 her minmax payoff, and player
1 his highest individually rational payoff. However, the dynamic game we consider is not
a repeated game, which makes the analysis easier, allowing us to work with imperfect
monitoring on the informed player’s actions, which brings new challenges. We leave a
more general analysis of this class of games for future work.
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Appendix
Section A presents a summary and reminder of the notation. Section B presents a
learning result. Section C presents the concept of generalized centralized plays and pro-
vides results about the limits of sequences of generalized centralized plays. Section D
presents the coarsening technique, which uses the martingale-splitting technique appro-
priately to reduce the dimensionality of centralized plays. Sections E and F provide the
proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3. All proofs that are not presented in the Appendix are in
the Supplementary Appendix.
A. Notation
For i = 1, 2, let u¯i := maxa2A |ui(a)| and ui := mina2Aui(a).
For every " 2 (0, 1) and   2 (0, 1) , let t (") be the smallest positive integer t such that
 t < 1  ".
For each m 2 N and  , let t (m) be the smallest positive integer t such that  
t <
1 m 1.
For every i 2 {1, ..., K}, let Yi := {y 2 Y : P (y | ↵i) > 0}, and P i := min{P (yj | ↵i) : y 2 Yi} .
Given two elements x, y of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, we define d(x, y) :=
kx  yk , where k. k stands for the Euclidian norm.
Given a set A ✓ RN and a vector x 2 RN, we define d(x,A) := infx˜2A￿ kx  x˜k . For
every subset A of RN and ✏ > 0 let A✏ :=
 
x 2 RN:d(x,A) < ✏
 
.
Given z1, z2 2 ∆Y , let
||z1, z2|| := max
y2Y
|z1(y)  z2(y)|.
Consider the set D = {S} [4A. The metric d⇤ on D is defined as follows. Take
two elements x0, x00 2 D. We have d⇤ (x0, x00) = 0 if x0 = x00 = S, d⇤ (x0, x00) = 2 if
(x0, x00) /2 4A⇥4A, and finally d⇤ (x0, x00) = kx0   x00k otherwise.
Recall that µi is the distribution over types that puts probability 1 on type i, µi
b is the
distribution that puts probability µ⇤i on type ✓i, and remaining probability on the normal
type, ✓0. Moreover, recall that µ˜i := {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) > 0, µ(✓j) = 0 for all j 6= {0, i}}.
For ✏ > 0, let µi
b,✏ denote the ✏ neighborhood (given the Euclidean metric) of µi
b.
Likewise, let µb := [i2{1,2,...,s}µi
b. Also let µi
" be the "-neighborhood of µi.
Let the set of beliefs at least "-away from the edges be defined by:
µ˜ε := {µ 2 ∆Θ : 9 (i, j) 2 {1, ..., K}
2 , i 6= j such that µ(✓i) > " and µ(✓j) > "}.
For any finite set A we let |A| represent its cardinality. For any set A ✓ X, we write
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Ac for its complement with respect to X. We write B (X) for the Borel sigma-field of
the topological space X. The term µt(✓) 2 ∆Θ means the belief held by player 2 at the
beginning of period t. We write ht [ {y} for a public history for period t+ 1 that follows
ht in which player 2 plays W and the public signal is y at the last period. We use U1, (h
t)
and U1(h
t;  ) interchangeably to denote the continuation payoff of the normal type of
player 1 at history ht when strategy profile is  . We use NE as an abbreviation for Nash
equilibrium.
B. Learning Result
This section establishes a learning result which shows that the expected discounted
number of periods in which different types of player 1 play different actions and player 2
remains uncertain about player 1’s type goes to zero as   goes to one. The proof of the
lemma adapts techniques developed by Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and their proofs are
relegated to the Supplementary Appendix, Section G. In the following, fix a sequence of
dynamic games along which the discount factor converges to 1, and take a sequence of
strategy profiles { n}, where  n = ( 1,n,  2,n) for each n 2 N.
Lemma 9.
1. For every ✏ > 0, i > 0, we have:
lim
n!1
E
✓0
( n)
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tµt(✓i)I{d( 1,n(ht;✓0),↵i)>✏}
!
= 0.
2. For any i, j > 0 and i 6= j, we have:
lim
n!1
E
✓i
( n)
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tµt(✓j)
!
= 0.
3. For any i > 0, we have:
lim
n!1
E
✓i
( n)
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tµt(✓0)Id( 1,n(ht;✓0),↵i)>✏
!
= 0.
Lemma 9 shows that identifying types is very fast when types are expected to play
even slightly different strategies, when players are patient. Item (i) establishes that the
normal type separates himself from a commitment type almost immediately if he does not
almost completely mimic a commitment type. Item (ii) establishes that two commitment
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types are separated almost immediately . Item (iii) together with item (ii) establish that
a commitment type is identified almost immediately if the normal type is not almost
completely mimicking that type.
C. Generalized Centralized Play, Implementation and Incentive
Compatibility
A generalized centralized play is a vector Γ = (Γ (✓0) , ...,Γ (✓K)), where each element in
the vector, Γ (✓), is a probability measure on ((4Θ⇥ ({S} [4A)) ,B (4Θ⇥ ({S} [4A))).
We say a generalized centralized play Γ implements a strategy profile  of a dynamic game
if for every ✓ 2 Θ, µ 2 ∆Θ, the following holds.
Γ (✓) ({µ}, {S}) = E✓( )
 
 TI{µ(hT)=µ}
 
,
Γ (✓) ({µ}, {↵}) = E✓( )
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tI{µ(ht)=µ, 1(ht;✓)=↵}
!
for every ↵ 2 4A.
If a generalized centralized play implements a strategy profile  , then each element in
the vector, Γ(✓), has a marginal distribution on its first element,  (✓) 2 ∆ (∆Θ), and a
conditional distribution on the actions, Y (✓) : ∆Θ! ∆ {S,A}, given by:
 (✓)(µ) := E✓( )
 
(1   )
T 1X
t=0
 tI{µ(ht)=µ} +  
T
I{µ(hT)=µ}
!
for every µ 2 ∆Θ,
and for every µ 2 ∆Θ, with  (✓)(µ) > 0,
Y (✓)(µ)(S) :=
E
✓
( )
 
 TI{µ(hT)=µ}
 
 (✓)(µ)
,
Y (✓)(µ)(a) :=
E
✓
( )
⇣
(1   )
P
T 1
t=0  
t
I{µ(ht)=µ,at=a}
⌘
 (✓)(µ)
for every a 2 A.
Remark 3. Note that if Γ implements  , and if  (✓)(µ) = 0 for some ✓ 2 Θ, µ 2 ∆Θ,
then there is no restriction on Y (✓)(µ).
When we refer to a generalized centralized play, sometimes we mean the vector of
measures Γ, and other times we mean the vector of tuples ( (✓), Y (✓))✓2Θ of marginal
distribution on beliefs, and conditional distributions over actions. We will be explicit
when the context does not clarify the usage.
We say a generalized centralized play obeys the martingale property if:
 (✓i)(µ)µ0(✓i)µ(✓j) =  (✓j)(µ)µ0(✓j)µ(✓i) for every i, j 2 {0, 1, ..., K}. (23)
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Because the public belief process under any strategy profile is a martingale, if a generalized
centralized play implements a strategy profile, then equation (23) holds.
For convenience, when it does not cause a confusion, we refer to   2 ∆ (∆Θ) with
 (µ) :=
P
✓2Θ µ0(✓) (✓)(µ) for each µ 2 ∆Θ as the distribution over posteriors. Observe
that for a given µ 2 ∆Θ , and ✓ such that µ0(✓) > 0, each  (µ) implies a unique  (✓)(µ)
obtained from equation (23). Moreover, if a generalized centralized play implements a
strategy profile, then for every ✓ 2 Θ,
ˆ
∆Θ
 (µ)µ(✓)d[µ] = µ0(✓).
The introduction of a generalized centralized play will be a useful tool to investigate
both players’ equilibrium payoff bounds. For any type ✓, the probability that each action
a 2 A is chosen by the generalized centralized play at belief µ for type ✓ will correspond
to the expected discounted number of periods in which player 2 plays W and player 1
plays action a at histories where the posterior belief about player 1’s type equals to µ,
conditional on type ✓. Likewise, the probability that S is chosen by the generalized cen-
tralized play at belief µ for type ✓ will correspond to the expected discounted probability
by which player 2 plays S at histories where the posterior belief about player 1’s type
equals to µ, conditional on type ✓.
Finally, observe that any element of Y (✓) (µ) 2 4{A, S} can be equivalently expressed
with a pair (v (✓) (µ) , Z (✓) (µ)) where v (✓) : ∆Θ ! [0, 1], and Z (✓) : ∆Θ ! ∆A with
the equalities:
v (✓) (µ) := Y (✓) (µ)(S) (24)
and whenever v (✓) (µ) < 1, for each a 2 A,
Z (✓) (µ)(a) =
Y (✓) (µ) (a)
1  v (✓) (µ)
. (25)
Hence, we can equivalently denote a generalized centralized play as Γ = ( , v, Z) where
v : Θ ⇥ ∆Θ ! [0, 1] and Z : Θ ⇥ ∆Θ ! ∆A. We use these equivalent representations
of a generalized centralized play throughout the Appendix. Observe that for every i 2
{1, ..., K}, for almost every µ 2 ∆Θ with respect to the measure  (✓i), if v(✓i)(µ) < 1,
then Z(✓i)(µ) = ↵i.
The next lemma shows that if Γ implements a strategy profile, then v(✓i)(µ) and
v(✓j)(µ) must agree for every i, j 2 {0, 1, ..., K}. Hence, from now on, we drop the
dependence of v on ✓.
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Lemma 10. If a generalized centralized play Γ = ( , v, Z) implements some strategy
profile  , then, for almost every posterior µ 2 ∆Θ with µ(✓i), µ(✓j) > 0, with respect to
the measure   we have v(✓i)(µ) = v(✓j)(µ).
Proof. For any ht 2 H,  2(h
t) is independent of ✓ 2 Θ. Therefore, v(✓)(µ) =
E✓
( )(I{µ(ht)=µ} T)
 (✓)(µ)
is constant across all ✓ for which  (✓)(µ) > 0.
Because in any NE, the normal type can always mimic a commitment type, a gen-
eralized centralized play Γ which implements a NE   satisfies the following incentive
compatibility constraints:
ˆ
∆Θ
 (✓0)(µ) ((1  v(µ)) u1 (Z (✓0) (µ)) + v(µ)V1) dµ   (26)ˆ
∆Θ
 (✓i)(µ) ((1  v(µ)) u1 (↵i) + v(µ)V1) dµ
for every i 2 {1, ..., K} .
C.1. Centralized Plays, Limit Centralized Plays For the following development,
fix a sequence of strategy profiles { n} of a sequence of dynamic games where in the
nth game of the sequence, the discount factor is  n < 1, and  n ! 1. Let {Γn} be the
associated sequence of generalized centralized plays where each Γn implements  n in the
nth game of the sequence.
Since the set (4Θ⇥ ({S} [4A)) is compact, the family of probability measures on
B (4Θ⇥ ({S} [4A)) is relatively compact by Prohorov’s Theorem (Billingsley (2013),
Theorem 5.1). Thus, each sequence {Γn (✓)} of probability measures has a (weakly)
convergent subsequence. Therefore, the sequence {Γn} has a subsequence (weakly) con-
verging to K + 1 probability measures Γ = (Γ (✓0) , ...,Γ (✓K)) with each element on
B (4Θ⇥ ({S} [4A)). We call any limit point of the sequence, Γ = (Γ (✓0) , ...,Γ (✓K)),
a limit centralized play.
Given a generalized centralized play, Γ, recall that  (✓) is the marginal distribution
over posteriors induced by Γ (✓). For each µ, let Γ (✓ | µ) be the conditional distribution
of Γ(✓) over {S} [4A.
Definition 3. A centralized play Γ is a generalized centralized play that satisfies the
following properties:
1. For almost every posterior µ 2 ∆Θ with µ(✓i), µ(✓j) > 0, with respect to the measure
50
 :
Γ (✓i | µ) = Γ (✓j | µ) .
2. For almost every posterior µ 2 ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0} with respect to the measure
 , Γ (✓i | µ) (S) = 1.
3. For every i 2 {1, .., K}, and for almost every posterior µ 2 µ˜i with respect to the
measure  , Γ (✓i | µ) ({↵i}) + Γ (✓i | µ) ({S}) = 1.
A centralized play satisfies three properties. The first property is that the strategy pro-
file associated with a belief µ is type independent. The second property is that for beliefs
that are outside of the edges of the belief simplex that can put positive probability only on
the normal type and at most one commitment type, i.e., µ 2 ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0}, the
action is S with probability 1. The third property states that for beliefs on the edges of
the belief simplex that puts positive probability on exactly one commitment type, either
action S is taken, or commitment type’s strategy ↵i is played. As will be also clear from
the proof of Theorem 6, the first property in the definition of a centralized play implies
the second and third properties. We keep the definition as it is since it highlights these
other properties of a centralized play that we will be using in what follows.
In the Supplementary Appendix, Section H, we prove Theorem 6, which shows that
every limit centralized play is a centralized play. Unless otherwise stated, we work with
centralized plays for the remaining of this Appendix.
Theorem 6. Every limit centralized play is a centralized play.
Theorem 6 shows that any limit point of a sequence a generalized centralized plays
that implements a sequence of strategy profiles is a centralized play (hence it is a general-
ized centralized play). Clearly, the limit centralized play obeys the martingale property,
equation (23). Recall the representation of a generalized centralized play in terms of
its marginal distribution, and conditional distribution over actions, ( , v, Z). A limit
centralized play, then satisfies the following properties:
1. For almost every posterior µ 2 ∆Θ with respect to the measure  , v and Z are type
independent.
2. For almost every posterior µ 2 ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0} with respect to the measure
 , v(µ) = 1.
3. For almost every posterior µ 2 µ˜i with respect to the measure  , v(µ) < 1 implies
Z(µ) =↵i.
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From hereon, in any centralized play we drop the dependence of v and Z on ✓.
C.2. Properties Inherited by Centralized Plays To express the payoff functions
of players 1 and 2 in centralized plays we define U1 : [0, 1] ⇥ ∆A ! R, and U2 : [0, 1] ⇥
∆A⇥Θ! R as:
U1 (v, Z) := (1  v) u1(Z) + vV1
U2 (v, Z, ✓) := (1  v) u2(Z) + vV2 (✓) .
Hence if the normal type follows the strategy of type ✓i in a centralized play Γ = ( , Z, v),
he obtains
ˆ
4Θ⇥[0,1]⇥4A
U1 (v, Z)Γ (✓i) (dµ, dv, dZ) =
ˆ
4Θ
U1 (v (µ) , Z (µ))  (✓i) (µ) dµ
We can thus write the incentive-compatibility constraints as
ˆ
4Θ
U1 (v (µ) , Z (µ))  (✓0) (µ) dµ  
ˆ
4Θ
U1 (v (µ) , Z (µ))  (✓i) (µ) dµ
for all i 2 {1, 2, ..., K}.
Player 2’s payoff in a centralized play Γ = ( , Z, v) when the prior is µ0 can be
expressed as:
X
✓2Θ
µ0 (✓)
ˆ
4Θ⇥[0,1]⇥4A
U2 (v, Z, ✓)Γ (✓) (dµ, dv, dZ) =
X
✓2Θ
µ0 (✓)
ˆ
4Θ
U2 (v (µ) , Z (µ) , ✓)  (✓i) (µ) dµ.
The next Theorem uses basic results on weak-convergence of probability measures
to establish that if the sequence of strategy profiles { n} satisfies some particular prop-
erty, then the limit centralized play Γ = ( , Z, v) satisfies a certain limit version of that
property. The proof of Theorem 7 is in the Supplementary Appendix, Section H.
Theorem 7. Take a sequence of strategy profiles { n} associated with a sequence games
where the discount factors converge to 1. Let {Γn} be the associated sequence of generalized
centralized plays where Γn implements  n. Every limit point of {Γn}, Γ, is a centralized
play and satisfies the following properties.
1. (Γ preserves the IC constraints) Suppose that each  n is a NE of the n
th game
in the sequence, and hence is incentive compatible. Then the limit centralized play
Γ = ( , Z, v) is incentive-compatible: For every i 2 {1, 2, ..., K}
ˆ
4Θ
U1 (v (µ) , Z (µ))  (✓0) (µ) dµ  
ˆ
4Θ
U1 (v (µ) , Z (µ))  (✓i) (µ) dµ.
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2. (S happens with probability zero in a subset of beliefs) Take an open subset
B 2 B (4Θ). Suppose { n} satisfies the “never stop in B” property for some type
✓ 2 Θ, i.e., for every " > 0 there is  ⇤ 2 (0, 1) such that for all  n >  
⇤, for every
on-path history ht of  n satisfying µ (h
t) 2 B, the continuation play starting at ht
satisfies E✓( n)
 
 T tn |h
t
 
< ". Then we have
ˆ
B
v (µ)  (✓) (µ) dµ = 0.
3. (S happens with probability one in a subset of beliefs) Take an open subset
B 2 B (4Θ). Suppose { n} satisfies the “stop in B” property for some type ✓ 2 Θ,
i.e., for every " > 0 there is  ⇤ 2 (0, 1) such that for all  n >  
⇤, for every on-path
history ht of  n satisfying µ (h
t) 2 B, the continuation play starting at ht satisfies
E
✓
( n)
 
 T tn |h
t
 
> 1  ". Then we have
ˆ
B
(1  v (µ))  (✓) (µ) dµ = 0.
D. Coarsening Procedure
Fix a centralized play Γ = ( , Y ), and a real number ¯ > 0. We say that a centralized
play Γ˜ is a ¯-coarsening of Γ if Γ˜ is constructed from Γ according to the procedure we
describe in this section.
For every µ 2 ∆Θ with µ(✓0) > 0, let (µ) 2 R+ be the unique number such that
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
= µ(✓0). (27)
If µ(✓0) = 0, let (µ) :=1.
For i 2 {1, .2, ..., s}, and for any  2 [0,1) [ {1}, let µ˜κi 2 ∆Θ be the distribution
that puts probability µi on ✓i and 1  µ

i on ✓0, where µ

i is the unique solution to
µi
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
= (1  µi ),
with the convention that µ1i = 1. Observe that µ
1
i = µ
⇤
i , and µ

i is strictly increasing
in .
Lemma 11. Fix µ 2 ∆Θ.
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1. If (µ) > 0, then there are unique numbers { i(µ)}i=0,1,...,K with  i(µ)   0 for
i = 0, 1, ..., K, and
P
i=0,1,..,K  i(µ) = 1 such that
µ =
X
1=1,2,...,s
 i(µ)µ˜
κ(µ)
i +
X
i=0,s+1,...,K
 i(µ)µi.
Moreover,  0(µ) = 0.
2. If (µ) = 0, then there are unique numbers { i(µ)}i=0,1,...,K with  i(µ)   0 for
i = 0, 1, ..., K,  i(µ) = 0 for i = 1, .., s, and
P
i=0,..,K  i(µ) = 1 such that
µ =
X
i=1,2,...,s
 i(µ)µ˜
κ(µ)
i +
X
i=0,s+1,...,K
 i(µ)µi.
Hence,  i(µ) = µ(✓i) for i = 0, s+ 1, ..., K.
The proof of this lemma is in the Supplementary Appendix, Section I. Lemma 11
shows that each belief µ 2 ∆Θ with (µ) > 0 can be written uniquely as a convex
combination of beliefs
n
µ˜
κ(µ)
i
o
i2{1,2,...,s} [ {µi} i2{s+1,...,K}. When (µ) = 0, µ0 = µ˜
κ(µ)
i
for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, so a multiplicity occurs in the decomposition. In this case, µ
can be written uniquely as a convex combination of beliefs {µi}i2{0,s+1,...,K}.
For each i = 1, ..., s, let mi :=
µ∗i
1 µ∗i
.
For each    0, let
xi() := max
⇢
(  ¯)mi
mi + 1
, 0
 
,
and let
yi() := min
⇢
¯mi + 1
mi + 1
,

¯
¯mi + 1
mi + 1
 
.
The terms xi(), yi() and 1  yi() will be weights we will use to further decompose
each belief µ˜
κ(µ)
i (recall these beliefs are on the edge of the simplex of beliefs connecting the
normal type and a commitment type ✓i for i 2 {1, ..., s}) to the set of beliefs
 
µ0,µi, µ˜
κ¯
i
 
,
i.e., the set of beliefs that either puts probability 1 to the normal type (✓0), or puts
probability 1 to type ✓i, or puts probability µ
¯
i to type ✓i and probability 1   µ
¯
i to
type ✓0. More precisely, If (µ)   ¯, then we split µ˜
κ(µ)
i to µ˜
κ¯
i and µi with weights
yi((µ)) =
¯mi+1
(µ)mi+1
and xi((µ)) =
((µ) ¯)mi
(µ)mi+1
, respectively. If (µ) < k¯, then ((µ) ¯)mi
(µ)mi+1
<
0, hence xi((µ)) = 0. In this case, we split the belief µ˜
κ(µ)
i to µ˜
κ¯
i and µ0 with weights
yi((µ)) =
(µ)
¯
¯mi+1
(µ)mi+1
and 1  yi((µ)) = 1 
(µ)
¯
¯mi+1
(µ)mi+1
, respectively. Importantly, the
following equality, which is easy to verify, allows us to do the martingale-splitting with
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the specified weights:
µ˜
κ(µ)
i = xi((µ))µi + yi((µ))µ˜
κ¯
i
+ (1  xi((µ))  yi((µ)))µ0.
θ0
θ1
θ2
µ
µ
κ
1
µ
κ
2
µ
κ¯
1
µ
κ¯
2
(a) (µ) > ¯
θ0
θ1
θ2
µ
µ
κ
1
µ
κ
2
µ
κ¯
1
µ
κ¯
2
(b) (µ) < ¯
Figure 4: This panel illustrates the decomposition of each belief µ in the ¯-coarsening procedure.
The figures in panel 4 illustrate the decomposition of beliefs in an example where
Θ = {✓0, ✓1, ✓2}, and s = 2. For any µ 2 ∆Θ, we first determine (µ). In Figure 4a,
(µ) > ¯, and in figure 4b, (µ) < ¯. The belief µ is decomposed to the set of beliefsn
µ˜
κ(µ)
1 , µ˜
κ(µ)
2
o
, where µ˜
κ(µ)
1 =
⇣
1  µ
(µ)
1 , µ
(µ)
1 , 0
⌘
, and µ˜
κ(µ)
2 =
⇣
1  µ
(µ)
2 , 0, µ
(µ)
2
⌘
.
This is the decomposition in Lemma 11. Then, we further decompose µ˜
κ(µ)
i to te set of
beliefs
 
µi, µ˜
κ¯
i
 
when (µ) > ¯, with weights xi((µ)) and yi((µ)), respectively. When
(µ) < ¯, we decompose µ˜
κ(µ)
i to te set of beliefs
 
µ0, µ˜
κ¯
i
 
, with weights 1   yi((µ))
and yi((µ)), respectively.
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Now, we construct the ¯-coarsening of Γ = ( , Y ), Γ˜ = ( ˜, Y˜ ) as follows:
 ˜ (µi) =
ˆ
∆Θ
 i(µ)xi((µ)) [dµ] for i = 1, .., s.
 ˜ (µi) =
ˆ
∆Θ
 i(µ) [dµ] for i > s.
 ˜
 
µ˜
κ¯
i
 
=
ˆ
∆Θ
 i(µ)yi((µ)) [dµ] for i = 1, .., s.
 ˜ (µ0) = 1 
X
i>0
 ˜ (µi) 
X
i=1,..,s
 ˜
 
µ˜
κ¯
i
 
=
ˆ
∆Θ
 
 0(µ) +
X
i=1,2...,s
 i(µ) (1  xi((µ))  yi((µ)))
!
 [dµ].
Once we have  ˜(µ), we obtain  ˜(✓)(µ) for each ✓ using Bayes’ rule, equation (23). For
each a 2 A [ {S}:
Y˜ (µi) (a) =
´
∆Θ
 i(µ)xi((µ))Y (µ)(a) [dµ]
 ˜ (µi)
if  ˜ (µi) > 0, for i = 1, .., s.
Y˜ (µi) (a) =
´
∆Θ
 i(µ)Y (µ)(a) [dµ]
 ˜ (µi)
if  ˜ (µi) > 0, for i > s.
Y˜
 
µ˜
κ¯
i
 
(a) =
´
∆Θ
 i(µ)yi((µ))Y (µ)(a) [dµ]
 ˜
 
µ˜
κ¯
i
  if  ˜  µ˜κ¯i   > 0, for i = 1, .., s
Y˜ (µ0) (a) =
´
∆Θ
⇣
 0(µ) +
P
i=1,2...,s  i(µ) (1  xi((µ))  yi((µ)))
⌘
Y (µ)(a) [dµ]
 ˜ (µ0)
if  ˜ (µ0) > 0.
Finally, for each i 2 {0, 1, ..., K} and µ 2 ∆Θ, we set Y˜ (✓i)(µ) = Y˜ (µ). This com-
pletes the description of the construction of ¯-coarsening of a centralized play Γ. The
term
⇣
v˜(µ), Z˜(µ)
⌘
denotes distribution over action profiles conditional on belief µ in the
centralized play Γ˜.
Lemma 12. Suppose Γ˜ is a ¯-coarsening of a centralized play Γ. Then:
1.
´
∆Θ
µ (µ)[dµ] =
´
∆Θ
µ ˜(µ)[dµ].
2. For each a 2 A[{S} and each ✓ 2 Θ:
ˆ
∆Θ
Y (µ)(a) (✓)[dµ] =
ˆ
∆Θ
Y˜ (µ)(a) ˜(✓)[dµ].
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3. Γ˜ is a centralized play.
4. If Γ is incentive compatible, then Γ˜ is also incentive compatible.
The proof of Lemma 12 is in the Supplementary Appendix, Section I. It asserts that
coarsening operation maps a centralized play to another centralized play, and preserves
the action profiles type by type. It also asserts that coarsening preserves incentive com-
patibility property of Γ.
E. Screening Games
Recall that in screening models, for each i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, there exists a unique number
µ⇤i 2 (0, 1) such that u2(↵i) = µ
⇤
iV2(✓i) + (1   µ
⇤
i )V2(✓0). We say that the prior belief
µ0 2 ∆Θ is a high reputation prior if
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
> µ0(✓0).
We say that the prior belief µ0 is a low reputation prior if
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
< µ0(✓0).
E.1. High Reputation Priors: We start by providing a lower bound on player 2’s
limit equilibrium payoffs along all sequences of NE { n} of a sequence of games where
along the sequence all parameters of the game except for the discount factor are fixed,
and where in the nth game the discount factor is  n, with  n ! 1.
Lemma 13. There exists a sequence of strategies for player 2 that guarantees player 2 a
payoff that converges along the sequence of games to
v2 :=
X
i2{0,1,...,s}
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
i2{s+1,...,K}
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i).
Proof. For every (small) " 2 (0, 1) , consider the following strategy  2,n (") for player 2: she
chooses W at every period t < t n("). At history h
t n ("), if
P
i>s µt(h
t n ("))(✓i) < ", then
player 2 plays S right away. Otherwise she plays W at every period in the rest of the game.
Let { n (")} represent a strategy profile sequence in which player 2’s strategy coincides
with  2,n ("). For each n, let Γn be the generalized centralized play that implements  n (").
Taking a subsequence if necessary, Γn converges weakly to a centralized play Γ (Theorem
6). Since payoffs are continuous, player 2’s payoffs converge to his payoffs from the
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centralized play Γ. Next notice in the first t n(") periods, player 2’s flow payoffs are at least
u2. Therefore, using property 2 of centralized plays (For all µ 2 ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0} we
have v(µ) = 1), and the learning lemma 9, we obtain that conditional on player 1 being
type ✓i, player 2’s payoff converges to a number at least as large as "u2 + (1  ")V2(✓i) if
i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, and to "u2 + (1  ") u2(↵i) for every i > s. Moreover, against the normal
type, player 2’s limit payoff is at least "u2+(1  ")V2(✓0). Hence a lower bound on player
2’s payoff from this strategy converges to
"u2 + (1  ")
2
4 X
i2{0,1,...,s}
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
i2{s+1,...,K}
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i)
3
5 .
Since " is arbitrary, we obtain the result.
E.1.1. Reputation Boundary: We now introduce the concept of reputation boundary.
Recall the definition of (µ) given by equation (27).
Definition 4. A number    0 is a reputation boundary if for every i 2 {0, 1, 2, ..., s},
for every ˆ > ,
lim inf
 %1
(
E
✓i
( )
⇥
 T
⇤
:   is a NE for
the game with prior µ˜0 with (µ˜0)   ˆ and discount factor  
)
= 1. (28)
We will show the existence of such a boundary in the following Lemma.
Lemma 14. There exists a reputation boundary.
Proof. Fix a prior µ0. We will show that there is some ¯ > 0 such that for every  > ¯,
if
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
> µ0(✓0), then as   ! 1, across all NE, player 2 takes action S
almost immediately against all types ✓i for i 2 {0, 1, 2, ..., s}. Consider the mechanism-
design problem in which player 1 first reports his type, and the mechanism chooses a
number Y (✓i) 2 [0, 1] for each type i > 0 that corresponds to the expected discounted
number of periods in which player 2 plays W , and {Ya(✓0)}a2A where Ya(✓0) 2 [0, 1]
corresponds to the expected discounted number of periods in which normal type of player
1 plays action a and player 2 plays W , with
P
a2A Ya(✓0)  1. Consider the problem of
maximizing player 2’s payoffs via such a mechanism subject to truth telling constraints
for the normal type.
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max U¯2 :=
X
i>0
µ0(✓i) (Y (✓i)(u2(↵i)  V2(✓i)) + V2(✓i))
+
X
a2A
µ0(✓0) (Ya(✓0)(u2(a)  V2(✓0)) + V2(✓0))
subject to
X
a2A
(Ya(✓0)(u1(a)  V1) + V1)   Y (✓i)(u1(↵i)  V1) + V1 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., K},
X
a2A
(Ya(✓0)(u1(a)  V1) + V1)   u1(a0).
In the optimal mechanism, let u¯ := V1+
P
a2A Ya(✓0)(u1(a) V1). Clearly, if u¯ = V1, then
the optimal mechanism is unique and Y (✓i) = 0 for i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} and Y (✓i) = 1 for
i > s.
Suppose towards a contradiction that u¯ < V1. Because u¯   u1(a0) in the optimal
mechanism, Y (✓i) = 1 for every i > s, since this maximizes player 2’s payoff against
such types, and does not violate IC constraints. Moreover, all other IC constraints for
i 2 {1, ..., s} hold with equality. This is because if the IC constraint for type ✓i is slack
then the objective function would be improved by a small decrease in Y (✓i). Therefore,
Y (✓i) =
V1   u¯
V1   u1(↵i)
> 0 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}
Rewriting the objective function by plugging in Y (✓i) for i > 0, we have
U¯2 =
X
is
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
i>s
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i) +
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
V1   u¯
V1   u1(↵i)
(u2(↵i)  V2(✓i))
+ µ0(✓0)
X
a2A
Ya(✓0) (u2(a)  V2(✓0))
Because u¯ < V1,
P
a2A Ya(✓0) > 0. Let
 1 := min
a2A
V1   u1(a)
u2(a)  V2(✓0)
,  2 := min
i2{1,...,s}
V2(✓i)  u2(↵i)
V1   u1(↵i)
.
Note that  1,  2 > 0. Because (u2(↵i) V2(✓i)) < 0 for every i 2 {1, ..., s}, and because
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V1   u¯ =
P
a2A Ya(✓0)(V1   u1(a)), we have that
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
V1   u¯
V1   u1(↵i)
(u2(↵i) V2(✓i))    1 2
 X
a2A
Ya(✓0) (u2(a)  V2(✓0))
! X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i).
Moreover, because
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
> µ0(✓0), we have
max
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
 
1
s
µ0(✓0).
It then follows that for some j 2 {1, ..., s},
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)  

s
µ⇤j
1  µ⇤j
µ0(✓0).
Then,
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
V1   u¯
V1   u1(↵i)
(u2(↵i)  V2(✓i)) + µ0(✓0)
X
a2A
Ya(✓0) (u2(a)  V2(✓0)) 
 
µ0(✓0)
X
a2A
Ya(✓0) (u2(a)  V2(✓0))
!✓
  1 2

s
µ⇤j
1  µ⇤j
+ 1
◆
.
Then, there exists a ¯ <1 such that for all i 2 {1, .., s},  > ¯ implies   1 2

s
µ∗j
1 µ∗j
+
1 < 0. When µ0(✓0) > 0, because
P
a2A Ya(✓0) > 0, and because (u2(a)  V2(✓0)) > 0 for
every a 2 A, we obtain that when  > ¯, and µ0(✓0) > 0,
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
V1   u¯
V1   u1(↵i)
(u2(↵i)  V2(✓i)) + µ0(✓0)
X
a2A
Ya(✓0) (u2(a)  V2(✓0)) < 0.
When µ0(✓0) = 0, because at least one of µ0(✓i) > 0, we again have
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
V1   u¯
V1   u1(↵i)
(u2(↵i)  V2(✓i)) + µ0(✓0)
X
a2A
Ya(✓0) (u2(a)  V2(✓0)) < 0.
Hence, the payoff of player 2 is uniquely maximized across all such mechanisms by setting
u¯ = V1 and Y (✓i) = 0 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} and Y (✓i) = 1 for every i > s when  > ¯.
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And in this case, her payoff is
X
i2{0,1,...,s}
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
i2{s+1,...,K}
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i),
and her payoff is strictly smaller if Y (✓i) > 0 for some i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}. Therefore, if
lim inf
 !1
E
✓i
( )
⇥
 T
⇤
< 1
for some i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, then player 2’s equilibrium payoffs along a subsequence would
converge to a number strictly smaller than v2, which contradicts Lemma 13.
E.2. Showing  = 1 is a reputation boundary We now tackle with the problem
of extending reputation boundaries arbitrarily close to 1, i.e., showing that  = 1 is a
reputation boundary. Assume towards a contradiction that the infimum of all reputation
boundaries is some  > 1 and observe that our definition above implies that  is itself a
reputation boundary. We will find " 2 (0, 1) such that   " is a reputation boundary,
which contradicts the hypothesis that  is the infimum of all reputation boundaries. For
some " > 0 which will be determined later, let µB := {µ 2 ∆Θ : (µ) 2 [   ",]} and
let { n} be a sequence of NE of a sequence of games where in the n
th game, the prior is
µn,0 2 µ
B with µ0 = limµn,0 2 µ
B, and the discount factor is  n with  n ! 1.
Suppose  > 1 is a reputation boundary. Let Γ be a limit centralized play of the
sequence of generalized centralized plays that implements the sequence of NE. Recall the
coarsening procedure in section D. Let Γ˜ be the -coarsening of Γ. Then, we show in
Lemma 15 below that every extreme posterior µ 2 {µi}i=1,2,...,s after coarsening leads to
S with probability one, i.e., v˜(µ) = 1.
Lemma 15. For every µ 2 {µi}i=1,2,...,s, if  ˜ (µ) > 0 then v˜(µ) = 1.
Proof. The beliefs projected into {µi}i=1,2,...,s come from a subset of B
 := {µ 2 4Θ :  (µ) > }
and hence above the reputation boundary. By definition of reputation boundaries, once a
posterior reaches a reputation boundary the expected discounted number of periods until
the game is stopped converges to zero. Applying item iii) from Theorem 7 leads to the
result.
Next, we show that  = 1 is a reputation boundary.
Lemma 16. If  > 1 is a reputation boundary, then there exists " 2 (0,  1) such that
  " > 1 is a reputation boundary.
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Proof. We describe the problem of finding an incentive-compatible centralized play Γ for
a prior µ0 2 {µ : (µ) 2 [  ",]} for some " > 0, that maximizes player 2’s payoff, and
obeys the property that  is a reputation boundary. Note that, every equilibrium has to
satisfy incentive compatibility, and that  is a reputation boundary. The solution to this
constrained-maximization problem gives an upper bound on player 2’s equilibrium payoffs.
Let Γ˜ denote the -coarsening of Γ. Thus, player 2’s payoff in incentive compatible and
-coarse centralized play Γ˜ = ( ˜, Z˜, v˜) when  is a reputation boundary is given by
U2 =
X
µ2{µi}i≥0[{µ˜

i
}i=1,2,...,s
 ˜(µ)
h
(1  v˜(µ))
⇣
u2
⇣
Z˜(µ)
⌘
  V2 (µ)
⌘
+ V2(µ)
i
subject to the following constraints:
u¯ =
X
µ2µ0[{µ˜i }i=1,2,...,s
 ˜(✓0)(µ)
h
(1  v˜(µ))
⇣
u1
⇣
Z˜(µ)
⌘
  V1
⌘
+ V1
i
u¯   u1(a0)
u¯  
X
µ2{µ˜
i
,µi}
 ˜(✓i)(µ)
h
(1  v˜(µ))
⇣
u1
⇣
Z˜(µ)
⌘
  V1
⌘
+ V1
i
for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}
u¯   (1  v˜(µi))
⇣
u1
⇣
Z˜(µi)
⌘
  V1
⌘
+ V1 for every i > s,
v˜(µi) = 1 for every i = 1, ..., s.
Z˜(µ) = ↵i if µ(✓i) > 0 for some i 2 {1, ..., K}.
The first equality defines player 1’s payoff in this centralized play. The second con-
straint arises because u1(a0) is player 1’s minmax payoff. The third and fourth con-
straints are player 1’s incentive compatibility constraints. The last 2 constraints follow
from Lemma 15, and from Γ˜ being a centralized play (Lemma 12). Therefore we have for
all µ˜κ
i
,  
1  v˜(µ˜κ
i
)
  ⇣
u1
⇣
Z˜(µ˜κ
i
)
⌘
  V1
⌘
=
 
1  v˜(µ˜κ
i
)
 
(u1(↵i)  V1) .
First notice that to maximize U2, we can set v˜(µi) = 0 for i > s, since this choice
maximizes player 2’s payoff in the objective function, and does not upset any incentive-
compatibility constraint as u2(↵i)   V2(✓i) and u1(a0)   u1(↵i) for i > s.
Second, we will argue that if u¯ = V1, then for every i 2 {1, ..., s},
 ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
v˜
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
+  ˜(✓i) (µi) v˜ (µi) =  ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
+  ˜(✓i) (µi) .
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This implies that, if the coarse centralized play that maximizes player 2’s payoff satisfies
the property u¯ = V1, then player 2 stops against types i 2 {0, 1, ..., s} almost immediately,
i.e,   ✏ is a reputation boundary.
To see the claim, note that for i 2 {1, ..., s},  ˜(✓i) (µi) v˜ (µi) =  ˜(✓i) (µi). Moreover,
if u¯ = V1, then from the definition of u¯, and from V1 > u1(a) for every a 2 A, it follows
that for each µ˜κ
i
, either v˜
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
= 1, or  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
= 0. If v˜
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
= 1, then the claim is
true. If  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
= 0, because µ¯i < 1,  ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
= 0, and the claim is again true.
We will now show that u¯ = V1. So now, on the way to a contradiction, suppose that
u¯ < V1.
We start with the claim that for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} with µ0(✓i) > 0, we have
u¯  
 
1  v˜(µ˜κ
i
)
 
(u1(↵i)  V1) + V1.
Notice that, because the contradiction hypothesis is that u¯ < V1,  ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
> 0.
This is because, otherwise  ˜(✓i) (µi) = 1, and because v˜ (µi) = 1, the IC constraint fails.
Notice that if  ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
> 0, then  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
κ
i
 
> 0. Suppose for some such i, we have
u¯ <
 
1  v˜(µ˜κ
i
)
 
(u1(↵i)  V1) + V1. Then, the IC constraint
u¯  
X
µ2{µ˜
i
,µi}
 ˜(✓i)(µ) [(1  v˜(µ)) (u1 (↵i)  V1) + V1]
fails. Note that because v˜(µi) = 1 for the set of types in focus now, we have
V1  
0
@ X
µ2{µ˜
i
,µi}
 ˜(✓i)(µ)
h
(1  v˜(µ))
⇣
u1
⇣
Z˜(µ)
⌘
  V1
⌘
+ V1
i1A =
 ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)
 
1  v˜(µ˜κ
i
)
 
(V1   u1(↵i(a))) .
We will now construct an alternative -coarse centralized play that satisfies the incen-
tive constraints, and increases player 1’s payoff by some small number ⌘ > 0, and that
improves player 2’s payoff. Consider a small increase in v˜(µ˜κ
i
), ∆v˜i, for each i in focus,
i.e., i 2 {1, ..., s} with µ0(✓i) > 0, such that
17
 ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V1   u1(↵i)) = ⌘.
If µ0(✓i) = 0, let ∆v˜i = 0. Note that such a change in v˜(µ˜
κ
i
) will make player 1’s
17Note that v˜(µ˜κi ) < 1, since V1 > u¯  
 
1  v˜(µ˜κi )
 
(u1(↵i)  V1) + V1. Hence, for some ⌘ > 0, such a
change is feasible.
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payoff from mimicking any type i in focus to increase by (at most) ⌘. Player 1’s payoff
also increases due to this change, but possibly not as much as ⌘, so we will also change
player 1’s payoff by compensating him by an amount ∆u by increasing v˜(µ0) by some
amount ∆v˜0 that increases u¯ by ⌘ (hence ensuring that the IC constraints are satisfied).
In particular, the expected payoff increase needed at belief µ0 to ensure u¯ increases by ⌘
is given by
∆u := ⌘  
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)(µ˜
κ
i )∆v˜i (V1   u1(↵i))
= ⌘
0
@1  X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)(µ˜
κ
i )
 ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i )
1
A = ⌘
0
@1  X
i2{1,2,...,s}
1  µ¯i
µ¯i
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1
A .
In the above equalities, the second one follows from  ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V1   u1(↵i)) = ⌘,
and the third one follows from Bayes’ rule. Recall that for i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}
µ¯i
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
= (1  µ¯i ).
Therefore,
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
1  µ¯i
µ¯i
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
=
1
µ0(✓0)
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
✓
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
µ0(✓i)
◆
.
Because by the assumption that (µ0) 2 [  ✏,], we have
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
✓
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
µ0(✓i)
◆
  (  ")µ0(✓0).
Hence, we obtain that
∆u  ⌘
✓
1 
  "

◆
= ⌘
"

.
To calculate the impact of all the changes on player 2’s payoff, first observe that there
exists ⇢ < 1, for which we can increase v˜(µ0) by ∆v˜0 to increase player 1’s payoff by
∆u, in such a way that player 2’s payoff does not decrease by more than ∆u⇢.18 Hence,
a lower bound on the total impact on player 2’s payoff is
∆U2  
" P
i µ0(✓i) ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V2(✓i)  u2(↵i))
+
P
µ0(✓0) ˜(✓0)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V2(✓0)  u2(↵i))  µ0(✓0)⌘
"

⇢
#
.
18In particular, ⇢ = maxa2A
u2(a) V2(✓0)
V1 u1(a)
= 1
 1
.
64
Observe that because  > 1, for every i 2 {1, ..., s}, we have V2(µ˜
κ
i
) > u2(↵i).
19 Hence,
µ0(✓i) ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V2(✓i)  u2(↵i)) + µ0(✓0) ˜(✓0)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V2(✓0)  u2(↵i))
=  ˜(µ˜κ
i
)∆v˜i
 
V2(µ˜
κ
i
)  u2(↵i)
 
> 0.
Moreover, because  ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)∆v˜i (V1   u1(↵i)) = ⌘, we have
 ˜(µ˜κ
i
) > µ0(✓i) ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
)   µ0(✓i)
⌘
V1   u1(↵i)
.
Hence,
∆U2   ⌘
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i) min
i2{1,2,...,s}
⇢
V2(µ˜
κ
i
)  u2(↵i)
V1   u1(↵i)
 
  µ0(✓0)⌘
"
¯
⇢
Clearly, as "! 0, ∆U2 > 0 for all µ0 2 {µ 2 ∆Θ : (µ) 2 [  ",]}. So, player 2’s payoff
maximizing coarse centralized play that satisfies the IC constraints has the property that
u¯ = V1, and hence v˜(µ˜
κ
i
) = 1 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} that satisfies  ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i
) > 0. This
implies that,   " is a reputation boundary for some " > 0.
Corollary 2.  = 1 is a reputation boundary.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 16.
E.3. Low Reputation Priors We now consider prior beliefs µ0 such that
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
< µ0(✓0).
We start by arguing the following claim which argues that a sufficiently patient player
2 never plays S against a type ✓ 2 {✓s+1, ..., ✓K}, or if her belief is below the reputation
boundary.
Lemma 17. For every ⇠ > 0, there is a  ¯ < 1 such that if   >  ¯, S is taken with probability
0 at history h0 (the beginning of the game) across all NE of the game with discount factor
  and prior belief µ0 where
P
i>s µ0(✓i) > ⇠ or
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< (1  ⇠)µ0(✓0).
Proof. For the first part of the claim, suppose towards a contradiction that there is a
sequence of equilibria of a sequence of games with discount factors  n ! 1 and µn ! µ0
with
P
i>s µ0(✓i)   ⇠ and in which player 2 plays S at h
0. Consider the deviation strategy
19Recall that V2(µ˜
κ
i ) = µ¯

i V2(✓i) + (1   µ¯

i )V2(✓0), and that µ0(✓i) ˜(✓i)(µ˜
κ
i ) =  ˜(µ˜
κ
i )µ¯

i ,
µΓ(✓0) ˜(✓0)(µ˜
κ
i ) =  ˜(µ˜
κ
i ) (1  µ¯

i ) .
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by Player 2 that plays S at the first history ht at which
P
i>s µ(h
t)(✓i) < ⇠/2. We know
from Lemma ii that under the deviation strategy, player 2 plays S at a (random) time tn
such that E✓i ( tn) converges to one for any type ✓i for i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, and plays S against
types ✓i for i > s with a total probability bounded above by ⇠/2. Against the normal type,
the worst payoff she can get is V2(✓0), which she gets in the sequence of strategy profiles
where player 2 is using the deviation strategies. The deviation strategy is profitable when
n is large, because it improves player 2’s payoff at least by an amount converging to
⇠
2
[minj>s u2(↵j)  V2(✓j)] (and hence at least as large as
⇠
4
[minj>s u2(↵j)  V2(✓j)] for n
large enough), which gives the desired contradiction.
For the second part of the claim, for each m 2 N, consider the sequence of devia-
tion strategies ( 2,m,n)
1
n=1 that plays S at the first history h
t with µ(ht)(✓i) > µ
⇤
i andP
j /2{0,i} µ(✓j)  m
 1 for some i 2 {1, ..., s}. Let Γm,n = ( m,n, Zm,n, vm,n) be the gen-
eralized centralized play that implements the strategy profiles generated by player 1’s
equilibrium strategy and the deviation strategy  2,m,n of player 2, when the discount
factor is  n.
Notice that, for every m 2 N, the expected discounted number of periods in which W
is taken and the belief lies in
Bm :=
s[
i=1
 
µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) > µ
⇤
i +m
 1
 
is equal to the expected discounted number of periods in which W is taken and the belief
lies in
B˜m :=
s[
i=1
8<
:µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) > µ⇤i +m 1,
X
j /2{0,i}
µ(✓j) > m
 1
9=
; .
Lemma 9 implies this expected discounted number of periods converges to zero as
n !1. Using this property and a diagonal argument we conclude that {Γm,n} contains
a subsequence
 
Γm(r),n(r)
 1
r=1
such that limr!1min{n (r) ,m (r)} =1 and for which the
expected discounted number of periods in which the belief lies in the set Br is smaller
than r 1 in Γm(r),n(r).
Moreover, in light of Theorem Theorem 6,
 
Γm(r),n(r)
 1
r=1
has a subsequence converging
to some limit centralized play Γ = ( , Z, v). Take this limit centralized play and consider
the corresponding 1 coarsening of Γ, Γ˜ = ( ˜, Z˜,v˜), which decomposes the posteriors
in Γ into
 
{µi}i=0,1,...K [ {µ˜
1
i
}i=1,2,...,s
 
. That is, we perform the coarsening procedure
described previously with  = 1. We have the following claim about the properties of
Γ˜ = ( ˜, Z˜,v˜):
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Claim 2. The following hold:
1. v˜ (µi) = 1 for µ 2 µi, for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} if  ˜ (µi) > 0.
2. v˜ (µi) = 0 for µ 2 µi, for every i > s if  ˜ (µi) > 0.
3. v˜(µ0) = 0 if  ˜ (µ0) > 0.
Proof. Item 1 follows from the argument in Lemma 15 and the observation that the
expected discounted number of periods in which the belief lies in the set Br is smaller
than r 1 in Γm(r),n(r). Item 2 follows because, by construction if S is played at some history
ht, then µ(ht)(✓i) 
1
m(r)
for i > s in the strategy profile that Γm(r),n(r) implements. Hence
the probability that S is played conditional on type i > s converges to zero and thus:
v˜ (µi) = limr!1
ˆ
µ2∆Θ
 m(r),n(r) (✓i) (µ)vm(r),n(r) (µ))dµ = 0.
Item 3 follows, because by construction if S is played at a history ht, then for some
i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, µ(ht)(✓i) > µ
⇤
i + m
 1 (r) and µ(ht)(✓j) 
1
m(r)
for every j 6= 0, i in the
strategy profile that Γm(r),n(r) implements. Similar to item 2, and using the feature of the
coarsening procedure that for such beliefs, the projection gives 0 weight on posterior µ0,
it is straightforward to verify that the projection of such posteriors on {µ0} vanishes as
r !1, which immediately implies that v˜(µ0) ˜ (µ0) = 0.
Completion of the proof of Lemma 17:
Recall that u2 = mina2A u2(a).
The payoff from the equilibrium strategy of playing S at h0 is equal to
X
i>s
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
is
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i). (29)
Player 2’s payoff from the deviation strategies converge to the expected payoff from
the coarse centralized play Γ˜ = ( ˜, Z˜,v˜), which is at least
X
i>s
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i) +
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
⇣
 ˜(µ˜1
i
)V2(µ˜
1
i
) +  ˜(µi)V2(✓i)
⌘
+  ˜(µ0)u2. (30)
We will show that player 2’s payoff from expression 30 is strictly higher that her payoff
from stopping in the beginning of the game, i.e., expression 29. Notice that the payoff in
30 is minimized (over all coarse centralized plays) when  ˜(µi) = 0 for all i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}.
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This is because, for such ✓i,
µ⇤iV2(✓i) + (1  µ
⇤
i )u2 > µ
⇤
iV2(✓i) + (1  µ
⇤
i )V2(✓0) = V2(µ˜
1
i
).
Therefore, player 2’s payoffs are bounded below by
X
i>s
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i) +
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
µ⇤i
V2(µ˜
1
i
) +
0
@µ0(✓0)  X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
1
A u2. (31)
The payoff to player 2 from stopping at the beginning of the game, i.e., expression 29
is equal to
X
i>s
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
µ⇤i
V2(µ˜
1
i
) +
0
@µ0(✓0)  X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
1
AV2(✓0).
(32)
To see this, we use the equality V2(µ˜
1
i
) = µ⇤iV2(✓i)+(1 µ
⇤
i )V2(✓0). Because V2(✓0) < u2
and
⇣
µ0(✓0) 
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘
> µ0(✓0)⇠ > 0, and because V2(✓i) < u2(↵i) for
i > s, the deviation strategy which delivers a limit payoff at least as much as (31) is
strictly higher than the payoff (32). Therefore, the deviation strategy is profitable when
  is larger than some  ¯ < 1.
Lemma 18. For any prior µ0 2 ∆Θ such that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0), player 1’s
NE payoffs converge to u1(a0) as   ! 1.
Proof. Take a prior µ0 that satisfies the condition stated in the Lemma. Player 1’s NE
payoffs are bounded below by u1(a0) since this is the lowest payoff he gets if plays always
a0 in every period (until player 2 plays S). We will show that the limit of his equilibrium
payoffs cannot be higher than u1(a0). Take a sequence of NE { n} of a sequence of games
with associated discount factors  n ! 1. Taking a subsequence if necessary, assume that
the sequence of generalized centralized plays that implement the sequence of NE converges
to a limit centralized play Γ = ( , Z, v) . Let Γ˜ = ( ˜, Z˜, v˜) be the 1-coarsening of Γ in
which posteriors are decomposed into
 
{µi}i=0,1,...K [ {µ˜
1
i
}i=1,2,...,s
 
(i.e., Γ˜ is obtained
from Γ by using the coarsening procedure for  = 1.). We have the following claim about
the properties of Γ˜ = ( ˜, Z˜,v˜):
Claim 3. The following hold:
1. v˜ (µi) = 1 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} if  ˜ (µi) > 0.
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2. v˜ (µi) = 0 for every i > s if  ˜ (µi) > 0.
3. v˜(µ0) = 0 and  ˜ (µ0) > 0.
Proof. Item 1 follows because  = 1 is a reputation boundary and by Lemma 17. For
items 2 and 3, first take " > 0 and consider the (open) set
D" := {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ ({✓s+1, ..., ✓K}) > "}
[8<
:µ 2 ∆Θ :
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
< (1  ")µ(✓0)
9=
;
Lemma 17 implies that the probability that S is taken at a history ht such that µ (ht) be-
longs to D" converges to zero. Theorem 7 (item ii) together with the coarsening procedure
implies that
´
µ2D"
 ˜(µ)v˜(µ)dµ = 0. Since D" increases to
D := {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ ({✓s+1, ..., ✓K}) > 0}
[8<
:µ 2 ∆Θ :
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
< µ(✓0)
9=
;
as " decreases to zero, the monotone convergence theorem implies
´
µ2D
 ˜(µ)v˜(µ)dµ = 0,
which then implies item 2 that v˜ (µi) = 0 for every i > s if  ˜ (µi) > 0. It also implies the
first part of item 3 that v˜(µ0) = 0 if  ˜ (µ0) > 0. The conclusion that  ˜ (µ0) > 0 follows,
because
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0).
Completion of the proof of Lemma 18: Assume towards a contradiction that we
can find a sequence of NE { n} of the sequence of games with associated discount factors
 n ! 1 and in which the normal type obtains a limit payoff that is strictly larger than
u1 (a0).
Notice that if the normal type imitates type ✓i for some i 2 {1, ..., s} he obtains
Ui : =  ˜(✓i)(µ˜
1
i )
 
v˜(µ˜1i ) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i)
 
+  ˜(✓i)(µi)V1 (33)
  v˜(µ˜1i ) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i), (34)
where the inequality follows because V1 > u1(↵i).
Let v1 := u1
⇣
Z˜(µ0)
⌘
be player 1’s payoff when the centralized play announces µ0
(recall property 3 of the claim that, v˜(µ0) = 0).
Because v˜(µ0) = 0, v1 < V1. Player 1’s payoff in the centralized play is then
U0 :=
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)(µ˜
1
i
)
 
v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i)
 
+  ˜(✓0)(µ0)v1. (35)
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Suppose now on the way to a contradiction that U0 > u1(a0). Because v1  u1(a0),
there is some i 2 {1, 2, .., s} with  ˜(✓0)(µ˜
1
i
) > 0 and v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i))+u1(↵i) > u1(a0).
Let U⇤ = maxi2{1,...,s} v˜(µ˜
1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i), and suppose U
⇤ is attained for type
✓i. Then:
Ui =  ˜(✓i)(µ˜
1
i
)
 
v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i)
 
+  ˜(✓i)(µi)V1   U
⇤ > U0,
where the first inequality follows from inequality (33), and the second inequality follows
because v1  u1(a0) < U
⇤, U⇤ = maxi2{1,...,s} v˜(µ˜
1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i))+u1(↵i), and  ˜(✓0)(µ0) >
0. The last inequality that  ˜(✓0)(µ0) > 0 follows from property 3 of the claim. But then
U0 < Ui, which is a violation of the IC constraint that type ✓0 does not strictly prefer to
imitate type ✓i. This gives the desired contradiction.
The proof of Lemma 18 delivers the following corollary:
Corollary 3. Assume that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0) and let Γ˜ be the 1-coarsening
of a limit centralized play Γ of an equilibrium sequence of a sequence of games where
 n ! 1. The following properties are true:
1. v˜ (µi) = 1 for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} if  ˜ (µi) > 0.
2. v˜ (µi) = 0 for every i > s.
3. v˜(µ0) = 0 and  ˜ (µ0) > 0.
Proof. Item 2. follows from the fact that given   (✓i) for i > s, the coarsening procedure
projects every posterior on µi and from the first statement of Lemma 17. Items 1. and
3. were proven in claim 3 located with in the proof of Lemma 18.
Lemma 19. Assume that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0) and let Γ˜ be the 1-coarse cen-
tralized play of the limit centralized play Γ of an equilibrium sequence. The following
properties are true:
1. v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i) = u1 (a0) for every i 2 {1, ..., s}.
2.  ˜(✓i)(µi) = 0 for every i 2 {1, ..., s}.
3. Z˜(µ0) = a0.
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Proof. Items 1 and 3: If v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i))+u1(↵i) > u1 (a0) for some i 2 {1, ..., s} then
(33) implies that the normal type can profitably deviate by imitating type ✓i, and obtains
a payoff strictly higher than u1(a0), a contradiction. So we have for every i 2 {1, ..., s}
v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i)  u1 (a0) . (36)
Observe that if  ˜(✓i)(µi) = 1 for some i 2 {1, ..., s}, then Ui > U0, which violates IC
constraint. Then  ˜(✓i)(µi) < 1 for every such i, which thus implies  ˜(✓0)(µ˜
1
i
) > 0 for
every such i. Because v˜(µ0) = 0 by property 3 of Corollary 3, v1  u1(a0). Moreover,
because U0 is a weighted average of terms less than or equal to u1(a0), and because
U0 = u1(a0), we have that for every i 2 {1, ..., s}, v˜(µ˜
1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i) = u1 (a0),
and v1 = u1
⇣
Z˜(µ0)
⌘
= u1(a0). Hence, Z˜(µ0) = a0.
Item 2: Since v˜(µ˜1
i
) (V1   u1(↵i)) + u1(↵i) = u1 (a0), which follows from item 1, if
 ˜(✓i)(µi) > 0 then Ui > u1(a0), which violates the IC constraint.
The next lemma shows that the limit centralized play Γ of an equilibrium sequence is
essentially equal to the 1-coarse centralized play Γ˜ with some additional properties.20
Lemma 20. Assume that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0). Let Γ be a limit centralized
play of an equilibrium sequence of a sequence of games where  n ! 1. The following
properties are true:
1.
´
µ=µi
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] = 1 for i > s.
2.
´
µ2{µ0,µ˜11,...,µ˜1s}
 (µ) (✓0) [dµ] = 1.
3.
´
µ=µ˜1
i
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] = 1 for i 2 {1, ..., s}.
Proof. We start by proving item 1:
Fix i > s. Recall that in a limit centralized play the following holds:
ˆ
{µ:µ(✓i)>0,µ(✓j)>0 for some j 6={0,i}}
v(µ) (µ)[dµ] =
ˆ
{µ:µ(✓i)>0,µ(✓j)>0 for some j 6={0,i}}
 (µ)[dµ].
Recall that by corollary 3, v˜(µi) = 0 for every i > s. Hence,
´
{µ:µ(✓i)>0,µ(✓j)>0 for some j 6={0,i}}
 (µ)[dµ] =
0. Therefore,
´
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] =
´
µ2µ˜i
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ], and
´
µ2µ˜i
v(µ) (µ) (✓i) [dµ] = 0. Note
that a0 = Z˜(µ0) from Lemma 19, and the beliefs µ 2 µ˜i are decomposed on µ0 and
µi in the coarsening procedure. Because Z(µ) = ↵i for all µ 2 µ˜i, we obtain that´
{µ2µ˜i:µ(✓i)<1}
 (µ) [dµ] = 0. Therefore,
´
µ=µi
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] = 1.
20They may differ in sets in which Γ puts zero measure.
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Now we prove item 3:
Take i 2 {1, ..., s}. By item 2 of Lemma 19,  ˜(✓i)(µi) = 0.
Assume towards a contradiction that
´
{µ2∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0}}  (µ) (✓i) [dµ] > 0. Next
define, for each m 2 N, the open set Bm :=
 
µ 2 ∆Θ:d
 
µ,
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0}
 
> m 1
 
and notice that Bm " ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0}. Hence the contradiction assumption implies
that there exists m⇤ 2 N for which ⇠ :=
´
Bm∗
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] > 0. Thus Portmanteau
theorem (Billingsley (2013), Theorem 2.1) implies
liminfn!1
ˆ
Bm∗
 n(µ) (✓i) [dµ]  
ˆ
Bm∗
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] > 0. (37)
Next, for each l2 N, consider the following sequence of deviating strategies ( 1,l,n)
1
n=1 for
the normal type that prescribe ↵i until period t n(l) and the action a0 in each future
period. But then an application of Lemma 9 implies that there exists n⇤l 2 N such that
for all n   n⇤l , the normal type is stopped before period t n(l) with probability at least
as large as ⇠
2
under  2,n. It then follows that (for n   n
⇤
l ) this deviating strategy leads to
a payoff at least as large as
⇠
2
⇥ 
2l 1
 
u1 (↵1) + (1  2l
 1)V1
⇤
+
✓
1 
⇠
2
◆⇥ 
2l 1
 
u1 (↵1) + (1  2l
 1)u1 (a0)
⇤
,
which is greater than u1 (a0) for l
⇤ sufficiently large. Therefore, since the limit payoff
from the equilibrium strategies ( 1,n)
1
n=1 is u1 (a0) , we can conclude that  1,l∗,n leads to
a profitable deviation whenever n is sufficiently large, a contradiction.
Next assume towards a contradiction that
´
{µ2µ˜i:µ(✓i)>µ∗i}
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] > 0 and no-
tice that the coarsening procedure would imply  ˜(✓i)(µi) > 0 in this case, which would
contradict Lemma 19.
Finally, assume towards a contradiction that
´
{µ2µ˜i:µ(✓i)<µ∗i}
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] > 0 and
notice that the second statement in Lemma 17 implies that
ˆ
{µ2µ˜i:0<µ(✓i)<µ∗i}
 (µ) (✓i) [dµ] =
ˆ
{µ2µ˜i:0<µ(✓i)<µ∗i}
(1  v (µ)) (µ) (✓i) [dµ] .
Moreover, since Z (µ) = ↵i in {µ 2 µ˜i : 0 < µ (✓i) < µ
⇤
i }, letting
⇣
d (✓i)
d (✓0)
⌘
be the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of   (✓i) with respect to   (✓0), we get:
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ˆ
{µ2µ˜i:0<µ(✓i)<µ∗i }
(1  v (µ)) (µ) (✓i) [dµ] =
ˆ
{µ2µ˜i:0<µ(✓i)<µ∗i ,Z(µ)=↵i}
(1  v (µ)) (µ) (✓i) [dµ]
=
ˆ
{µ2µ˜i:0<µ(✓i)<µ∗i ,Z(µ)=↵i}
(1  v (µ)) (µ) (✓0)
✓
d  (✓i)
d  (✓0)
◆
(µ) [dµ] .
But this implies that a positive measure sets of beliefs in which Z (µ) = ↵i is projected
into µ0, which contradicts our finding that a0 = Z˜(µ0) from Lemma 19.
Finally, notice that item 2 follows immediately from items 1 and 3 above.
Corollary 4. Assume that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0). Let Γ be the limit cen-
tralized play of an equilibrium sequence. For i 2 {1, ..., s}, we have   (✓0)
  
µ˜
1
i
  
=⇣
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
⌘
. Moreover, we have   (✓0) ({µ0}) = 1 
Ps
i=1
⇣
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
⌘
.
Proof. The fact that   (✓0)
  
µ˜
1
i
  
=
⇣
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
⌘
follows from our finding from
Lemma 20 that  (µ) (✓i)
  
µ˜
1
i
  
= 1 and Bayes’ rule. The fact that   (✓0) ({µ0}) = 1 Ps
i=1
⇣
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
⌘
follows from the last finding and our finding
´
µ2{µ0,µ˜11,...,µ˜1s}
 (µ) (✓0) [dµ] =
1 from Lemma 20.
Corollary 5. Assume that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0). Let Γ be the limit centralized
play of an equilibrium sequence. We have v(µ˜1
i
) = u1(a0) u1(↵i)
V1 u1(↵i)
for every i = 1, ..., s.
Proof. Our finding in Lemma 20 that   (✓i)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
=  ˜ (✓i)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
for every i = 1, ..., s implies
that v(µ˜1
i
) = v˜(µ˜1
i
). Therefore item 1 from Lemma 19 implies v(µ˜1
i
) = u1(a0) u1(↵i)
V1 u1(↵i)
.
E.4. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 for Screening Games We show Theorems 1 and
2 together for each of the cases, i.e., when we have high-reputation priors
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
>
µ0(✓0) or low-reputation priors
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0):
E.4.1. Case 1: Inequality (3) holds
⇣P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
> µ0(✓0)
⌘
.
Claim 4. E✓i( n)
 
 Tn
 
! 1 for every i 2 {0, ..., s} . Player 1’s equilibrium payoff converges
to V1.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.
Claim 5. The equilibrium payoff of player 2 converges to
v2 :=
X
i2{0,1,...,s}
µ0(✓i)V2(✓i) +
X
i2{s+1,...,K}
µ0(✓i)u2(↵i).
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Proof. By claim 4, player 2’s payoff against each type ✓ 2 {✓0, ..., ✓s} converges to V2(✓).
Player 2’s payoff against each type ✓ 2 {✓s+1, ..., ✓K} is weakly below u2(↵i), and is
achieved by playing W against such types at every period. Hence, player 2’s limit equi-
librium payoff is bounded above by v2. By Lemma 13, player 2’s limit equilibrium payoff
is bounded below by v2. Therefore, her limit equilibrium payoff is v2.
Claim 6. E✓i( n)
 
 Tn
 
! 0 for every i > s.
Proof. Claims 5 and 4 together imply that player 2’s limit equilibrium payoff against each
type ✓ 2 {✓s+1, ..., ✓K} is equal to u2(↵i). This payoff is attainable only if E
✓i
( n)
 
 Tn
 
!
0.
Claim 7. For every i > s, and for every " > 0, limE✓i( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,{µi})<"}
 
=
1.
Proof. Follows from Claims 6 and 4, and Lemma 9.
Proof of Theorem 1 for Case 1: In the auxiliary game the unique equilibrium out-
come is that player 2 plays S with probability 1 against each type {✓0, ..., ✓s}, and plays
W against each type {✓s+1, ..., ✓K}. Claims 4 and 6 establish that reduced equilibrium
outcomes of the NE converge to the unique equilibrium reduced outcome fo the auxiliary
game..
Proof of Theorem 2 for Case 1: The only claim in the Theorem for high-reputation
priors is for types in {✓s+1, ..., ✓K}. Claim 7 shows that the claim is true in this case.
E.4.2. Case 2: Inequality (4) holds
⇣P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
< µ0(✓0)
⌘
.
Claim 8. E✓i( n)
 
 Tn
 
! 0 for every i > s.
Proof. Follows from claim 3, item 2 and Lemma 20, item 1.
Claim 9. For every i > s and for every " > 0, limE✓i( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,{µi})<"}
 
= 1.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 20, item 1 and claim 8.
Claim 10. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for every " 2 (0, "⇤) and for every i 2 {1, ..., s}:
1. limE✓i( n)
⇣
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,{µ˜1i })<"}
⌘
=  ˜2(↵i) = 1 
u1(a0) u1(↵i)
V1 u1(↵i)
.
2. limE✓i( n)
⇣
 TnI{d(µT,{µ˜1i})<"}
⌘
= 1   ˜2(↵i) =
u1(a0) u1(↵i)
V1 u1(↵i)
.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 20, item 3 and Corollary 5.
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Claim 11. There exists "⇤ > 0 such that for every " 2 (0, "⇤):
1. limE✓0( n)
 
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µ0)<",d( 1(ht;✓0),a0)<"}
 
=  ˜1(a0).
2. limE✓0( n)
⇣
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI{d(µt,µbi)<",d( 1(ht;✓0),↵i)<"}
⌘
=  ˜1(↵i) ˜2(↵i) for every i 2
{1, ..., s}.
3. limE✓0( n)
⇣
 TnI{d(µT,µbi)<"}
⌘
=  ˜1(↵i) (1   ˜2(↵i)) for every i 2 {1, ..., s}.
Proof. Item 1 follows from Corollary 4 and Lemma 19. Items 2 and 3 follow from Corollary
4, Corollary 5 and Theorem 6.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 for Case 2: In the auxiliary game, in the unique equi-
librium outcome, player 2 plays W with probability 1 against each type {✓s+1, ..., ✓K}.
This is also the case in the limit outcome behavior of the dynamic game. This follows
from Claim 8. Moreover, the first item of Theorem 2 holds from Claim 9. In the unique
equilibrium of the auxiliary game, type ✓0 randomizes among {a0,↵1, ...,↵s} with the
distribution  ˜1(↵i) =
⇣
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
⌘
for every i 2 {1, .., s}, and chooses a0 with the re-
maining probability. Moreover, if the choice is a0, player 2 plays W , and if the choice is ↵i,
player 2 plays W with probability  ˜2(↵i) = 1 
u1(a0) u1(↵i)
V1 u1(↵i)
. Claims 10 and 11 show items
2 and 3 of Theorem 2. These also imply that the discounted strategy profile distribution
conditional on each type i 2 {1, .., s} converges to the strategy profile distribution against
such a type in the equilibrium of the auxiliary game. For the normal type, the behavior
convergence follows from Corollaries 4 and 5, and from Theorem 6, as shown in Claim
11.
F. Contracting Games
We order types i 2 {1, ..., s} so that j < s implies that u1 (↵j) > u1 (↵j+1). Recall also
that u1 (↵i) 6= u1 (↵j), for any i 6= j 2 {1, .., s}.
F.1. Reputation Boundaries Let the reputation boundary be the following set:
µb := {µ 2 ∆Θ :
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
= µ(✓0)}.
µ 2 ∆Θ is above the reputation boundary if µ 2 µ+b := {µ 2 ∆Θ :
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
>
µ(✓0)} and below the reputation boundary if µ 2 µ
 b := {µ 2 ∆Θ :
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
<
µ(✓0)}.
Recall that µi is the distribution over types that puts probability 1 on type i, µi
b = µ˜1
i
is the distribution that puts probability µ⇤i on type i, and remaining probability on the
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normal type, ✓0. Recall that µ˜i := {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) > 0, µ(✓j) = 0 for all j 6= {0, i}}.
Finally, recall the coarsening procedure in Section D.
F.2. Auxiliary Results
Claim 12. For every i > s and " > 0, there exists  ⇤ 2 (0, 1) such that, for all   >  ⇤, and
any NE,  , we have P( )
 
ht (") : µ
 
ht (")
 
(✓i) > " and S has not been played
 
< ".
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that we can find " > 0, i 2 {s+ 1, ..., K} , a
sequence of NE { n} associated with a sequence of games where  n ! 1 such that
limP( n)
 
ht n (") : µ
 
ht n (")
 
(✓i) > ", S has not been played
 
  ".
Thus, taking a subsequence if necessary, we find that there exists ⌘ > 0 such that
limP( n)
0
@ ht ( "2) : µ
⇣
ht (
"
2)
⌘
(✓i) > ⌘, S has not been played,
E( n,µn)
⇣
 
T t n (⌘)
n | h
t ( "2)
⌘
< 1  ⌘
1
A   ⌘.
But notice that Lemma 9 implies the existence of a sequence of positive constants ⇠n # 0
such that
limP( n)
0
@ ht ( "2) : µ
⇣
ht (
"
2)
⌘
(✓i) > ⌘, S has not been played,
E( n, µn)
⇣
 
T t n (⌘)
n | h
t ( "2)
⌘
< 1  ⌘,
P
j 6=0,i µ
⇣
ht (
"
2)
⌘
(✓j) < ⇠n
1
A   ⌘
2
.
But notice also that S is a strict best response for player 2 conditional on any type
✓ 2 {✓0, ✓i}, which implies that player 2 has a profitable deviation at the histories h
t ( "2)
when n is sufficiently large.
Corollary 6. Take a sequence of Nash equilibria { n} of a sequence games where all
parameters except the discount factor are fixed, and the discount factors converge to one.
For every i > s, if µ0(✓i) > 0, then limE
✓i
( n)
 
 T
 
= 1.
Proof. Follows from Claim 12, and Bayes’ rule.
Claim 13. For every " > 0, there exists ⌘ > 0 such that in any NE,  , of a game with a
prior µ0 2 µ0
⌘, we have E( )
 
 T
 
> 1  ".
Proof. Suppose to the contrary. First notice that E( )
 
 T
 
< 1 " implies that E✓0( )
 
 T
 
<
1   "
2
for ⌘ small enough. Second, notice that S is a strict best response for player 2
conditional on type ✓0. Hence, player 2 can profitably deviate by playing S at h
0 when ⌘
is sufficiently small.
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Claim 14. Take i 2 {1, ..., s}. For every " > 0, there exists ⌘ > 0 and  ⇤ 2 (0, 1) such that,
for all   >  ⇤, and any NE ,  , of a game with a prior µ0 2 {µ 2 µ˜i : µ(✓i) < µ
⇤
i   "}
⌘ we
have E( )
 
 T
 
> 1  ".
Proof. For every m 2 N, take a sequence ( n) ! 1 and an associated sequence of
equilibria ( n,m) in which the prior beliefs µ0,m 2 {µ 2 µ˜i : µ(✓i) < µ
⇤
i   "}
1
m such
that limµ0,m = µ0. Let Γm,n be the generalized centralized play that implements  n,m.
Using a diagonal argument, we can find a subsequence of equilibria
 
 n(r),m(r)
 
r
(with
limr!1min{n(r),m(r)} =1) for which the sequence of corresponding generalized cen-
tralized plays converges (weakly) to a limit centralized play Γ. Consider simple coarsening
of Γ to obtain a centralized play Γ˜ which is obtained by a simple martingale split of beliefs
on {µj}j=0,1,..,K .
21 Since Γ˜ is a centralized play, we have Z˜(µi) = ↵i, and Claim 13 and
the assumption that µ0,m 2 {µ 2 µ˜i : µ(✓i) < µ
⇤
i   "}
1
m imply Z˜(µ0) = ↵i whenever
v˜(µ0) < 1. To see why, notice that if we had v˜(µ0) < 1 and Z˜(µ0) 6= ↵i, then our
learning lemma 9 would imply the existence of a constant ' > 0 such that for every ✏ > 0
we could find r⇤ 2 N such that, for every r   r⇤ we would have
E
✓0 
 n(r),m(r)
 
 
(1   n(r))
X
t<T
 tn(r)Id(µt,µ0)<✏
!
  ',
contradicting Claim 13. Since Γ˜ is incentive compatible (see item i of Theorem 7), we have
(1  v˜(µ0))   (1  v˜(µj)). Next consider the mechanism-design problem of maximizing
µ0 (✓0) (V2 (✓0) + Y0 (u2 (↵i)  V2 (✓0))) + µ0 (✓i) (V2 (✓i) + Yi (u2 (↵i)  V2 (✓i)))
subject to: 1   Y0   Yi   0.
Clearly any solution of the problem above involves Y0 = Yi = 0, whenever
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
<
µ∗i "
1 µ∗i+"
. Hence a continuity argument implies that if v˜(µ0) < 1 then player 2 would have
a profitable deviation by playing S at h0 at the equilibrium
 
 n(r),m(r)
 
for all large r.
Therefore we have v˜(µ0) = 1. Moreover, since (1  v˜(µ0))   (1  v˜(µj)), we also have
v˜(µi) = 1, which implies the claim.
Recall the coarsening procedure from Section D. We will be exclusively using the
coarsening procedure for  = 1 to obtain from a centralized play Γ the 1-coarsening of Γ,
which we denote by Γ˜.
21This is a different coarsening procedure than the one in Section D. In particular, the simple procedure
we use here projects each belief µ to the extreme points of the belief simplex.
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Lemma 21. For any ⇠ > 0 there exists a  ⇤ < 1 such that if   >  ⇤, then in any NE,
 , player 2 does not play S at any on path history ht in which
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µt(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
>
max {(1 + ⇠)µt(✓0), ⇠} .
Proof. Suppose the claim is not true. Then we can find a sequence if discount factors
( n)! 1 and an associated sequence of NE { n} with µ0,n such that
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
>
max {(1 + ⇠)µ0(✓0), ⇠}, and in which player 2 plays S at h
0. For each m 2 N, con-
sider the sequence of deviation strategies ( ˜2,n,m)
1
n=1 that plays S at the first history
ht such that : i)
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ(h
t)(✓i) 
1
m
or ii)
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ(h
t)(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
 µ(ht)(✓0) andP
i>s µ(h
t)(✓i) 
1
m
. Let  ˜n,m be the strategy profile that coincides with the sequence
of NE at all components except player 2’s strategy, which corresponds to the deviation
strategies ( ˜2,n,m)
1
n=1 . Let also Γn,m be the associated generalized centralized play that
implements  ˜n,m. Notice that, for each m2 N, we have
a) limn!1E
✓i
( ˜n,m)
 
 Tn
 
= 1 for every i > s.22
b) limn!1E( ˜n,m)
✓
(1   n)
P
t<T  
t
nI
nP
i∈{1,2,...,s} µ(h
t)(✓i)
1−µ∗i
µ∗
i
 µ(ht)(✓0), µ(ht)(✓0)  
1
m
o
◆
= 0
for i 2 {1, ..., s} .
Hence, using a diagonal argument we can find a subsequence
 
Γn(k),m(k)
 
with limk!1min{n(k),m(k)} =
1 such that property a) holds and, for each " > 0,
limk!1E( ˜n,m)
  
1   n(k)
 X
t<T
 tn(k)I
nP
i∈{1,2,...,s} µ(h
t)(✓i)
1−µ∗i
µ∗
i
 µ(ht)(✓0), µ(ht)(✓0)   "
o
!
= 0.
(38)
By Theorem 6, taking a subsequence (without relabelling) we may assume that
 
Γn(k),m(k)
 
converges to a centralized play Γ. Let Γ˜ be the 1-coarsening of Γ. Note that along the
sequence of strategy profiles, the probability that player 2 plays S at histories ht with
µ(ht) 2 µ+b converges to zero. To see why, notice that µ+b is equal to the following
countable union of open sets µ+b = [1l=1Bl, where
Bl :=
8<
:µ 2 µ+b :
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
> µ(✓0) + l
 1,
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i) > l
 1
9=
; .
It is immediate to verify that limk!1E( ˜n,m)
⇣
 TnI{µ(hT) 2 Bl}
⌘
= 0. Hence, applying The-
22This property follows from two observations: First, conditional on type ✓i, for every ✏ > 0, the joint
probability that S is not played by time t n(✏) and the posterior belief at period t n(✏) is outside of {µ0}
✏
converges to zero with n. Second, the property i) used in the stopping decision of the deviation strategies
implies that S is played when the posterior belief reaches {µ0}
✏, for small ✏.
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orem 7 item ii, we obtain that
´
Bl
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] = 0, and hence
´
µ+b:
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] = 0
by monotone convergence. Because in the coarsening procedure, the only beliefs that are
projected with positive probability to µi for i 2 {1, .., s} are beliefs µ 2 µ
+b, we get the
following property of Γ˜:
Property 1: v˜(µi) = 0 for all i 2 {1, ..., s}.
Likewise, along the sequence of strategy profiles { ˜n,m}, the probability that player 2
plays S at histories ht with µ(ht) 2 µ b converges to one. To see why, notice that µ b is
equal to the following countable union of open sets [1l=1Dl, with
Dl :=
8<
:µ 2 µ b :
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
< µ(✓0)  l
 1, µ(✓0) > l
 1
9=
; .
Using (38) and applying Theorem 7 item iii, we obtain
´
Dl:
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] =
´
Dl:
 (µ) [dµ]
and hence
´
µ−b
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] =
´
µ−b
 (µ) [dµ] again by monotone convergence. Because in
the coarsening procedure, the only beliefs that are projected with positive probability to
µ0 are those in µ
 b, we get that following property of Γ˜:
Property 2: v˜(µ0) = 1.
Finally, because the sequence satisfies property a) above we immediately obtain
Property 3: v˜(µi) = 1 for all i > s.
Consider now the problem of calculating player 2’s payoffs across all 1  coarse centralized
plays that satisfy the 3 properties above. We will show that this payoff is strictly larger
than the payoff player 2 would get if she played S at time 0.
First, we calculate player 2’s payoff from playing S right away when
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
>
µ0(✓0). Player 2’s payoff from playing S at period 0 is:
v2 :=
X
✓2Θ
µ0(✓)V2(✓).
Recall that in any centralized play, for any µ 2 µ˜i, Z˜(µ) = ↵i. Moreover, V2(µ˜
1
i
) =
µ⇤iV2(✓i) + (1  µ
⇤
i )V2(✓0), and by the definition of µ
⇤
i , V2(µ˜
1
i
) = u2(↵i). Hence, player 2’s
payoff from a fixed 1  coarse centralized play satisfying the 3 properties above is:
v02 :=
X
i21,2,...s
⇣
 ˜(µi)u2(↵i) +  ˜(µ˜
1
i )V2(µ˜
1
i )
⌘
+  ˜(µ0)V2(✓0) +
X
i>s
 ˜(µi)V2(✓i),
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where we used property 1 and V2(µ˜
1
i
) = u2(↵i) in the first line, property 2 in the
second line, and property 3 in the third line.
First observe that for i > s,  ˜(µi) = µ0(✓i). Second, observe that
X
i21,2,...s
⇣
 ˜(µi)u2(↵i) +  ˜(µ˜
1
i
)V2(µ˜
1
i
)
⌘
+  ˜(µ0)V2(✓0) =
X
i21,2,...s
⇣
 ˜(µi)u2(↵i) + µ
⇤
i  ˜(µ˜
1
i
)V2(✓i)
⌘
+  ˜(µ0)V2(✓0) +
X
i21,2,...s
⇣
 ˜(µ˜1
i
)(1  µ⇤i )V2(✓0)
⌘
.
Observe that Bayes’ rule implies that  ˜(µ0)+
P
i21,2,...s
⇣
 ˜(µ˜1
i
)(1  µ⇤i )
⌘
= µ0(✓0). There-
fore,
v02 =
X
✓2{✓0,✓s+1...,✓K }
µ0(✓)V2(✓) +
X
i21,2,...s
⇣
 ˜(µi)u2(↵i) + µ
⇤
i  ˜(µ˜
1
i
)V2(✓i)
⌘
.
Note also that by Bayes’ rule,  ˜(µi) + µ
⇤
i  ˜(µ˜
1
i
) = µ(✓i), and u2(↵i) > V2(✓i) for i 2
{1, ..., s}. Therefore, v02   v2. Moreover, again by Bayes’ rule,
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
>
µ0(✓0) implies that there exists ✏ > 0 and an i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} with  ˜(µi) > ✏. Hence,
v02 > v2+✏
0 for some ✏0 that does not depend on Γ˜. Because this is true for every 1 coarse
centralized play that satisfies the three properties above, we conclude that the deviation
strategies give player 2 a strictly higher payoff than playing S right away, no matter what
the normal type of Player 1 does.
Since the set µ+b := {µ 2 ∆Θ :
P
i2{1,2,...,s} µ(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
> µ(✓0)} can be written as a
countable union of open sets, µ+b =[1l=1Bl with
Bl :=
8<
:
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
µt(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
> max
 
(1 + l 1)µt(✓0), l
 1
 9=; ,
Lemma 21 and Theorem 7, item ii imply:
Corollary 7. If Γ = ( , v, Z) is a centralized play that is a limit of a sequence of gener-
alized centralized plays that implements a sequence of NE of a sequence of games with  n
converging to 1, then
´
Bl
 (µ)v(µ)dµ = 0 and hence by monotone convergence theorem
ˆ
µ+b
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] = 0.
For the following development, we fix a sequence of games along which all parameters
except for the discount factors are fixed, and the discount factors converge to 1. Take
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a sequence of NE of the sequence of games, and let {Γn} be a sequence of generalized
centralized plays where each element implements the corresponding Nash equilibrium of
the corresponding game, and let Γ = ( , Z, v) be a limit centralized play that this sequence
converges to weakly.
Lemma 22.
´
µ+b\[i∈{1,2,..,K}µ˜i
 (µ) [dµ] = 0.
Proof. Notice that
´
µ+b\[i∈{1,2,..,K}µ˜i
 (µ) [dµ] =
´
µ+b\[i∈{1,2,..,K}µ˜i
(v(µ) + (1  v(µ))) (µ) [dµ]
=
´
µ+b\[i∈{1,2,..,K}µ˜i
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] = 0,
where we used property 2. of centralized plays that asserts that v(µ) = 1 for almost every
posterior in ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0} and the last equality follows from Corollary 7.
Lemma 23. For every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s},
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ+b
 (µ) (1  v(µ)) I{Z(µ) = ↵i} [dµ] =
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ+b
 (µ) [dµ] .
Proof. We have
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ+b
 (µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ+b
(v(µ) + (1  v(µ))) (µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ+b
 (µ)I{Z(µ) = ↵i} [dµ]
where we first use Corollary 7 and then we use the property 3. of centralized plays that
asserts Z(µ) = ↵i when µ 2 µ˜i and v(µ) < 1.
Lemma 24. For every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s},
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ−b
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] +   ({µ0}) v ({µ0}) =
ˆ
µ2µ˜i\µ−b
 (µ) [dµ] +   ({µ0}) .
Proof. Take " > 0. Notice that for every m 2 N, we have
  ({µ0}) (1  v ({µ0})) 
ˆ
{µ0}m
−1
 (µ) (1  v(µ)) [dµ] .
It follows from Claim 13 and the fact that Γn converges weakly to Γ that we can find m
⇤ 2
N such that
´
{µ0}m
−1  (µ) (1  v(µ)) [dµ] < ", implying that   ({µ0}) (1  v ({µ0})) < ".
Take " > 0. Next notice that by monotone convergence
´
µ2µ˜i\µ−b
 (µ) (1  v(µ)) [dµ] =
limm!1
´
µ2µ˜i:µ(✓i)<µ
∗
i m
−1  (µ)(1  v(µ)) [dµ]. Take any m 2 N. It follows by Claim 14 and
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the fact that Γn converges weakly to Γ that we can find ⌘ > 0 such that
ˆ
{µ2µ˜i:µ(✓i)<µ
∗
i m
−1}⌘
 (µ) (1  v(µ)) [dµ] < ",
which implies
´
µ2µ˜i:µ(✓i)<µ
∗
i m
−1  (µ) (1  v(µ)) [dµ] < ".
Consider now a 1-coarsening of Γ, which we call Γ˜. The following Lemma characterizes
properties of Γ˜.
Lemma 25. If Γ˜ = ( ˜, v˜, Z˜) is a 1-coarsening of Γ, then:
1. For all i 2 {0, s+ 1, ..., K}, v˜(µi) = 1 whenever  ˜(µi) > 0 .
2. For all i 2 {1, ..., s}, Z˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= ↵i whenever v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
< 1, and  ˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
> 0.
3. For all i 2 {1, ..., s}, v˜(µi) = 0 and Z˜(µi) = ↵i whenever  ˜(µi) > 0.
Proof. We start with the first claim, for i = 0. Recall that in the coarsening procedure,
the only beliefs µ that are projected to µ0 with positive probability belong to the set µ
 b.
Because Γ is a centralized play, Property 2 of the centralized plays imply
ˆ
µ2µ−b\{[i∈{1,...,K}µ˜i[{µ0}}
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
µ2µ−b\{[i∈{1,...,K}µ˜i[{µ0}}
 (µ) [dµ] .
Combining this with Lemma 24 and claim 12, we obtain that
ˆ
µ2µ−b
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
µ2µ−b
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] .
Therefore, v˜(µ0) = 1 when  ˜ (µ0) > 0.
If i > s, then in the coarsening procedure, the only beliefs µ that are projected to µi
with positive probability belong to the set {µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) > 0}. But claim 12 implies
that ˆ
{µ:µ(✓i)>0}
 (µ)v(µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
{µ:µ(✓i)>0}
 (µ) [dµ] .
Hence, v˜(µi) = 1 whenever  ˜(µi) > 0 .
We now prove the second claim. This follows from 1  coarsening of a centralized play
itself being a centralized play, given by Lemma 12, and the definition of a centralized play.
We now prove the third claim. Note that in the coarsening procedure, the only beliefs µ
that are projected to µi with positive probability belong to the set µ
+b\{µ 2 ∆Θ : µ(✓i) >
0}. Lemmata 22 and 23 imply that v˜(µi) = 0 and Z˜(µi) = ↵i whenever  ˜(µi) > 0.
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Let
vi :=
 
1  v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
  
u1(↵i) + v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
V1   V1. (39)
Then, using Lemma 25, we obtain the following IC constraints for i 2 {1, 2, ..., s} in Γ˜:
v : =
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
vi +
0
@1  X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 1AV1 (40)
   ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
vi + (1   ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
)u1(↵i). (41)
Lemma 26. If v > V1, then the following hold:
1. For every j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, u1(↵j) > v and µ(✓j) > 0 implies:
1.1.  ˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
> 0.
1.2. vj = v.
1.3.  ˜(µj) = 0.
2.
P
i2{1,2,...,s}  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 1.
3.  ˜(µ0) = 0.
Proof. On the way to a contradiction to (1.1), suppose that there is a j 2 {1, 2, ..., s} with
u1(↵j) > v, and  ˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0. Then,  ˜(✓j)(µj) = 1. But then, the IC constraint for type
j is violated in inequality (40), which is a contradiction.
To prove (1.2), first notice that the incentive-compatibility constraint (40) implies that
vj  v for all j 2 {1, 2, ..., s} which satisfy u1(↵j) > v. This is because, the right hand
side of inequality (40) is a weighted average of u1(↵j) and vj, with weights summing up
to 1. Second, suppose on the way to a contradiction that vj < v. Note that, v is a convex
combination of terms vi for which  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
> 0 and the term V1 < v. Then, there exists
vi > v for some i 6= j for which  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
> 0. Moreover, vi > v implies u1(↵i) > v,
because by equation (39), vi is a convex combination of u1(↵i) and V1, and V1 < v. Hence,
there exists i 2 {1, ..., s} with u1(↵i) > v, and vi > v, which contradicts the finding in
the first sentence of this paragraph. Hence, vj = v for all j 2 {1, 2, ..., s} which satisfy
u1(↵j) > v.
To prove (1.3), notice that v = vj together with the IC constraint (40) for type j
implies vj    ˜(✓j)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
vj + (1    ˜(✓j)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
)u1(↵j). Because u1(↵j) > v = vj, we have
implies  ˜(✓j)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 1, and  ˜(✓j)(µj) = 0. Bayes’ rule then also implies  ˜(µj) = 0.
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To prove (2), notice that if u1(↵i)  v, then vi  v, because v > V1. Because v is a
weighted average of terms that are weakly below v, the terms that are strictly less than
v must have a weight equal to zero. Hence, 1 
P
i2{1,2,...,s}  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 0.
Finally, (3) follows from (2) and Bayes’ rule.
Recall that we have ordered types i 2 {1, ..., s} so that j < s implies that u1 (↵j) >
u1 (↵j+1).
Corollary 8. If v > V1, then there is j
⇤ 2 {1, 2, ..., s} such that vj = v and  ˜(µj) = 0 if
j < j⇤, and  ˜(✓j)(µj) = 1 if j > j
⇤ + 1 and j  s.
Proof. Clearly, v  u1 (↵1) . First assume that v = u1 (↵1) . In this case, (40) implies that
 ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
1
 
= 1 and  ˜(✓j)(µj) = 1 for all j > 1, which implies the result. For the remainder
of this proof assume that v < u1 (↵1) . Hence the set J := {j 2 {1, 2, ..., s} : v < u1 (↵j)}
is nonempty.
If J = {1, 2, ..., s} then Lemma 26 implies that vj = v and  ˜(µj) = 0 for every j 2 J.
We can thus set j⇤ = s, which implies the result.
If J = {1, 2, ..., k} for some k < s, let j⇤ = k + 1 and hence Lemma 26 implies that
 ˜(µj) = 0 for every j 2 J (hence for every j < j
⇤). Assume towards a contradiction that
there is r 2 {j⇤ + 1, ..., s} such that  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
r
 
> 0. Then, v is a convex combinations
of elements from {v1, ..., vj⇤} and from a nonempty subset of {vj∗+1, ..., vs} . Lemma 26
implies that vi = v for all i 2 {1, ..., j
⇤   1} . Moreover, by definition of j⇤ we have
v   vj⇤ and hence the weighted average of vi’s over {v1, ..., vj⇤} is no more than v. But
since v > u1 (↵z) if z > j
⇤ and z  s, we conclude that the weighted average of vi’s
over {vj∗+1, ..., vs} is strictly less than v. This is a contradiction, because v cannot be a
weighted average of terms less than or equal to v, where at least one term has a strictly
positive weight, and is strictly less than v.
Lemma 27. If v > V1 and if  ˜(µj) = 0 for some j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, then  ˜(✓0)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
=
µ(✓j)
µ(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
. If  ˜(µj) > 0, then  ˜(✓0)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
<
µ(✓j)
µ(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
.
Proof. If  ˜(µj) = 0, then  ˜(✓j)
 
µ˜
1
1
 
= 1. By Bayes’ rule, we have
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
= µ(✓0)
µ(✓j)
 ˜(✓0)(µ˜11)
 ˜(✓j)(µ˜11)
.
Plugging in  ˜(✓j)
 
µ˜
1
1
 
= 1 and rearranging delivers the result. The second claim follows
because if  ˜(µj) > 0, then  ˜(✓j)
 
µ˜
1
1
 
< 1, hence the equality
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
= µ(✓0)
µ(✓j)
 ˜(✓0)(µ˜11)
 ˜(✓j)(µ˜11)
delivers
the result.
Lemma 28. If µ0 2 µ
 b, then v = V1.
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Proof. Suppose on the way to a contradiction that v > V1. First assume that v = u1 (↵1).
Then,  ˜(✓0)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0 for all j   2. By Lemma 27,  ˜(✓0)(µ0) = 1    ˜(✓0)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
 
1 
P
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓j)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
> 0, because µ 2 µ b. Thus,
v :=
X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
vi +
0
@1  X
i2{1,2,...,s}
 ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 1AV1
implies that v < u (↵1), a contradiction. Next assume that v < u (↵1) . Again by Lemma
27 we have ˜(✓0)(µ0) = 1 
P
i2{1,2,...,s}  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
  1 
P
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓j)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
. If µ0 2 µ
 b,
then
P
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓j)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
< 1, hence  ˜(✓0)(µ0) > 0. But this contradicts Lemma 26,
item (3). Hence, v  V1. Moreover, v   V1, because each vi   V1. Therefore, v = V1.
Lemma 29. If µ0 2 µ
+b, then v > V1.
Proof. Note again that v   V1. Suppose on the way to a contradiction that v = V1.
Then IC constraints 40 imply that  ˜(µi) = 0 for all i 2 {1, 2, ..., s}. But then Lemma 27
implies that
P
i2{1,2,...,s}  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
=
P
i2{1,2,...,s}
µ0(✓j)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
> 1, because µ 2 µ+b, which
contradicts that  ˜(✓0) is a probability measure on ∆Θ.
We define for j 2 {1, ..., s} (with the convention that if j = 1 then
P
i2{1,2,...,j 1} µ0(✓i)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
=
0)
µj :=
8<
:µ 2 Θ :
X
i2{1,2,...,j}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
> µ(✓0) >
X
i2{1,2,...,j 1}
µ(✓i)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
9=
; .
Lemma 30. If µ0 2 µ
j for some j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, then v = u1(↵j),  ˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
> 0,  ˜(µj) > 0
and v˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0.
Proof. Notice that if µ0 2 µ
j, then µ0 2 µ
+b and hence we have v > V1 by Lemma 29.
Therefore by corollary 8, there is a j⇤ such that  ˜(µi) = 0 for all i < j
⇤, and  ˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 0
if i > j⇤ and i  s. Hence, for all i < j⇤, we have  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
, and for i = j⇤,
we have  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
 µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
, by Lemma 27. Thus, since
P
i2{1,2,...,s}  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 1,
we conclude that j = j⇤ and hence  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
for all i < j. Therefore we
have  ˜(✓0)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
=
 ˜(✓j)(µ˜1j)µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗j
µ∗j
and µ0 2 µ
j imply  ˜(µj) > 0 and  ˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
> 0.
Now we show that v = u1(↵j). First we note that because j = j
⇤, Lemma 26 implies
that v1 = ... = vj 1 = v. Moreover, v is a convex combination of v and vj and u1(↵j).
Clearly vj  u1(↵j). If vj < u1(↵j), the fact that  ˜(µj) > 0 implies that the IC constraint
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40 is violated. Therefore vj = u1(↵j). Then, v is a convex combination of v and vj, which
delivers v = u1(↵j). Finally, the definition of vj, vj = u1(↵j),u1(↵j) > V1, and  ˜(µj) > 0
imply that v˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0.
Corollary 9. If µ0 2 µ
j for some j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}, then for all i 2 {1, ..., j 1},  ˜(µi) = 0,
and for all i 2 {j + 1, ..., s},  ˜(µi) = 1.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 8, Lemma 26 and Lemma 30.
Lemma 31. If v = V1, then for every i 2 {1, 2, ..., s},  ˜(µi) = 0, and vi = V1, i.e.,
v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 1.
Proof. If v = V1, then the IC constraint 40 for type i is satisfied only if  ˜(µi) = 0 and
v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 1, because u1(↵i) > V1.
F.3. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 for Contracting Games Lemma 32 below proves
Theorem 1 for contracting games for the case in which µn,0 = µ0 2 µ
 b.
Lemma 32. For any sequence of NE { n} of a sequence of games where µn,0 = µ0 2 µ
 b
for all n, and in the nth game the discount factor is  n and  n ! 1, we have limE( n)( 
T) =
1.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that we can find a sequence of NE { n} such that
(taking a subsequence if necessary) limE( n)( 
T) < 1. Claim 12 implies that for i > s,
limE✓i( n)( 
T) = 1. Hence, there is i 2 {0, ..., s} such that limE✓i ( n)( 
T) < 1. Now recall
that Lemma 28 implies v = V1, i.e., player 1’s equilibrium payoffs converge to V1. Hence,
there is i 2 {1, ..., s} such that limE✓i ( n)( 
T) < 1. But then, player 1 can obtain a limit
payoff strictly greater than V1 by playing ↵i at every period, which is a contradiction to
his equilibrium payoff converging to V1.
Lemma 33. Assume that µ0 2 µ
j for some j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}. We have:
1. For every i > s, E✓i( n)
 
 T
 
! 1.
2. For every i 2 {j, j + 1, ..., s}, E✓i( n)
 
 T
 
! 0.
3. For every i 2 {1, ..., j   1}, E✓i( n)
 
 T
 
! u1(↵i) u1(↵j)
u1(↵i) V1
.
4. E
✓j
( n)
 
 T
 
! 0.
5. E✓0( n)
 
 T
 
!
P
i<j
⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⇣
u1(↵i) u1(↵j)
u1(↵i) V1
⌘
+
⇣
1 
P
i<j
⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⌘
.
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Proof. Item 1: Follows from the first item of Lemma 25 and Corollary 25.
Item 2: Follows from the fact that  ˜(µi) = 1 for every i 2 {j+1, ..., s} from Corollary
9, the fact v˜(µi) = 0 derived in Lemma 25, and that v˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0 from Lemma 30.
Item 3: First notice that Corollary 9 implies that  ˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 1 for every i 2 {1, ..., j 1}.
Next notice that Lemma 30 implies that v = u1 (↵j). Hence,
u1 (↵j) = v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
V1 +
 
1  v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
  
u1 (↵i) ,
implying that v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
=
⇣
u1(↵i) u1(↵j)
u1(↵i) V1
⌘
, which leads to the result.
Item 4: Lemma 30 implies v˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0, while Lemma 25 implies v˜(µi) = 0. Hence,
the result follows.
Item 5: First notice that Lemma 27 implies that  ˜(✓0)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
for every i < j,
Lemma 26 implies that  ˜(✓0)(µ0) = 0 and hence  ˜(✓0)
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
=
⇣
1 
P
i<j
⇣
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1 µ∗i
µ∗i
⌘⌘
.
Since v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
 
=
⇣
u1(↵i) u1(↵j)
u1(↵i) V1
⌘
for i < j and v˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= 0, the claim follows.
Lemma 34. Assume that µ0 2 µ
j for some j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}.
1. Take i 2 {1, 2, ..., j   1}. For every ✏ > 0,
E
✓i
( n)
 X
t 0
(1   ) tI{t<T,µt2µb,✏i }
!
!
✓
1 
u1 (↵i)  u1 (↵j)
u1 (↵i)  V1
◆
.
2. For every ✏ > 0, E
✓j
( n)
⇣P
t 0(1   ) 
t
I{t<T,{µt2µ˜j :µt(✓0)1 µ∗j}
✏
}
⌘
! 1.
3. Take i 2 {j + 1, ..., s}. For every ✏ > 0, E✓i( n)
 P
t<T(1   ) 
t
I{µt2µ✏i}
 
! 1.
4. Take i 2 {1, 2, ..., j   1}. There exists ✏ > 0 such that, for every ✏ 2 (0, ✏),
E
✓0
( n)
 X
t<T
(1   ) tI{µt2µb,✏i }
!
!
✓
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
◆✓
1 
u1 (↵i)  u1 (↵j)
u1 (↵i)  V1
◆
.
5. Take i = j. There exists ✏ > 0 such that, for every ✏ 2 (0, ✏),
E
✓0
( n)
 X
t<T
(1   ) tI{µt2µi:µt(✓i) µ∗i }✏
!
!
 
1 
X
i<j
✓
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
◆!
.
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Proof. Item 1: Corollary 9 implies  ˜(µi) = 0 for i 2 {1, ..., j  1}. Hence,  ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
1
i
 
= 1.
The coarsening procedure implies
 ˜(✓i)
 
µ˜
1
i
   
1  v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
  
=
ˆ
∆Θ
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] .
Moreover, since Γ is a centralized play, we have
ˆ
∆Θ
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
µ˜i
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] .
Finally,  ˜(µi) = 0 and  ˜(µ0) = 0 from Lemma 26 imply that
ˆ
µ˜i
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
{µ˜1
i
}
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] .
Hence, we obtain  
1  v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
  
=
ˆ
{µ˜1
i
}
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] .
A straightforward application of Portmanteau theorem (Billingsley (2013), Theorem 2.1)
implies E✓i( n)
⇣P
t 0(1   ) 
t
I{t<T,µt2µ
b,✏
i }
⌘
!
 
1  v˜
 
µ˜
1
i
  
. The last term was calculated
in item 3 from Lemma 33, implying the result.
Item 2: Notice that item 2 from Lemma 33 implies that v˜
⇣
µ˜
1
j
⌘
= v˜(µj) = 0. Next
we claim that ˆ
{µ2µ˜j :µ(✓0)>1 µ∗j}
  (✓j) (µ) [dµ] = 0.
Indeed, notice that our coarsening procedure projects posteriors in
 
µ 2 µ˜j : µ (✓0) > 1  µ
⇤
j
 
into µ0 with a strictly positive probability. Because  ˜(µ0) = 0 from Lemma 26, the claim
is true. Moreover, since every centralized play has the property that for almost every
posterior µ 2 ∆Θ\
 
[Ki=1µ˜i
 S
{µ0} with respect to the measure  , we have v(µ) = 1,
and
´
∆Θ\µ˜j
  (✓j) (µ) [dµ] = 0. Therefore,
ˆ
{µ2µ˜j :µ(✓0)1 µ∗j}
(1  v(µ))  (✓j) (µ) [dµ] =
ˆ
{µ2µ˜j :µ(✓0)1 µ∗j}
  (✓j) (µ) [dµ] = 1.
Hence, Portmanteau theorem implies
lim inf E
✓j
( n)
0
@X
t 0
(1   ) tI{t<T,{µt2µ˜j :µt(✓0)1 µ∗j}
✏
}
1
A = ˆ
{µ2µ˜j :µ(✓0)1 µ∗j}
(1 v(µ))  (✓j) (µ) [dµ] = 1.
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Item 3: Notice that Corollary 9 implies  ˜(µi) = 1 for all i 2 {j + 1, ..., s}, and Lemma
25 implies v˜(µi) = 0. This implies that
ˆ
µi
(1  v(µ))  (✓i) (µ) [dµ] = 1,
in which case a straightforward application of Portmanteau theorem implies the result.
Items 4 and 5: Using Lemma 26, the arguments in items 1 and 2 above, and Bayes’
rule we see that
´
∆Θ
(1  v(µ))  (✓0) (µ) [dµ]
=
P
i<j
´
µib
(1  v(µ))  (✓0) (µ) [dµ] +
´
{µ2µj :µ(✓j) µ
∗
j}
(1  v(µ))  (✓0) (µ) [dµ] ,
ˆ
{µ2µi:µ(✓j) µ
∗
j}
(1  v(µ))  (✓0) (µ) [dµ] =
 
1 
X
i<j
✓
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
◆!
,
and, for every i < j,
ˆ
µib
(1  v(µ))  (✓0) (µ) [dµ] =
✓
µ0(✓i)
µ0(✓0)
1  µ⇤i
µ⇤i
◆✓
1 
u1 (↵i)  u1 (↵j)
u1 (↵i)  V1
◆
.
Take ✏ so that every pair of sets in the collection
n
µb,✏1 , ...., µ
b,✏
j   1,{µ 2 µi :µ (✓i)   µ
⇤
i }
✏
o
has empty intersection. Using these findings, for every ✏ < ✏, a straightforward application
of Portmanteau theorem implies items 4 and 5.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 when µ0 2 µ
+b: Lemma 33 and Lemma 34 will be used
to complete the proof of Theorems 1 and 3 for contracting games for the case in which
j 2 {1, 2, ..., s}. We start with Theorem 1. Lemma 33 establishes the the convergence
of the equilibrium reduced outcomes of the dynamic games to the equilibrium reduced
outcome of the auxiliary game for every commitment type, ✓i, i > 0. For type ✓0, the
result follows from properties 4 and 5 of Lemma 34 and Theorem 6.
Now we turn to Theorem 3. For item 1, assume as in the claim that j < s and take
i 2 {j + 1, ..., s} . Property 2 of Lemma 33 and property 3 of lemma 34 imply the result.
For item 2, assume as in the claim that j > 1 and take i 2 {1, ..., j   1} . The result
follows from property 3 of Lemma 33 and property 1 of Lemma 34. Next notice that item
3 follows from property 4 of Lemma 34 and property 2 of Lemma 34. Consider now item
4. This follows from property 3 of Lemma 33, property 4 of Lemma 34, Bayes’ rule and
Theorem 6. Finally notice that item 5 follows from property 5 of Lemma 34 and Theorem
6.
89
